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THE MONUMENTAL LEGACY OF THE
ANTIQUITIES ACT OF 1906
Mark Squillace*
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 18, 1996, President Bill Clinton stood on the south
rim of the Grand Canyon and announced the creation of the 1.7
million acre Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument in
southern Utah.' The proclamation, which was made shortly before
the 1996 presidential election under the Antiquities Act of 1906,2
brought cheers from the environmental community.' But it caused
an uproar among the political establishment in Utah and other
parts of the West, reminiscent of other political battles over national
monument proclamations, including the very land on which the
President chose to make his announcement.4
Even when viewed as an isolated use of the Antiquities Act,
history likely will regard the Grand Staircase-Escalante decision as
one of the Clinton Administration's most significant land protection
initiatives. But it was only a beginning. Following his re-election
in 1996, and acting on the recommendations of Secretary of the
* Professor, University of Toledo College of Law. The author served as a special assistant
to the Interior Department Solicitor, John Leshy, during the last year of the Clinton
Administration. During a portion of that time he worked directly with Interior Secretary
Bruce Babbitt in the development of a myriad of monument proposals that were pending
before the Administration. The author gratefully acknowledges the comments and helpful
suggestions offered by John Leahy, Molly McUsic, James Rasband, Maureen Ryan, Joseph
Feller, and Robert Keiter on an earlier draft of this Article.
Proclamation No. 6920, 3 C.F.R. 64 (1996). It was no accident that Clinton chose to
announce the establishment of the new Utah monument in Arizona. Clinton narrowly lost
Arizona in the 1992 presidential election, but won the state in 1996. Electoral Votes by State,
1789-1996, available at http://www.archives.gov/federaLregister/electoraLcollege/votes-
index.html#state (last visited Feb. 8,2003). Utah went to the Republican candidates in both
elections, and was never seriously contested. Id.
2 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-33 (2000).
' See generally, e.g., Carl Pope, Earth to Congress, SIERRA MAGAZINE, May/June 1997.
See inlra notes 92-110 and accompanying text.
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Interior Bruce Babbitt,5 Clinton embarked on what was arguably
the most ambitious expansion of the national monument system
ever, exceeding even the prodigious efforts of the Theodore Roosevelt
administration nearly one hundred years earlier." By the end of his
second term, Clinton had proclaimed twenty-two new or expanded
national monuments,7 thereby adding approximately six million
acres to the national monument system.' Although the number and
size of the monuments designated by President Clinton is remark-
5 On several occasions when Babbitt encountered President Clinton he would hand him
an index card. Paul Larmer, Mr. Babbitt's Wild Ride, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Feb. 12, 2001,
at 1. On one side of the card Babbitt listed the monuments created by Theodore Roosevelt,
and on the other side were those created by Clinton. Id. During his three years in office
following passage of the Antiquities Act, Roosevelt created eighteen national monuments
encompassing approximately 1.5 million acres. See infra Appendix. Ultimately, Clinton
surpassed Roosevelt's record by proclaiming nineteen new monuments and expanding three
more, thereby designating nearly six million acres of new land as national monuments. Id.
6 As noted above, Roosevelt designated eighteen monuments covering approximately 1.5
million acres of land. Roosevelt, of course, was also known for the large scale forest land
withdrawals that he made under the General Revision (Forest Reserves) Act of 1891, also
called the Creative Act of 1891. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 561, § 24, 26 Stat. 1095, 1103,
repealed by 90 Stat. 2792 (1976). Clinton's twenty.two monuments encompassing nearly six
million acres are in some ways more remarkable than Roosevelt's, because Roosevelt was
setting aside areas at a time when far fewer people had settled the West, and the population
centers and political power were primarily in the East. Moreover, Clinton's land legacy was
hardly limited to monument proclamations. See infra notes 239-46 and accompanying text.
Indeed, as described below, several significant legislative acts protecting large tracts of land
were negotiated at the end of the 2000 legislative session, in large part because of the threat
that a monument would otherwise be proclaimed. See infra notes 237-46 and accompanying
text. Most notable, because of its size and unique character, is the Northwestern Hawaiian
Islands Coral Reef Ecosystem Reserve, which encompasses 84 million acres of submerged
lands. Exec. Order No. 13,196, 66 Fed. Reg. 7,395 (Jan. 18, 2001). In addition, in one of the
last acts of the Clinton Administration, the Forest Service issued a rule protecting 58.5
million acres of roadless lands in our national forests. 66 Fed. Reg. 3,245 (Jan. 19, 2001).
' Nine of these monuments were proclaimed during the waning hours of the Clinton
Administration. See, e.g., Proclamation Nos. 7392-7399, 66 Fed. Reg. 7,335-7,367 (Jan. 17,
2001); Proclamation No. 7402, 66 Fed. Reg. 7855 (Jan. 19, 2001). Citations to all of the
monument proclamations are set forth in the Table attached as an Appendix to this Article.
See infra Appendix.
' Roosevelt was president for less than three years after the Antiquities Act was passed,
and his eighteen monuments were important not only because of the lands they protected but
also because of the precedent that his efforts set for future presidents. The only other
president whose Antiquities Act decisions might compare with Clinton's was Jimmy Carter,
who still holds the record for protecting the most land. See infra Appendix. Carter's
proclamations were remarkable, but they were limited to a single set of decisions designed
to protect certain Alaskan lands from development pending Congressional action. See infra
notes 180-216 and accompanying text.
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able, the individual decisions fall squarely within a long tradition of
presidential action under the Antiquities Act to protect special
places that were, for a variety of reasons, unlikely to receive
congressional protection.' Nonetheless, Clinton's actions have
renewed a longstanding debate over the Antiquities Act, and have
prompted calls for repealing or modifying the broad authority
accorded the President under this arcane law.'"
This Article explores the Antiquities Act and its long and
remarkable legacy. It describes the history of the law," the special
places that have received its protection, 2 and the many controver-
sies that it has sparked over the years."3 It then considers the
myriad of legal and policy issues that are raised by the law,' 4 and its
continuing utility and evolution as a conservation management
tool.'5 Finally, the Article discusses proposals to reform or repeal
the Antiquities Act."1
Some critics of the law have argued that the law divests Congress
of its constitutional responsibility to "make all needful rules ...
respecting the . . . property belonging to the United States. ' 7
' John Leshy, who served as the Interior Department Solicitor during the full eight-year
tenure of President Clinton and Secretary Babbitt, has described more generally the long
tradition of public lands protection by the executive branch. See generally John Leshy,
Shaping the West: The.Role ofthe Ezecuti Branch, 72 U. COL L. REV. 287 (2001),
"o See, e.g., James R. Rasband, Utah's Grand Staircase: The Right Path to Wilderness
Preservation?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 483, 562 (1999); John F. Shepherd, Up the Grand
Staircase: Executive Withdrawals and the Future of the Antiquities Act, 43 ROCKY MTN. MIN.
L. INST. 4-1, 4-37 to 4-43 (1997) (discussing past efforts to amend or repeal Antiquities Act and
Act's future); see also National Monument Fairness Act of 1997, S. 477, 105th Cong. (1997)
(requiring that all monuments in excess of 5000 acres are approved in advance by Congress);
Public Lands Management Participation Act of 1997, S. 691, 105th Cong. (1997) (requiring
opportunity for public involvement in formulation of plans relating to declaration of National
monuments); National Monument Fairness Act of 1997, H.R. 1127, 105th Cong. (1997)
(requiring that any National monument proclamation that protects more than 50,000 acres
"shall cease to be effective two years after issued unless approved by Congress").
" See infra notes 20-70 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 71-265 and accompanying text.
13 Id.
"4 See infra notes 206-548 and accompanying text.
15 Id.
16 See infra notes 549-612 and accompanying text.
17 U.S, CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. This argument was specifically rejected, however, in two
recent decisions from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
Tulare County v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1138, 1142-43 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Mountain States Legal
Found. v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1132, 1136-37 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
2003] 475
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Others argue that the statute's lack of a public process is at odds
with the fundamental tenets of a participatory democracy.' 8 But the
Congress recognized many years ago that it was in no position to
manage the public lands, and over the years it has delegated broad
land management authority to a host of federal agencies.!' More-
over, the Antiquities Act is hardly unique in denying the public a
role in the decisionmaking process, and it is arguably the very lack
of process that has allowed the Antiquities Act to serve the Amer-
ican people so well over its long history. This assessment is not
diminished by the plethoric use of the Antiquities Act during the
Clinton Administration. On the contrary, Clinton's actions serve to
confirm that the authority to proclaim national monuments should
not be denied to future presidents.
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE ANTIQUITIES ACT
Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the Antiquities Act of
1906 is its brevity. The heart of the law consists of two sentences:
The President of the United States is authorized, in his
discretion, to declare by public proclamation historic
landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and
other objects of historic or scientifio interest that are
situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the
Government of the United States to be national monu-
ments, and may reserve as a part thereof parcels of land,
the limits of which in all cases shall be confined to the
smallest area compatible with the proper care and
management of the objects to be protected. When such
'8 See infra notes 565-70 and accompanying text.
'9 The most prominent land management agencies are the United States Forest Service,
the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the National Park Service, and the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service. George Cameron Coggins, The Developing Law of Land Use
Planning on the Federal Lands, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 307, 308 (1990). The Forest Service and
BLM manage land under broad organic legislation enacted by the Congress. 16 U.S.C. §§
1600-1614 (2000); 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (2000). Professor Coggins notes that, while the
Park Service has only partial planning authority, and the Fish and Wildlife Service has more,
both agencies "routinely prepare land use plans." COGGINS ET AL., supra, at 308.
[Vol. 37:473476
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objects are situated upon a tract covered by a bona fide
unperfected claim or held in private ownership, the
tract, or so much thereof as may be necessary for the
proper care and management of the object, may be
relinquished to the Government, and the Secretary of
the Interior is authorized to accept the relinquishment
of such tracts in behalf of the Government of the United
States.20
Most commentators who have considered the Act and its legislative
history have concluded that it was designed to protect only very
small tracts of land around archaeological sites. 1 The complex
political history of the law, however, suggests that some of its
promoters intended a much broader design.
There seems little doubt that the impetus for the law that would
eventually become the Antiquities Act was the desire of archaeolo-
gists to protect aboriginal objects and artifacts. Following the
discovery of such noted archaeological sites as Chaco Canyon and
Mesa Verde, as well as dozens of lesser sites, private collecting of
artifacts on public lands by both professionals and amateurs
threatened to rob the public of its cultural heritage.22 A consensus
2o 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2000). In addition to this provision, the Antiquities Act authorizes the
Secretary of the Interior, Agriculture, or Army to issue rules and require permits from
persons excavating archaeological sites or gathering objects of antiquity, on lands under the
jurisdiction of these agencies. 16 U.S.C. § 432 (2000). Penalties are imposed for the unlawful
excavation, gathering, or destruction of historic or prehistoric monuments or ruins, or objects
of antiquity located on lands owned or controlled by the United States. 16 U.S.C. § 433
(2000). While these provisions remain in force, they have largely been superseded by the
requirements of the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470U
(2000). The Department of the Interior has promulgated regulations that implement the
requirements of both of these laws. 43 C.F.R. pt. 7 (2000).
21 See, e.g., David H. Getches, Managing the Public Lands: The Authority of the Executive
to Withdraw Lands, 22 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 279,301-02 (1982); Rasband, supra note 10, at 501;
Shepherd, supra note 10, at 4-11 to 4-13.
2 See HAL ROTHMAN, PRESERVING DIFFERENT PASTS 1-33 (1989). Rothman describes the
great uncertainty regarding federal ownership of artifacts found on public lands before the
passage of the Antiquities Act in the context of the discovery of a stone dish by a private
collector in Sequoia National Park. Id. at 1-5. Rothman also notes that the Antiquities Act
came too late for some cultural resources such as the pictographs and ruins of the San




had emerged among policy officials that this practice had to be
stopped and that even surveys conducted by qualified researchers
had to be carefully regulated.2" But officials from within the
Department of the Interior consistently pushed for more expansive
authority than was needed to address this specific problem,24 and
the Department's persistence helps to explain why the language
included in the final legislation was not as limiting as some in
Congress may have preferred.
In 1899, the American Association for the Advancement of
Science and the Archaeological Institute of America separately
established committees that subsequently joined together under the
leadership of Dr. Thomas Wilson to draft a bill to protect a wide
range of archaeological, historical, and aesthetic objects.25 The
broad language of Wilson's bill was incorporated in large part into
a bill introduced by Congressman Jonathan Dolliver of Iowa on
February 5, 1900.26 That bill, H.R. 8066, authorized the President
to:
[w]ithdraw from sale and set aside for use as a public
park or reservation ...any prehistoric or primitive
works, monuments, cliff dwellings, cave dwellings,
cemeteries, graves, mounds, forts, or any other work of
prehistoric or primitive man, and also any natural
formation of scientific or scenic value of interest, or
natural wonder or curiosity on the public domain
together with such additional area of land surrounding
or adjoining the same, as he may deem necessary for the
2 Ronald F. Lee, THE ANTIQUITIES ACT OF 1906, at http://www.cr.nps.gov/aad/pubs,
reprinted in Raymond Harris Thompson, An Old and Reliable Authority, 42 J. OF THE S.W.
198 (2000). Lee's manuscript offers an excellent and comprehensive review of the history
behind the passage of the Antiquities Act. It was originally published in 1970. Id. Among
other things, Lee notes that Richard Wetherill and several of his brothers had "dismantled
and shipped complete rooms to the American Museum of Natural History.. ." from the ruins
at Chaco Canyon, and that these and other instances "hastened the movement for
administrative and legislative action in Washington, D.C." Id.
24 Id.
2 Id.
2 H.R. 8066, 56th Cong. (1900).
478 [Vol. 37:473
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proper preservation or suitable enjoyment of said
reservation.27
Two competing bills were introduced in the House of Representa-
tives by Congressman John F. Shafroth of Colorado." The first of
these, H.R. 8195, would merely have made it a federal crime for an
unauthorized person to harm an aboriginal antiquity on public
land.29 The second bill, H.R. 9245, would have required a survey of
public lands in four Western states and territories, authorized the
Secretary to reserve tracts of land up to 320 acres in size to protect
prehistoric ruins, and placed these lands in the custody of the
Bureau of American Ethnology in the Smithsonian Institution.3 All
three bills were referred to the House Committee on Public Lands
chaired by Congressman John Lacey of Iowa."1
Lacey sent the three bills to Secretary of the Interior Ethan
Hitchcock who referred them to Binger Hermann, Commissioner of
the General Land Office. 2 While Hermann supported the general
idea of preserving archaeological sites found on the public lands, he
plainly preferred a bill that would grant the President broad
authority to protect a wide range of resources.33 Hermann noted, for
example, "the need for legislation which shall authorize the setting
apart of tracts of public land as National Parks, in the interest of
science and for the preservation of scenic beauties and natural
wonders and curiosities, by Executive Proclamation, in the same
manner as forest reservations are created." 4
" H.R. 8066, 56th Cong. (1900); see also LEE, supra note 23, at ch. 6 (quoting and
referencing Wilson's bill).
" LEE, supra note 23, at ch. 6.
2 H.R. 8195, 56th Cong. (1900).
* H.R. 9245, 56th Cong. (1900). Colorado gained admission to the Union in 1876. Act
of Mar. 3, 1876, ch. 17, 19 Stat. 5, 6. Utah followed in 1896. J. Res. 8, 29 Stat. 461 (1896).
Arizona and New Mexico remained territories until 1912. S.J. Res. 8, 62d Cong., 37 Stat. 39
(1911).
"' LEE, supra note 23, at ch. 6.
3 Id.
3 Id.
' Robert Claus, Information About the Background of the Antiquities Act of 1906, at 3
(May 10, 1945) (on deposit with Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation of the National
Park Service). The report contains excerpts of the Annual Report of the Commissioner of the
General Land Office for 1901, p. 154; for 1902, pp. 115-17; for 1904, pp. 322-23; for 1905, p.
2003] 479
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Dissatisfied with all three of the bills that Lacey had referred to
the Department, Hermann proposed a separate bill that embodied
his more ambitious goals.8" Congressman Lacey introduced H.R.
11021, entitled "A Bill to establish and administer national parks,
and for other purposes," at the Department's request on April 26,
1900.36 H.R. 11021 authorized the President to:
[s]et apart and reserve tracts of public land, which for
their scenic beauty, natural wonders or curiosities,
ancient ruins or relics, or other objects of scientific or
historic interest, or springs of medicinal or other proper-
ties it is desirable to protect and utilize in the interest of
the public; and the President shall, by public proclama-
tion, declare the establishment of such reservations and
the limits thereof.8
7
While the law that was ultimately enacted does not authorize
protection of lands for their "scenic beauty" or "natural wonders," it
embraces the notion of protecting "objects of scientific or historic
interest," which apparently was first proposed in Hermann's bill.3"
40; for 1906, pp. 47-48.
86 LEE, supra note 23, at ch. 6.
as Id.
" H.R. 11021, 58th Cong. § 1 (1900). The bill further declared that "such reservations
shall be known as national parks and shall be under the exclusive control of the Secretary of
the Interior, who is hereby empowered to prescribe such rules and regulations and establish
such services as he shall deem necessary for the care and management of the same." Id. §
2. At the time that Hermann proposed this legislation, only six national parks had been
designated, and one (Mackinac) had been abolished. LEE, supra note 23, at ch. 6. By
comparison, forty-one forest reserves encompassing forty-six million acres had been
designated. Id. At the time Hermann proposed this legislation, these forest reserves were
under his jurisdiction. Id. In the Forest Transfer Act of 1905, 16 U.S.C. §§ 472, 476, 495, 551,
554, 615(b), however, these reserves were transferred to the Division of Forestry in the
Department of Agriculture. LEE, supra note 23, at ch. 6. Gifford Pinchot became the first
Chief Forester of the new agency. Id.
' Wilson's earlier draft bill would have authorized protection ofprehistoric and scientific
objects, but the language contained in Hermann's bill was much closer to the language
ultimately enacted. Id.
480 [Vol. 37:473
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This language has proved dispositive in the cases that have
supported an expansive interpretation of the Antiquities Act.
39
To be sure, H.R. 11021 met resistance in the House largely
because of its expansive language.4" In a letter dated April 19, 1900,
Congressman Lacey wrote to Secretary Hitchcock expressing the
views of the entire committee:
[t]hat it would not be wise to grant authority in the
Department of the Interior to create National parks
generally, but that it would be desirable to give the
authority to set apart small reservations, not exceeding
320 acres each, where the same contained cliff dwellings
and other prehistoric remains.41
Some members of Congress, particularly those from the western
United States, did not want to grant the President broad authority
to establish large new reserves on federal lands, in light of their
experience with Theodore Roosevelt and his decisions setting aside
vast tracts of public land as forest reserves under the General
See, e.g., Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 130, 132, 141-42 (1976); Cameron
v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 455 (1920).
o LEE, supra note 23, at ch. 6.
Claus, supra note 34, at 5.
2003] 481
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Revision Act of 1891.42 Nonetheless, the Department continued to
promote broader authority.49
In the final push that eventually led to passage of the Antiquities
Act, the focus within the House Public Lands Committee remained
on archaeological artifacts." The chief architect of the bill that
eventually became law was Dr. Edgar Lee Hewett. 45 Hewett was
one of the foremost experts on the Indian ruins of the southwestern
United States, and he was well known within both academic and
political circles.46 In 1902, Hewett took Congressman Lacey on a
tour of archaeological sites in the southwestern United States.47 In
1904, W.A. Richards, the Commissioner of the General Land Office
who succeeded Binger Hermann, asked Hewett to review the
problem of drafting legislation that would preserve archaeological
and other historic sites on federal lands. 48  Like his predecessor,
however, Richards plainly supported legislation that would
authorize the President to protect lands for broad purposes,
including national parks.4 s
42 Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 561, § 24, 26 Stat. 1095,1103, repealed by 90 Stat. 2792(1976).
Shortly after the Creative Act was passed, President Harrison set aside the Yellowstone Park
Forest Reserve. See A Proclamation Rededicating the National Forests of the Yellowstone
Park Timber Land Reserve, at http://fs.iorge.com/archieves/centenniaL1991/proclamation
presidentbush.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2003). Over the next two years he set aside an
additional fourteen reserves encompassing thirteen million acres of public land. SAMUEL
TRASK DANA, FOREST AND RANGE POLICY: ITS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 102
(1956). Grover Cleveland set aside an additional fifteen forest reserves, and William
McKinley added another seventeen. SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF
EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890-1920, at 47 (1959).
Subsequently, during his first year in office from 1901-1902, President Theodore Roosevelt
set aside more than fifteen million acres on thirteen forest reserves. Id. Many members of
Congress from the Western states were angry about these reservations, and in 1907 they
persuaded the Congress to revoke the President's authority to create new forest reserves in
six western states. Id. Before signing the legislation, President Roosevelt set aside an
additional seventy-five million acres of land, thereby increasing total forest reserves to more
than 150 million acres in 159 national forests. Id.
'3 HAYS, supra note 42, at 122.





'4 Richards was a former governor of Wyoming, but he apparently did not share the
federalist views of some of his Western colleagues. In a letter to the Secretary of the Interior
written in 1904, Richards promoted the need for "a general enactment, empowering the
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Hewett responded with a memorandum dated September 3, 1904
that reviewed all of the important known archaeological sites in
Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, and Arizona that might be protected
under the proposed law.5" In drafting the bill that became the
Antiquities Act, however, Hewett consulted with officials from the
affected government agencies, and surely was influenced by Interior
Department officials, especially Commissioner Richards, for whom
he had conducted the review.5" Thus, it should have been no
surprise that the final bill reflected at least some of the Depart-
ment's long-held views on the need for more expansive legislation.
In particular, although the words "historic" and "scientific" were
flipped, the final bill included the basic language from H.R. 11021
that authorized the protection of "objects of scientific or historic
interest."5 Likewise, while the bill limited reserves to "the smallest
area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects
to be protected," it did not propose that reserves be limited in size
to 320 or 640 acres as several predecessor bills had proposed.53
Finally, the bill introduced the term "national monument" into the
public lands lexicon.54
On January 9, 1906, Congressman Lacey introduced Hewett's bill
in the House of Representatives as H.R. 11016."5 An identical
companion bill was introduced in the Senate on February 26, 1906
by Senator Thomas Patterson of Colorado as S. 4698.56 The
President to set apart, as national parks, all tracts of public land which ... it is desirable to
protect and utilize in the interest of the public." Letter from W.A. Richards, Commissioner,
General Land Office, to Secretary of the Interior (Oct. 5, 1904), quoted in Robert Righter,
National Monuments to National Parks: The Use of the Antiquities Act of 1906, 20 W. HIST.
Q. 281, 282 (1989).
80 Hewett's memorandum appears as an Appendix to H.R. REP. No. 3704, 58th Cong.,
Appendix (1905). See also LEE, supra note 23, at 6.5 See LEE, supra note 23, at ch. 6.
52 Id. Hewitt's bill uses the phrase as it appears in the Antiquities Act--"objects of
historic or scientific interest." The bill omitted, however, the language that would have
allowed protection of lands for their "scenic beauty" and "natural wonders." Id.
53Id.
54 Id.
m H.R. 11016, 59th Cong. (1906).
5 S. 4698, 59th Cong. (1906); see also LEE, supra note 23, at ch. 6 (noting companion bill
in Senate). The text of these bills is reproduced in 4 EDMUND B. ROGERS, HISTORY OF
LEGISLATION RELATING TO THE NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM, Appendix A (1958).
2003] 483
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legislation passed both houses of Congress without change and was
signed into law by President Theodore Roosevelt on June 8, 1906.57
There was very little debate over Hewett's bill, and thus Con-
gress's understanding of what Hewett intended is not entirely
clear. 8 Those commentators who claim that Hewett's proposed
legislation was designed to encompass only small tracts of public
lands frequently cite a colloquy between Congressman Lacey and
Congressman John H. Stephens of Texas.59 The House Report on
the legislation further seems to support a narrow reading of the
law. 0 But the compromise language proposed by Hewett does not
reflect an intent to limit the President's authority as Lacey and
others may have assumed. On the contrary, as noted above, Hewett
had specifically included-most likely at the urging of Interior
Department officials-language authorizing the President to
proclaim as national monuments "objects of historic or scientific
interest," and had specifically avoided the acreage limits of the
earlier bills while making clear that the area to be protected must
still be the smallest area compatible with the protection of the
67 LEE, supra note 23, at ch. 6.
" See ROTHMAN, supra note 22, at 49 (describing Antiquities Act as "a hasty compromise"
that "left many issues unresolved").
See supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also 40 CONG. REC. 7,888 (1906):
Mr. LACEY: There has been an effort made to have national parks in
some of these regions, but this will merely make small reservations where
the objects are of sufficient interest to preserve them....
Mr. STEPHENS of Texas: How much land will be taken off the market
in the Western States by the passage of the bill?
Mr. LACEY: Not very much. The bill provides that it shall be the
smallest area necesetry [sic] for the care and maintenance of the objects
to be preserved.
Mr. STEPHENS of Texas: Would it be anything like the forest-reserve
bill, by which seventy or eighty million acres of land in the United States
have been tied up?
Mr. LACEY: Certainly not. The objective is entirely different. It is to
preserve these old objects of special interest and the Indian remains in the
pueblos of the Southwest, whilst the other reserves the forests and the
water courses.
Id. In describing the colloquy, Hal Rothman notes that "[t]he situation deceived beth Lacey
and Stephens." ROTHMAN, supra note 22, at 48.
60 H.R. REP. No. 59-2224, at 1 (1906) ("The bill proposes to create small reservations
reserving only so much land as may be absolutely necessary for the preservation of these
interesting relics of prehistoric times.").
484
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objects.6 Thus, far from demonstrating that Hewett's bill was
designed to limit the President's authority to small tracts of land,
the legislative history suggests a more ambiguous conclusion."
Hewett's bill established a middle ground between the "postage
stamp" archaeological sites favored by western legislators, and the
large scale reservations that could be designated solely for their
scenic beauty, as was favored by the Department of Interior.63 It is
hardly surprising that a bill drafted by a representative for the
Interior Department would favor the Department's longstanding
efforts to promote broad executive powers to protect large tracts of
land for a wide range of uses.6
Thus far, the only judicial analysis of the legislative history of the
Antiquities Act comes from an unpublished opinion in a case
involving a challenge to various Alaska monuments proclaimed by
President Carter.8 In that case, the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska reviewed various proposals before
Congress during the time it was considering the Antiquities Act,
including a proposal by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachu-
setts that would have protected only historic and prehistoric ruins,
monuments, archaeological objects, and antiquities on the public
lands."' Noting the broader language that Congress ultimately
approved, the court concluded that the phrase "objects of historically
scientific interest.., was indeed intended to enlarge the authority
of the President."
67
6, LEE, supra note 23, at ch. 6; ROTHMAN, supra note 22, at 47.
6 ROTHMAN, supra note 22, at 47-48.
63 Id. at 47.
LEE, supra note 23, at ch. 6.
Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrews, 14 Envtl. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1853 (D. Alaska 1980).
6 S. 5603, 58th Cong. (1904); see also LEE, supra note 23, at ch. 6.
6' Anaconda Copper, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1854. The court also found it
compelling that presidents have over the years established a pattern of construing the law
broadly over the course, its history, and that Congress refused to restrict the President's
authority under the Antiquities Act when it enacted the Federal Land Policy and Manage-
ment Policy Act in 1976 despite having restricted executive power under a host of other laws
authorizing the reservation of public lands. Id.
20031 485
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:473
Legislative history and congressional intent aside,68 the plain
language of the Antiquities Act supports a broad construction of the
President's authority to protect large tracts of land." The plain
language of the Act, more than any legislative history, is likely to
ensure judicial support for Antiquities Act proclamations that
protect large landscapes arguably relevant to science and history.7"
" Davis v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989) ("Legislative history is
irrelevant to the interpretation of an unambiguous statute."); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437
U.S. 153, 184 n.29 (1978) C'When confronted with a statute which is plain and unambiguous
on its face, we ordinarily do not look to legislative history as a guide to its meaning.").
69 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2000).
70 In Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920), the Supreme Court had no trouble
finding that the more than 800,000-acre Grand Canyon National Monument was "an object
of unusual scientific interest." Id. at 455-56. It might be argued that virtually all public land
has some scientific value and that, therefore, the Antiquities Act constitutes an unlawful
delegation of legislative power to the executive branch because it fails to establish a
sufficiently "intelligible principle" to guide the exercise of the President's authority. SeeJ.W.
Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (stating "intelligible principle"
necessary for lawful delegation of legislative power). Recently, in Whitman v. American
Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 457, 490 (2001), the Court rejected a claim that the Clean Air
Act, which requires the EPA to set ambient air quality standards "requisite to protect the
public health," failed to state an "intelligible principle." The Court found that while "the
degree of agency discretion that is acceptable varies according to the scope of the power
congressionally conferred[,J . . . . even in sweeping regulatory schemes we have never
demanded... that statutes provide a 'determinate criterion' for saying 'how much [of the
regulated harm] is too much.'" Id. at 475; see also Carol Hardy Vincent & Pamela Baldwin,
National Monuments and the Antiquities Act. Recent Designations and Issues, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV. REP. RL30528, at 11 (Jan. 15, 2001), available at http://www.cnie.org/nle/
crsreports/public/pub-15.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2003). So too here, the government need
not show that the Antiquities Act articulates how much scientific value national monument
lands must have in order to survive a nondelegation challenge. See, e.g., Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414, 424 (1944); Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26
(1943). Moreover, the Supreme Court has expressed a preference for construing statutes
narrowly to avoid a constitutional question regarding the scope of the statutory delegation.
See Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980). This does not mean
that the Court will construe a statute unreasonably so as to avoid a constitutional problem,
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 459, 485 (2001), but it does mean that the
Court will "ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which [a
constitutional] question maybe avoided." Public Citizen v. United States Dep'tof Justice, 491
U.S. 440, 465-66 (1989) (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)). Thus, while a court
might reasonably construe the Antiquities Act so as to require that objects of "scientific
interest" meet some minimum threshold of significance in order to qualify for monument
status, the statute itself would not likely be deemed unconstitutional. Indeed, this was the
conclusion reached by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
in two recent opinions affirming the dismissal of challenges to five monuments proclaimed
by President Clinton. Tulare County v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1138,1142 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Mountain
States Legal Found. v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1132, 1136-37 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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III. THE LEGACY OF THE ANTIQUITIES ACT
To appreciate the legacy of the Antiquities Act, it is helpful to
consider its place alongside other conservation authorities. At the
time it was enacted in 1906, Congress had enacted no other laws
that specifically authorized the President to set aside lands for
preservation purposes. Congress had previously set aside Yellow-
stone National Park in 18727' and had enacted the General Revision
Act of 1891, which authorized the President to set aside forest
reserves.72 But while forests were generally withdrawn from
disposition and entry under the homestead and other laws, they
were not protected from other forms of development, especially
mining. 73 As a result of Gifford Pinchot's utilitarian approach to
forest management, the focus of the Forest Service was on the
conservation and use of forest resources, and not on their preserva-
tion.74
Presidents have asserted an implied power to reserve lands for
conservation purposes, and this authority was ultimately upheld in
United States v. Midwest Oil Co.75 But at the time of the Antiquities
Act, no legislative authority was available that provided for the
preservation of public lands. Thus, when enacted in 1906, the
71 Act of Mar. 1, 1872, ch. 21-24., 17 Stat. 32 (1872) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
21(2000)).
72 Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 561, § 24, 26 Stat. 1095, 1103 (1891), repealed 90 Stat. 2792
(1976).
73 See 16 U.S.C. § 475 (2000) C'[1]t is not the purpose or intent of these provisions [of the
Forest Service Organic Act of 1897] to authorize the inclusion therein [of forest reserves] of
lands more reliable for the mineral therein.").
7' See generally Harold W. Wood, Jr., Pinchot and Mather: How the Forest Service and
the Park Service Got That Way, NOT MAN APART (1976), reprinted in GEORGE CAMERON
COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAw 114-16 (5th ed. 2002); see also
HAYS, supra note 42, at ch. III.
" 236 U.S. 459, 463, 483 (1915). The implied authority recognized by the Court in
Midwest Oil was repealed by the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) of 1976,
43 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000). Before its repeal, however, it had been used to set aside numerous
reserves, which at the time of Midwest Oil included at least forty-four "Bird Reserves."
Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 470. An interesting and unresolved question is whether the Midwest




Antiquities Act was unique in affording the President clear author-
ity to set aside lands for preservation purposes.76
Over the years, Congress has enacted many other laws that
recognize and promote the preservation of public lands and their
resources, including, most importantly, the National Park Service
Organic Act of 1916,"7 the Wilderness Act of 1964,78 the National
Wildlife Refuge Administration Act of 1966,"o and the National Wild
and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968.80 But with the possible exception of
the Refuge Administration Act,"1 each of these laws clearly contem-
plates congressional establishment of protected areas, and all but
the Park Service Organic Act were enacted in relatively recent
times. Thus, while the Antiquities Act was not necessarily designed
as a vehicle for public land preservation, it has carried much of that
burden for many years, and it has performed remarkably well in
that role, perhaps because the chief executive is in the best position
to give voice to national preservation goals. 2
Between 1906 and 2001, fourteen presidents have established
122 national monuments covering approximately seventy million
acres of land in twenty-eight states, one territory, and the District
of Columbia, pursuant to their authority under the Antiquities Act.8'
Many of our most treasured national parks-including Grand
7 See ROTHMAN, supra note 22, at 52-71 (discussing first monuments created under
Antiquities Act).
16 U.S.C. §§ 1-4 (2000).
78 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (2000).
79 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd-668ee (2000).
80 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (2000).
"I The National Wildlife Refuge Administration Act of 1966 appears to recognize a
continuing authority on the part of the President and Secretary of the Interior to designate
areas to be included in the National Wildlife Refuge System. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(3)(A)
(2000).
82 Righter, supra note 49, at 283; see also HAYS, supra note 42, at 133-35 (describing
views of Theodore Roosevelt, Secretary of Interior James Garfield, and Gifford Pinchot on
importance of having experts within executive branch, rather than politicians in legislative
branch, making decisions affecting conservation of public resources).
" The appendix contains a list of all of the monuments thus far proclaimed, along with
pertinent information about each of them. Seventy million acres is a land mass approxi-
mately the size of the entire State of Nevada. See Thomas R. Harris et al., Public Lands in
the State of Nevada, available at http://www.unce.unr.edu/publications/FS0/FS0132.doc (last
visited Feb. 9, 2003). Table I in Harris's article shows that Nevada has 70,264,320 total acres.
Id.
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Canyon, Olympic, Zion, Bryce Canyon, Capitol Reef, Canyonlands,
and Glacier Baya-began as national monuments, and were fre-
quently expanded under the Antiquities Act.84 Until Richard Nixon
broke the string, every President since Theodore Roosevelt had
invoked the Antiquities Act and proclaimed a new or expanded
national monument at least once.85 In addition to Nixon, only
President Reagan and the first President Bush failed to invoke the
Antiquities Act during their tenure in office.86 But the remarkable
legacy left by the Antiquities Act did not develop without contro-
versy.
A. THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE ANTIQUITIES ACT
The story of the Antiquities Act, and its remarkable legacy,
begins with President Theodore Roosevelt. Had Roosevelt not
become President as a result of William McKinley's assassination in
1901,87 and had he not dared to assert an expansive view of the law,
the Antiquities Act might well have been relegated to the role that
some in Congress plainly had intended, namely preservation of
small tracts of land with archaeological or historic significance. 8
See infra Appendix.
s Like Reagan, President George Herbert Walker Bush proclaimed no national
monuments. However, President Clinton more than made up for this lapse during his two
terms in office. See infra notes 219-36 and accompanying text.
" At the time of this writing, President George W. Bush remains in office and may still
choose to designate one or more national monuments under the Antiquities Act. And while
Bush and his Interior Secretary, Gale Norton, have shown antipathy toward the law, see, e.g.,
Kirsten Bovee, Monuments Caught in the Crosshairs, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Apr. 23, 2001,
at 3, Utah's Republican Governor Mike Leavitt recently asked the Bush Adminsitration to
designate a new San Rafael National Monument in Utah. Governor Mike Leavitt, Utah State
of the State Address (Jan. 28,2002), available at http://www.utah.gov/governor/stateofstate02/
html (last visited Feb. 9, 2003). Secretary Norton has indicated that the Governor's proposal
will receive "serious consideration." Dan Harris, Cannon Blasts Monument Plan, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Feb. 12, 2002, at Al.
ST Roosevelt was elected Vice President when William McKinley was re.elected in 1900.
He became President when McKinley was assassinated in September 1901, and was elected
President in 1904. Biography of Theodore Roosevelt, available at http://www.theodore-
roosevelt.comltrbio.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2003).
6 ROTHMAN, supra note 22, at 69-70.
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Roosevelt was the first President of the Progressive Era,89 and in
line with this philosophy he took an activist approach toward the
role of government, especially as it related to the conservation of
natural resources.' Soon after the Antiquities Act was passed,
Roosevelt designated Devil's Tower in Wyoming as the nation's first
monument.9 He followed that decision with seventeen more
proclamations in less than three years, including, most importantly,
the more than 800,000-acre Grand Canyon National Monument. 92
The Grand Canyon National Monument was important not only
because of its significance to our national heritage, but also because
it spawned the lawsuit that seemed destined from the start to
secure the expansive interpretation of the Antiquities Act that
would make the Act's legacy possible.93
If one were to choose a set of facts from which to promote a broad
reading of the Antiquities Act, one might very well have chosen the
Grand Canyon as the setting, and invented a character like Ralph
Henry Cameron.94 Cameron, along with his brother Niles and a
local prospector named Peter Berry, had located mining claims
along the South Rim of the Grand Canyon and had successfully
developed a copper mine in the canyon below Grandview Point.95
Cameron's real interests, however, were along the Bright Angel
Trail where he was able to use the mining law to exploit tourists
' See Conservation in the Progressive Era, available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/ammem/
ndlpedu/features/timeline/progressconserve/conserve.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2003).
' Id.; see also Roosevelt's Progressive Party Acceptance Speech (Aug. 6, 1912), available
at http://www.theodore-roosevelt.com/trppaccepts.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2003).
o' Proclamation No. 658, 34 Stat. 3236 (1908).
Proclamation No. 794, 35 Stat. 2175 (1908). Among the most important of Roosevelt's
other seventeen proclamations were the 60,000-acre Petrified Forest National Monument in
Arizona, Proclamation No. 697, 34 Stat. 3266 (1906), the 10,000-acre Chaco Canyon National
Monument in New Mexico, Proclamation No. 740, 35 Stat. 2119 (1907), and the nearly
640,000-acre Mount Olympus National Monument in the State of Washington, Proclamation
No. 809, 35 Stat. 2247 (1909).
* See generally Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920).
John Leshy describes the saga of Ralph Cameron's mining claims at the Grand Canyon
as "[plerhaps the single most spectacular abuse of the Mining Law." JOHN D. LESHY, THE
MINING LAW: A STUDY IN PERPETUAL MOTION 57 (1987).
' Douglas H. Strong, Ralph H. Cameron and the Grand Canyon: Part 1, 20 ARIZONA AND
THE WEST 41, 43 (1978). The Cameron brothers' Last Chance Mine apparently yielded a
substantial profit. Id. at 44 (noting that Last Chance Mine shipped five hundred tons of ore
by 1896).
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rather than minerals." Initially, Cameron charged a toll for access
along the trail as authorized under an Arizona territorial law.97
When his toll rights expired in 1906, Cameron used numerous
strategically-located, but probably invalid, mining claims along the
trail98 as a pretense for continuing to charge an access fee. 9
Unfortunately for Cameron, his interests conflicted with those of the
Santa Fe Railroad Company, and the railroad challenged Cameron's
claims in the courts and before the Department of the Interior.'00
In 1909, Secretary of the Interior James Garfield1"' declared that
Cameron's claims lacked sufficient mineral values to justify issuing
a patent."0 2 Still, Cameron persisted in charging fees for access to
public land that he did not own and for which he lacked any lawful
claim, using his various political offices to keep the authorities at
bay.10 3 Eventually, Cameron's case wound up in the United States
Supreme Court.0 4 Among other things, Cameron alleged that
President Roosevelt lacked the authority to designate the Grand
96Id. at 45.
97 Id. at 46-47.
" Cameron first constructed the trail in 1890 and named it the Cameron Trail. Id. at 45.
The trail was improved by Peter Berry and others later that same year so that it was capable
of handling cattle and horses. Id. at 46. In 1891, Berry filed a certificate under Arizona law
that allowed him to charge a toll for access to the road for ten years with the possibility of
having the time extended for five additional years. Id. at 46-47. Cameron purchased Berry's
interest in the trail and was able to charge tolls in this manner until 1906. Id. at 47.
" Id. at 47-48, 50. The 1908 proclamation withdrawing the Grand Canyon National
Monument land from mineral mining was made subject to "all prior valid adverse claims."
Proclamation No. 794, 35 Stat. 2175, 2176 (1908).
"o Strong, supra note 95, at 49-50.
'0' Garfield was the son of the former President of the United States, James A. Garfield.
102 Strong, supra note 95, at 50.
103 Id. at 55-64. Cameron had been elected delegate from the Arizona Territory in 1908,
a position he held until Arizona became a state in 1912. Id. at 52. In 1914, he ran an
unsuccessful campaign for Governor. Id. at 58. It was not until he became a United States
Senator in 1920 that he was able to exert sufficient influence to substantially improve his
personal interests. Id. at 64. Professor Joseph L. Sax has suggested that "It]here has
probably never been a more scandalous case of a member of Congress using his office to
protect private interests." Joseph L. Sax, Free Enterprise in the Woods, NAT. HIST., June
1982, at 14, 17. Eventually, however, Cameron's antics came to the attention of the Attorney
General, Harlan Fiske Stone, who later became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and
Stone appointed a special prosecutor who promptly ended Cameron's tenure on the Bright
Angel Trail. Id. at 17.
"o4 See generally Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920).
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Canyon as a national monument. 5 The Court quickly dismissed
Cameron's Antiquities Act claim." Quoting from Roosevelt's
proclamation, the Court found that the Grand Canyon "is an object
of unusual scientific interest."0 7 The Court went on to note:
[The Grand Canyon] is the greatest eroded canyon in the
United States, if not in the world, is over a mile in
depth, has attracted wide attention among explorers and
scientists, affords an unexampled field for geologic
study, is regarded as one of the great natural wonders,
and annually draws to its borders thousands of
visitors.108
Nowhere does the court specifically address the language from the
Antiquities Act that the monument must be "the smallest area
compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to
be protected,"'0 9 but the clear implication of the Court's decision was
that the size of the monument was not disqualifying if the "pro-
tected object" was otherwise of "scientific interest."" Cameron
marks one of only two Supreme Court decisions that addresses the
scope of the Antiquities Act."'
Aside from the Grand Canyon, the most important of Theodore
Roosevelt's other monuments was probably the Mount Olympus
National Monument"' in Washington, which now forms the core of
the Olympic National Park."' The Mount Olympus proclamation
"05 Id. at 455.
'06 Id. at 455.
'o' Id. at 455-56.
'o8 Id. at 456.
"o Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2000).
110 Cameron, 252 U.S. at 455.
.. The other case is Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976), discussed below. See
infra notes 160-63 and accompanying text. In United States v. California, 436 U.S. 32 (1978),
the Court held that California had jurisdiction over certain submerged lands off the coast of
the Channel Islands National Monument. Id. at 37. The scope of the Antiquities Act,
however, was not at issue in that case.
"' Proclamation No. 869, 35 Stat. 2247 (1909).
113 Act of June 29, 1938, 52 Stat. 1241.
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was issued just two days before Roosevelt left office, 114 at a time
when he likely was preoccupied with closing out his Administration.
Because of these distractions, Roosevelt was not personally involved
in developing the proposal, and he deferred entirely to the recom-
mendation of Congressman William E. Humphrey of Washington in
proclaiming the monument." 5 Still, Roosevelt was no stranger to
the Olympic Peninsula. Among the "objects" protected in this
proclamation were Roosevelt elk," 6 which were named in his honor
in 1898 by the American biologist C. Hart Merriam." 7
The six presidents who followed immediately after Theodore
Roosevelt took up the cause of proclaiming new monuments with
surprising vigor. Among the ten monuments proclaimed by William
Howard Taft was the Mukuntuweap National Monument " 8 in
southwestern Utah, which in 1915 was enlarged and renamed the
Zion National Monument by President Wilson. " 9 On November 19,
1919, Congress further enlarged the protected area, and
redesignated it the Zion National Park.'
Woodrow Wilson established or modified seventeen national
monuments.' 2' He proclaimed the first eighty acres of what is now
the more than 200,000-acre Dinosaur National Monument in
northwestern Colorado and northeastern Utah, 2 2 as well as the
"' ROTHMAN, supra note 22, at 68.
15 CARSTEN LIEN, OLYMPIC BATrLEGROUND 37-38 (1991).
,6 See Proclamation No. 869, 35 Stat. 2247 (1909):
The slopes of Mount Olympus and the adjacent summits of the Olympic
Mountains . . . embrace certain objects of unusual scientific interest,
including numerous glaciers, and the region which from time immemorial
has formed the summer range and breeding grounds of the Olympic elk
(Cervus RooseveltO, a species peculiar to these mountains and rapidly
decreasing in numbers.
Id.
7 Righter, supra note 49, at 291.
,18 Proclamation No. 877, 36 Stat. 2498 (1909).
"' Proclamation No. 1435, 40 Stat. 1760 (1918).
2 Act of Nov. 19, 1919, 16 U.S.C. § 344 (2000).
"' See infra Appendix.
' 2 Proclamation No. 1313, 39 Stat. 1752 (1915); see also Proclamation No. 2290, 53 Stat.
2454 (1939).
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Sieur de Monts National Monument 2 ' in Maine in 1916, which now
forms the core of Acadia National Park. 124
Perhaps the most important of William Harding's eight national
monuments was Bryce Canyon 125 in southern Utah, now included in
the Bryce Canyon National Park. 2 ' Calvin Coolidge created
thirteen national monuments including Craters of the Moon 127 in
Idaho, Glacier Bay 28 in Alaska, and the Statue of Liberty 129 in New
York. Herbert Hoover created nine national monuments including
Arches 31 in southeastern Utah, the Great Sand Dunes 13' in
southern Colorado, Death Valley 3 2 in California, and Saguaro 13 in
southern Arizona. 134  Each of these monuments is now a national
park. 135
In addition to enlarging many existing monuments, Franklin
Roosevelt created eleven new monuments including the Joshua Tree
.23 Proclamation No. 1339, 39 Stat. 1785 (1916).
32' The Act of Feb. 26, 1919, ch. 45, 40 Stat. 1178 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 341
(2000)), established the Lafayette National Park. The boundaries were enlarged and the
name was changed to Acadia National Park by the Act of Jan. 19, 1929, ch. 77, 45 Stat. 1083
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 342b (2000)).
" Proclamation No. 1664, 43 Stat. 1914 (1923).
'22 Bryce Canyon was originally authorized as the Utah National Park, Act of June 24,
1924, 43 Stat. 593, but in 1928 Congress changed its name to Bryce Canyon National Park,
Act of Feb. 25, 1928, ch. 102, 45 Stat. 147 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 401 (2000)).
127 Proclamation No. 1694, 43 Stat. 1947 (1924).
' Proclamation No. 1733, 43 Stat. 1988 (1925).
' Proclamation No. 1713, 43 Stat. 1968 (1924).
'3' Proclamation No. 1875, 46 Stat. 2988 (1929).
133 Proclamation No. 1994,47 Stat. 2506 (1932). The boundaries of the Great Sand Dunes
were refined by proclamation on several occasions. In 2000, the Great Sand Dunes became
a National Park. 16 U.S.C. § 410hhh (Supp. 2002).
12 Proclamation No. 2028, 47 Stat. 2554 (1933). Hoover originally designated nearly
850,000 acres as the Death Valley National Monument. Id. In 1994, Death Valley was made
into a national park encompassing more than two million acres. 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa (2000).
'3 Proclamation No. 2032, 47 Stat. 2557 (1933). Hoover designated more than 53,000
acres as the Saguaro National Monument. Id. In 1994, Saguaro became a national park
encompassing more than 83,000 acres. Pub. L. No. 103-364, 108 Stat. 3467 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. 410zz (2000)).
" Hoover also proclaimed the Canyon de Chelly National Monument in Arizona, but not
under the Antiquities Act. Instead, his action was based upon special legislation enacted by
Congress authorizing the President to establish the Canyon de Chelly National Monument
within the Navajo Indian reservation. Pub. L. No. 71-667, 47 Stat. 1419 (2000).
"' 16 U.S.C. § 445 (2000).
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National Monument 3 ' in California, Cedar Breaks'37 in southwest-
ern Utah, Capitol Reef" in southern Utah, Channel Islands" 9 off
the coast of southern California, the Badlands National
Monument 40 in western South Dakota, and the Jackson Hole
National Monument1 4' in Wyoming. This last decision sparked the
next major lawsuit under the Antiquities Act. 142
Roosevelt's Jackson Hole proclamation designated 221,610 acres
of land as a national monument which included 32,117 acres of land
donated by John D. Rockefeller, Jr.,44 and which enclosed approxi-
'" Proclamation No. 2193, 50 Stat. 1760 (1937). Joshua Tree was made a national park
in 1994. See 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa-22 (2000).
' Proclamation No. 2054, 48 Stat. 1705 (1933).
"s Proclamation No. 2246, 50 Stat. 1856 (1937). The original proclamation encompassed
about 32,000 acres. Id. In 1971, Capitol Reef was made a national park encompassing nearly
223,000 acres. See 16 U.S.C. § 273 (2000).
' Proclamation No. 2281, 3 C.F.R. 139 (1936-1938).
'4 Proclamation No. 2320, 3 C.F.R. 74 (1938-1943). Congress had provided for the
establishment of the Badlands National Monument following the acquisition of sufficient
lands as well as compliance with other conditions set forth in the legislation. Act of Mar. 4,
1929, Pub. L. No. 70-1021, 45 Stat. 1553.
"' Proclamation No. 2578, 3 C.F.R. 327 (1938-1943). Roosevelt issued his proclamation
after unsuccessful attempts by the Park Service over many years to have Congress expand
the Grand Teton National Park. But see A Bill to Abolish the Jackson Hole National
Monument. Hearings on H.R. 2241 Before the House Comm. on Public Lands, 78th Cong. 6-10
(1943).
4 See generally Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F. Supp. 890 (D. Wyo. 1945).
"4 Proclamation No. 2578, 57 Stat. 731 (1943). Rockefeller purchased the lands in 1927
at the "earnest recommendation" of Stephen Mather, who was then the Director of the
National Park Service, with the expectation of donating the lands to the National Park
Service for inclusion in the Grand Teton National Park. A Bill to Abolish the Jackson Hole
National Monument: Hearings on H.R. 2241 Before the House Comm. on Public Lands, 78th
Cong. 11 (1943) (statement of Newton B. Drurry, Director, National Park Service). Fifteen
years later, after several attempts to expand the park had failed, Rockefeller sent a letter to
Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes dated November 27, 1942, which stated as follows:
I have definitely reached the conclusion, although most reluctantly, that
I should make permanent disposition of this property before another year
has passed. If the Federal Government is not interested in its acquisition,
or if being interested, is still unable to arrange to accept it on the general
terms long discussed and with which you are familiar, it will be my
thought to make some other disposition of it, or failing that, to sell it in
the market to any satisfactory buyers.
Id. at 76. It thus appears that Roosevelt's decision to proclaim the Jackson Hole National
Monument on March 15, 1943, less than four months after Rockefeller's letter, was driven in
substantial part by the federal government's desire not to lose the Rockefeller donation.
Indeed, Ickes responded to Rockefeller's letter on December 4, 1942 with a promise to "do
everything in my power to bring about the acceptance of your gift as an addition to the
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mately 17,000 acres of private land.114 Shortly after the proclama-
tion was signed, Congressman Frank Barrett of Wyoming intro-
duced legislation to abolish the monument. 145 In testimony before
the House Committee on Public Lands, Barrett described the land
included within the new monument as follows:
It is rough sagebrush, grazing land, and some lakes but
there is no particular reason it should be included in the
Park Service, and this land has been used and is benefi-
cial for livestock, and for farming purposes and nothing
more. 146
Other witnesses, however, including noted biologist Olaus Murie,
National Park Service Director Newton Drury, and United States
Geological Survey Director F.M. Fryxell, testified to the outstand-
national-park system." Id. at 80. Despite Rockefeller's seemingly altruistic motives, at least
part of the reason for the acrimony caused by the designation of the Jackson Hole National
Monument was the way in which the lands were secretly acquired with Rockefeller money.
See Candy Moulton, National Monuments? Not in Wyoming, CASPERSTARTRIB., Jan. 1, 2001,
at Al.
144 A Bill to Abolish the Jackson Hole National Monument: Hearings on H.R. 2241 Before
the House Comm. on Public Lands, 78th Cong. 3 (1943) (statement of Newton B. Drurry,
Director, National Park Service). The Antiquities Act authorizes the protection only of lands
"owned or controlled by the Government of the United States." 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2000). Thus,
while national monument boundaries might enclose private or state lands, those lands are
not themselves part of the monument.
'4 A Bill to Abolish the Jackson Hole National Monument: Hearings on H.R. 2241 Before
the House Comm. on Public Lands, 78th Cong. 3 (1943) (statement of Newton B. Drurry,
Director, National Park Service).
'4 A Bill to Abolish the Jackson Hole National Monument: Hearings on H.R. 2241 Before
the House Comm. on Public Lands, 78th Cong. 5 (1943) (statement of Frank A. Barrett,
Member, House Comm. on the Public Lands). The anti-federal sentiment of Wyoming's
congressional delegation was also apparent at the hearing. According to Congressman
Barrett, "The Park Service is just like every other bureau. They are exceedingly avaricious."
Id. at 52. According to Wyoming Senator Joseph O'Mahoney, the Jackson Hole proclamation
was "not only an invasion of the rights of the sovereign State of Wyoming ... [and] an
invasion of the sacred rights of people affected, it is also an invasion of the rights of Congress
to legislate in connection with something definitely within the jurisdiction of the Congress
albne." Id. at 114.
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ing, scientific, biological, geological, and historic features of the
area. 1
47
In Wyoming v. Franke,141 the State challenged Roosevelt's
proclamation on the grounds that the evidence failed to support the
claim that the monument contained "historic landmarks, [and]
historic or prehistoric structures or objects of historic or scientific
interest." 49 After hearing evidence on both sides, the court noted
that it had limited authority to review the proclamation:
If there be evidence in the case of a substantial charac-
ter upon which the President may have acted in declar-
ing that there were objects of historic or scientific
interest included within the area, it is sufficient upon
which he may have based a discretion."5
Moreover, the court conceded that:
[]f a monument were to be created on a bare stretch of
sage-brush prairie in regard to which there was no
substantial evidence that it contained objects of historic
or scientific interest, the action in attempting to estab-
lish it by proclamation as a monument, would undoubt-
edly be arbitrary and capricious and clearly outside the
scope and purpose of the Monument Act.' 5'
But the court found ample evidence "of experts and others" to
support the Jackson Hole National Monument, and refused to
"'probe the reasoning which underlies this Proclamation'" on the
" A Bill to Abolish the Jackson Hole National Monument: Hearings on H.R. 2241 Before
the House Comm. on Public Lands, 78th Cong. 66-97, 122-29, 130-38 (1943); see also
ROTHMAN, supra note 22, at 217-20 (describing testimony of several federal government
witnesses, including Dr. Harold E. Anthony of American Museum of Natural History, Dr.
Leland Horberg, who was geologist from University of Illinois, and biologist Olaus Murie).
" 58 F. Supp. 890 (D. Wyo. 1945).
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grounds that it would constitute" 'a clear invasion of the legislative
and executive domains.' 0152
The controversy over the Jackson Hole National Monument also
sparked what was perhaps the most successful congressional
opposition to a monument proclamation. Lengthy hearings were
held before the House Committee on Public Lands, and virtually
every prominent Wyoming politician offered testimony opposing the
monument.' 53 In 1944, Congress actually passed legislation that
would have abolished the monument, 15 4 but Roosevelt pocket vetoed
the bill. 55 In response, Congress refused to appropriate money for
the management of the monument for seven years after it was
proclaimed.' 0 Finally, in 1950, Congress negotiated a compromise
with President Truman that provided for adding the monument
lands to the Grand Teton National Park,'57 but amending the
Antiquities Act to prohibit the President from designating any
further monuments in Wyoming. 5 ' Many years later, former
Senator Clifford Hansen, who led the opposition to the Jackson Hole
National Monument, conceded that his opposition was a mistake.' 59
'52 Id. at 895-96 (quoting United States v. George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371, 380
(1939)). A key part of the federal government's litigation strategy was its decision not to
present evidence regarding the size of the monument. ROTHMAN, supra note 22, at 220. This
proved to be a sound approach when the court concluded that it had only limited review
authority. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
'" See generally A Bill to Abolish the Jackson Hole National Monument: Hearings on
H.R. 2241 Before the House Comm. on Public Lands, 78th Cong. (1943).
.54 H.R. 2241, 78th Cong. (1943); 90 CONG. REC. 9196 (1944).
i5 90 CONG. REC. 9808 (1944).
'56 S. REP. No. 81-1938, at 4 (1950).
117 16 U.S.C. § 406d-1 (2000).
' 16 U.S.C. § 431a (2000).
in At the time of the Jackson Hole National Monument controversy, Hansen was a Teton
County Commissioner, actively involved in opposing the monument because of concerns
regarding the economic impacts that would result from the designation. Candy Moulton,
National Monuments? Not in Wyoming, CASPERSTARTRIB., Jan. 1, 2001, at Al. Hansen has
admitted, however, that his concerns were not "borne out." Id. Former Senator Alan
Simpson, who also opposed the monument, went further:
All of us agree that Teton County would not look like it does today if they
hadn't (established the monument and expanded the park). Instead of
open space there would be gas stations, motels and other businesses on
Antelope Flats north of Jackson where the view of the Tetons remains
largely unobstructed by development. It was great in hindsight.
Id.; see also Editorial, Clinton Forest Plan Deserves Fair Hearing, CASPER STAR TRIB., Oct. 17,
1999, at As (noting that "[flormer Senator Clifford Hansen at first opposed expansion of the
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Franke's deferential approach toward reviewing monument
proclamations was implicitly affirmed by the United States
Supreme Court in Cappaert v. United States.60 That case involved
President Truman's designation of the Devil's Hole National
Monument to protect an underground pool and a unique species of
fish that resided there."' In upholding the federal government's
claim to reserved water rights sufficient to protect the fish, the
Court rejected Cappaert's claim that the Antiquities Act protected
only archaeological sites. 6 ' On the contrary, the Court found that
"the language of the [Antiquities] Act... is not so limited" and that
"[t]he pool in Devil's Hole and its rare inhabitants are objects of
historic or scientific interest."'
16 3
B. THE QUIESCENT PERIOD
After Franklin Roosevelt and until Jimmy Carter, presidents
continued to expand and otherwise modify existing monuments, but
new monuments slowed to a trickle. 64 There were, however, two
important monuments established during this period. The first was
the C&O Canal proclaimed by Dwight Eisenhower at the end of his
administration in 1961.165 The canal, which stretches more than
180 miles between Washington and Cumberland, Maryland,
operated from 1828-1924, primarily to haul coal from western
Maryland. 6 6 Many of the original locks and aqueducts along the
canal were preserved, as was the towpath that runs the entire
length of the canal.67 The proclamation recognizes these historic
[Grand Teton National Park], but had the integrity to later admit he had been wrong and that
the park was good for Jackson Hole").
160 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
161 Id. at 131-32.
102 Id. at 141-42.
' Id. at 142.
' ROTHMAN, supra note 22, at 212-14.
' Id. at 224-25.'
' National Park Service, Chesapeake & Ohio Canal National Historic Park, available




structures as the principal reason for proclaiming a national
monument. 168
Some members of Congress held continuing disdain for these
executive branch proclamations. In fact, Eisenhower's decision so
piqued Congressman Wayne Aspinall of Colorado, the powerful
chair of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, that
Aspinall blocked funding for the C&O Canal National Monument for
many years.1 69  Aspinall's action, like the action of an earlier
Congress with respect to the Jackson Hole National Monument,
served as a continuing warning to future presidents that national
monument proclamations under the Antiquities Act carried risks.
A President might be able to preserve the status quo on public lands
through a monument proclamation, but he might be denied the
money that was needed to protect the monument's resources.
The other important monument proclaimed during this period
was Marble Canyon, adjacent to the former Grand Canyon National
Monument and now part of the Grand Canyon National Park. 70
Lyndon Johnson issued the proclamation on the last day of his
Administration in 1969 after a protracted fight over a proposal to
build two dams in the Colorado River.' One of the proposed dams
would have inundated Marble Canyon. 72 The Johnson administra-
tion, and his Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall, had initially
supported the dams, but the proposals triggered a massive and
ultimately successful campaign by the conservation community to
'6 Proclamation No. 3391, 3 C.F.R. 110 (1959-1963). The monument was redesignated
as the Chesapeake and Ohio National Historic Park. 'Act of Jan. 8, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-664,
84 Stat. 1978. In the early 1950s the National Park Service had approved a plan to build a
scenic highway along the canal route, and the plan was endorsed by the Washington Post.
Righter, supra note 49, at 297. But Justice William 0. Douglas argued eloquently for its
preservation, and he persuaded reporters from the Post to accompany him on a hike along the
full 185 mile length of the canal. Id. When the hikers arrived in the District of Columbia
they were greeted by thousands of canal supporters, and soon thereafter, the Park Service
abandoned the highway proposal. Id.
16 ROTHMAN, supra note 22, at 225.
"o Proclamation No. 3889, 83 Stat. 924 (1969). The monument was part of the Grand
Canyon National Park Act of Jan. 3, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-620, 88 Stat. 2089.
"I See RODERICKNASH, WILDERNESSANDTHEAMERICANMIND 228(1967) (indicating that
dams were to be used to generate hydroelectric power to finance construction of massive
project that would bring water from Pacific Northwest to Colorado River basin).
172 Id.
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block their construction.173 In 1967, Udall took a rafting trip down
the Colorado River through the Grand Canyon and recanted his
support for the dams. 174 A little more than a year later, Lyndon
Johnson proclaimed the Marble Canyon National Monument.175
While the Marble Canyon proclamation made an important
contribution to the protection of the Grand Canyon, the proclama-
tions that Lyndon Johnson chose not to proclaim offer a more telling
portrait of the political difficulties that presidents face in using the
Antiquities Act. Secretary Udall and his staff had developed
seventeen monument proposals for the President's consideration, in
large part because these areas were not likely to receive congressio-
nal protection. 7 ' In the end, Johnson chose to designate only
Marble Canyon and to approve modest expansions at several other
monuments. 77 But the political fallout from Udall's more ambitious
agenda nearly cost him his job just two days before the end of the
Johnson Administration. 1
78
After Johnson, Richard Nixon chose not to exercise his authority
under the Antiquities Act, and Gerald Ford limited his efforts to the
modest expansion of two existing monuments.' The election of
s See id. at 227-34.
114 Id. at 233-34.
"" Proclamation No. 3889, 83 Stat. 924 (1969). Before Johnson proclaimed the
monument, Congress had passed legislation that prohibited construction of dams anywhere
in the Grand Canyon. Id. at 234. Marble Canyon was added to the Grand Canyon National
Park in 1975. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 228a, 228b (2000).
17' Righter, supra note 49, at 298. Among Udall's proposal were a Gates of the Arctic
National Monument, comprising 4,119,000 acres in northern Alaska; a Mt. McKinley National
Monument, also in Alaska containing 2,202,000 acres adjoining the national park; and a
Sonoran Desert National Monument in Arizona, embracing 911,700 acres. LEE, supra note
23, at ch. 8.
"' See infra Appendix. Udall had pared his list to seven monuments but even this proved
too much for President Johnson who was concerned that "[lthe taking of this land without
opportunity for Congressional study would strain the Antiquities Act for beyond its intent."
WILLIAM C. EVERHART, THE NATIONALPARKSERVICE 179 (1983). Johnson was also concerned
about Congressional opposition to the new monuments. Id. at 174-79.
17 EVERHART, supra note 177. In expectation of Johnson's approval, Udall had signed a
press release announcing that the proclamation had been signed. Johnson ordered Udall to
retract the story but refused to accept his resignation. Id.
' Proclamation No. 4319, 3 C.F.R. 397 (1971-1975); Proclamation No. 4359, 3 C.F.R. 461
(1971-1975).
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Jimmy Carter, however, ultimately led to the largest expansion of
the monument system in our nation's history.
C. JIMMY CARTER AND THE ALASKA MONUMENTS
President Jimmy Carter did not make extensive use of the
Antiquities Act, with one remarkable exception. On December 1,
1978, Carter proclaimed seventeen new or enlarged national
monuments in Alaska, covering fifty-six million acres. 180 For their
sheer size, Carter's proclamations were unparalleled, 8' and it is
unlikely that land-based monuments will ever again approach their
scale.8 2 The path that led to protecting these lands serves as a
testament to the significant role that the Antiquities Act continues
to play in land preservation in the United States.
Congress took the first step toward protecting large tracts of
"national interest" lands in Alaska on December 18, 1971 when it
passed the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA).'83
ANSCA granted Alaska Natives the right to select approximately
180 The names and citations to the seventeen monuments are found in the Appendix. See
infra Appendix. Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall had recommended to President
Johnson that he proclaim about seven million acres of land in Alaska as national monuments,
but as a result of congressional opposition, Johnson chose not to act on Udall's recommenda-
tions. EVERHART, supra note 177, at 130.
181 They included the nearly eleven million acre Wrangell-St. Elias National Monument,
the largest national monument ever proclaimed. Proclamation No. 4625, 3 C.F.R. 98 (1979).
182 The Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice has determined that national
monuments may be proclaimed within the territorial seas extending 200 miles from shore.
Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of
Justice, to John Leshy, Solicitor, Department of Interior, James Dorskind, General Counsel,
National Organic and Atmospheric, Administration, and Dinah Bear, General Counsel,
Counsel on Environmental Quality 4-9 (Sept. 15, 2000), available at http://www.atlantisforce.
org/dojl.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2003). At one point during the Clinton Administration,
Secretary Babbitt was considering a recommendation for a national monument that would
have encompassed as much as one-hundred million acres of submerged lands around the
northwestern Hawaiian Islands. Clinton Creates Hawaiian Ocean Preserve, WASH. POST, Dec.
5, 2000, at A08. Jurisdictional issues between the Interior and Commerce Departments as
well as concerns about restrictions on fishing ultimately led to a compromise under which
President Clinton signed an executive order, Exec. Order No. 13,178, 3 C.F.R. 312 (2001),
establishing the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands Coral Reef Ecosystem Reserve under the
National Marine Sanctuaries Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1445 (2000).
'83 Act of Dec. 18, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-
1629 (2000)).
LEGACY OF THE ANTIQUITIES ACT
forty-four million acres of federal land in Alaska.184 In addition,
however, section 17(d)(2) of ANCSA185 gave the Secretary of the
Interior nine months to withdraw up to eighty million acres of land
for further study as possible additions to the National Park,
National Wildlife Refuge, National Wild and Scenic Rivers, and the
National Forest Systems." 6 The Secretary was supposed to submit
the required studies for these "(d)(2)" lands to Congress within two
years of ANCSA's enactment. 187
On December 17, 1973, Secretary of the Interior Rogers Morton
proposed legislation to protect approximately 83.5 million acres of
land in Alaska, as national parks, forests, refuges, and wild
rivers. 88 As provided by ANCSA, the effect of this recommendation
was to withdraw most of this land for a period of five years while
Congress considered the recommendations and decided how to
proceed.8 9
Acting on the Secretary's recommendation, the House of Repre-
sentatives passed legislation on May 19, 1978 by a vote of 277-31. '°
A separate bill also was reported out of the Senate Energy and
Natural Resources Committee, but the full Senate never voted on
the bill, and the five-year deadline was doomed to run without the
enactment of the necessary legislation. 1' This would have meant
that the lands that had been closed for study as possible conserva-
tion units would now once again be opened to various forms of entry
and development. 192
184 Id.
'm 43 U.S.C. § 1616(d)(2) (2000). Section 17(d)(2) was first proposed as an amendment to
the proposed native claims settlement legislation by Senator Alan Bible of Nevada.
EVERHART, supra note 178, at 128.
"s All unreserved public lands in Alaska were withdrawn during the nine month period.
43 U.S.C. § 1616(d)(1) (2000).
187 EVERHART, 8upra note 178, at 128.
I Id. at 130.
'89 43 U.S.C. § 1616(d)(2)(D) (2000).
19 124 CONG. REC., H4238-39 (daily ed. May 19, 1978).
"I' G. FRANKWILLISs, THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE AND THE ALASKA NATIONAL INTEREST
LANDS CONSERVATION ACT OF 1980: ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY, at ch. 4 & n.115 (1985),
available at http://www.cr.nps.gov/history/online-books/wifliss/adhi4f.htm (last visited Feb.
16, 2003).
"2 Id. at ch. 4 & nn.127-41.
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To avoid having these lands reopened before Congress could
enact appropriate legislation, the Carter Administration took
several actions. First, on November 16, 1978, Secretary of the
Interior Cecil Andrus temporarily withdrew 105 million acres of
land under section 204(e) of the Federal Land Policy and Manage-
ment Act (FLPMA) for a three-year period. 9 ' The Secretary of
Agriculture withdrew an additional eleven million acres under
FLPMA section 204(b) for a two-year period.'94 Finally, on Decem-
ber 1, 1978, the President proclaimed seventeen new or expanded
national monuments in Alaska covering nearly fifty-six million acres
of land to be administered by the National Park Service, the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service, and the United States Forest
Service.9 5 In announcing these new monuments, Secretary Andrus
made clear that the Carter Administration would not allow "Alaska
[to] become a private preserve for a handful of rape, ruin and run
developers." '196
The Carter monuments sparked bitter opposition in Alaska,'97
but the withdrawals effectively halted mineral development in
Alaska and thereby provided the impetus for congressional action.
On December 2, 1980, two years after these executive actions,
Congress passed the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation
Act (ANILCA).9 8 ANILCA designated more than one-hundred
million acres of land in new conservation units, including 43.6
million acres of new parklands, 53.7 million acres of new wildlife
refuge land, twenty-five new wild and scenic rivers, and 56.4 million
acres of wilderness. Many of the protected areas were carved out of
the monuments that had been declared just two years earlier by
President Carter. 199
I9 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) (2000). On February 12, 1980, the Secretary of the Interior
withdrew forty million acres of land for a period of twenty years under the authority of
FLPMA to extend the three-year withdrawals that were scheduled to expire in November
1981. 45 Fed. Reg. 9562 (Feb. 12, 1980).
"4 43 U.S.C. § 1714(b) (2000).
19 Proclamation Nos. 4611-4627, 93 Stat. 1446-1473 (1978).
IS EVERHART, supra note 177, at 130-31.
I See supra notes 210-16 and accompanying text.
16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233 (2000).
" See, e.g., ANILCA, Pub. L. No. 96-487,94 Stat. 2371 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§ 410hh(1).(10) (2000)).
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Despite Congress's ultimate support for much of what the Carter
Administration had done, ANILCA imposed a significant new limit
on executive authority to withdraw lands in Alaska. The relevant
language from ANILCA provides that:
No future executive branch action which withdraws
more than five thousand acres, in the aggregate, of
public lands within the State of Alaska shall be effective
except by compliance with this sub-section. To the
extent authorized by existing law, the President or the
Secretary may withdraw public lands in the State of
Alaska exceeding five thousand acres in the aggregate,
which withdrawal shall not become effective until notice
is provided in the Federal Register and to both Houses
of Congress. Such withdrawal shall terminate unless
Congress passes a joint resolution of approval within one
year after notice of such withdrawal has been submitted
to Congress.2"
The potential significance of this restriction to national monument
designation came to the fore during the Clinton Administration as
a result of a proposal by a coalition of environmental, human rights,
and religious groups to have the Alaska National Wildlife Refuge
(ANWR) declared a national monument.2 1
The Clinton Administration opposed oil and gas development in
ANWR, but the groups were concerned that a subsequent adminis-
tration might take a different view.202 The State of Alaska, which
supported oil and gas development in ANWR, opposed monument
20 16 U.S.C. § 3213(a) (2000).
"o Mary Helen Yarborough, Groups Continue to Press for ANWR Protection, But Hopes
Wane, INSIDE ENERGY, Dec. 25, 2000, at 13.
' See H. Josef Hebert, Babbitt Advises Clinton on Refuge, AP ONLINE, Jan. 5, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 3649349. Their concerns were well.founded, as the Bush Administra-
tion has actively supported limited development of ANWR. See Report of the National Energy
Policy Development Group, at 5-10 (May 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
energy (last visited Feb. 16, 2003) (recommending "that the President direct the Secretary of
the Interior to work with Congress to authorize exploration and, if resources are discovered,
development of the 1002 Area of ANWR").
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designation, and apparently took the position that the above-
referenced language from ANICLA effectively precluded it. 20 3
ANILCA, however, prohibits new withdrawals in excess of 5,000
acres. 20 4 It does not preclude a mere national monument designa-
tion that does not include a withdrawal of lands.0 5 Since the
Antiquities Act does not require a withdrawal or reservation of
lands, it might have been possible for the President to declare
ANWR a national monument in name only, without actually
withdrawing the land from any uses.206 Declaring ANWR a national
monument would have effectively precluded mineral leasing under
the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920.207 But ANILCA had already closed
ANWR to mineral leasing unless Congress enacted specific legisla-
tion to allow it. 2 8 For this reason, and in reliance on the advice of
Secretary Babbitt, Clinton decided that it was unnecessary to
proclaim ANWR a national monument.2 9
Despite the fact that the conservation units established under
ANILCA ultimately supplanted the monuments proclaimed by
Carter, it was the Antiquities Act decision that prompted two
lawsuits, one brought by the State of Alaska and the other by the
Anaconda Copper Company. In Alaska v. Carter,210 the State
claimed that the President's decision to designate a monument, and
the Secretary of the Interior's recommendation to the President that
he declare a monument, were subject to NEPA's environmental
impact statement requirement.2" The court did not address the
scope of the Antiquities Act directly, but did conclude that the
203 See PATTON BOGGS LLP, THE IMPACT OF ANILCA ON THE POTENTIAL DESIGNATION OF
THE COASTAL PLAIN OF ANWR AS A NATIONAL MONUMENT (2000) (on file with author).
2' 16 U.S.C. § 3213(a) (2000).
Id.
' The Antiquities Act authorizes the President "to declare.., national monuments." 16
U.S.C. § 431 (2000). The President "may," but is not required to, "reserve" the lands in
conjunction with the declaration. Id.
w' See 30 U.S.C. § 181 (2000).
16 U.S.C. §§ 3142(i), 3143 (2000).
2 Despite the fact that he is "passionately opposed to drilling" in ANWR, Secretary
Babbitt described the proposal to designate ANWR as a national monument "a meaningless
gesture" that "adds no protection that isn't already there." H. Josef Hebert, Babbitt Advises
Clinton on Refuge, AP ONLINE, Jan. 5, 2001, available at 2001 WL 3649349.
210 462 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Alaska 1978).
2" Id. at 1158.
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President was not an agency subject to NEPA's impact statement
requirement. 212 Furthermore, the court found that since the Interior
Department's recommendation was made at the President's request,
the Interior Department could not be compelled to file an impact
statement before making its recommendation. 2"3  According to the
court, to hold otherwise "would raise serious constitutional ques-
tions. 214
In contrast to the procedural issue raised by the State of Alaska,
the Anaconda Copper Company claimed that the Alaska proclama-
tions were substantively flawed because they were beyond the scope
of the Antiquities Act.1 5 In an unpublished opinion, the court
rejected the mining company's arguments, finding that while the
Antiquities Act imposes limits on the exercise of presidential
authority, the. President had adequately justified the Alaska
monuments as objects of scientific interest.21 6
D. THE RESURGENCE OF THE ANTIQUITIES ACT IN THE CLINTON ERA
Viewed in isolation, Bill Clinton's record under the Antiquities
Act was extraordinary and on most counts more impressive than the
21 Id. at 1159. This result appears to be consistent with the Supreme Court's subsequent
decision in Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992), that the President is not an
agency for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The Franklin Court held
that "[ojut of respect for the separation ofpowers and the unique constitutional position of the
President, we find that textual silence [within the APA] is not enough to subject the President
to the provisions of the APA." Id. at 800-01.
213 Carter, 462 F. Supp. at 1160.
21 Id. At oral argument, the State conceded that the President was not subject to NEPA
but nonetheless claimed that the Secretary of the Interior had to prepare an impact
statement before forwarding his or her recommendation to the President. Id. The court
disagreed, stating, "The argument that the President cannot ask for advice, and must
personally draw lines on maps, file the necessary papers, and the other details that are
necessary to the issuance of a Presidential Proclamation in order to escape the procedural
requirements of NEPA approaches the absurd." Id. The Clinton Administration relied
substantially on Alaska v. Carter to avoid NEPA compliance for the recommendations
made-ostensibly at the President's request-by Secretary Babbitt. See H.R. 1487, The
National Monument NEPA Compliance Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat'l Parks &
Public Lands of the House Comm. on Resources, 106th Cong. 7-9 (1999) (statement of Rep.
Hansen, Member, House Comm. on Resources).
21' Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrus, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1853, 1853-54 (D. Alaska
July 1, 1980).
216 Id. at 1854-55.
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record of Theodore Roosevelt. When viewed from the perspective of
history, however, Clinton's record is truly remarkable because his
decisions were made against a backdrop of nearly a hundred years
of presidents, legislators, and public land administrators with the
prior opportunity to evaluate and recommend lands for protection
under the Antiquities Act and a host of other land protection laws.
The most obvious candidates had long since been protected.
Moreover, every single monument created during the Clinton
Administration came at a time when the Republican party-the
opposition party-held control of both houses of Congress.217 And
many of these Republicans were adamantly opposed to the Antiqui-
ties Act, and especially to its repeated use by a Democratic presi-
dent.2"8
The monuments created during the Clinton Administration are
a diverse collection. They include four small historic sites,219 one
new and one expanded monument in the Virgin Islands that consist
entirely of submerged lands,22 the California Coastal National
Monument, which includes all unappropriated islands, rocks,
pinnacles, and exposed reefs in the jurisdictional waters of the
United States for the 841 miles of California coastline,221 and
217 Statistical information and election results for congressional elections is available at
http://clerkweb.house:gov/members/electioninformation/elections.php.
21' Jon Margolis, In Washington, The Emperor Is on Babbitt's Side, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS,
Nov. 22, 1999, available at http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article?article-id=5390 (last
visited Feb. 16, 2003).
219 The historic monuments include the following: (1) President Lincoln and Soldiers'
Home National Monument, the two-acre site of the Anderson Cottage (also known as Soldiers'
Home), where President Lincoln and his family lived during Washington's warm summer
months, Proclamation No. 7329, 3 C.F.R. 123 (2001); (2) Minidoka Internment National
Monument, a 72.75-acre tract of land in Idaho that was the site of a Japanese internment
camp during World War II, Proclamation No. 7395, 3 C.F.R. 15 (2002); (3) Pompeys Pillar
National Monument, a 51-acre tract of land in Montana that includes a bluff with William
Clark's name carved in the wall, which is the only known tangible evidence of the Lewis and
Clark expedition, Proclamation No. 7396, 3 C.F.R. 19 (2002); and (4) Governors Island
National Monument, a 20-acre site in New York State that served as an outpost for New York
City during the early part of the 19th century, Proclamation No. 7402, 3 C.F.R. 39 (2002).
"0 These monuments include (1) the 12,708-acre Virgin Islands Coral Reef National
Monument, which is directly adjacent to the Virgin Islands National Park off the island of St.
John, Proclamation No. 7399, 3 C.F.R. 32 (2002), and (2) the 18,135-acre expansion of the
Buck Island Reef National Monument off the island of St. Croix, Proclamation No. 7392, 3
C.F.R. 3 (2002).
2' Proclamation No. 7264, 3 C.F.R. 5 (2001).
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fourteen monuments that are managed in whole or in part by the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM).22 One new monument-Giant
Sequoia in California-is managed primarily by the United States
Forest Service,22 and one-Hanford Reach, which protects the last
free-flowing nontidal stretch of the Columbia River-is managed
primarily by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, in
cooperation with the Department of Energy.224 The National Park
Service has a role in managing ten of the new or expanded monu-
ments.225
The monuments entrusted to BLM management are of particular
importance because of the precedent they establish and because of
their sheer size. Among these is the Grand Staircase-Escalante,226
which was the first, the largest, and politically the most important
of the BLM monuments. It encompasses a vast and largely
undeveloped landscape of steep canyons and spectacular geologic
features that borders the Capitol Reef National Park and Glen
Canyon National Recreation Area on its east side, and Bryce Canyon
National Park on the west.227 The 1,014,000-acre Grand Canyon-
Parashant National Monument 228 on the northwest side of the
Grand Canyon National Park, and the 293,000-acre Vermilion Cliffs
2 Fifteen BLM.managed national monuments are noted on BLM~s website. Bureau of
Land Management, National Landscape Conservation System, available at http://www.blm.
gov/nles/brochure (last visited Feb. 17, 2003). One of these, the Santa Rosa and San Jacinto
Mountains National Monument, was designated by Congress. Id.
22 Proclamation No. 7295, 3 C.F.R. 60 (2001). As a result of two legal opinions issued in
the wake of the Alaska monuments proclaimed by President Carter in 1978, the National
Park Service is required to retain some management responsibility for this monument. See
infra notes 329-30 and accompanying text.
22 Proclamation No. 7319, 3 C.F.R. 102 (2001).
2'5 These include the following seven new monuments: Grand Staircase-Escalante,
Proclamation No. 6920, 3 C.F.R. 64 (1996); Grand Canyon-Parashant, Proclamation No. 7265,
3 C.F.R. 7 (2001); Giant Sequoia, Proclamation No. 7295, 65 Fed. Reg. 24,095 (Apr. 15, 2000);
President Lincoln and Soldiers Home, Proclamation No. 7329, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,673 (July 7,
2000); Minidoka Internment, Proclamation No. 7395, 66 Fed. Reg. 7,347 (Jan. 17, 2001);
Virgin Islands Coral Reef, Proclamation No. 7399, 66 Fed. Reg. 7,364 (Jan. 17, 2001);
Governors Island, Proclamation No. 7266, 65 Fed. Reg. 2,831 (Jan. 11, 2000); Craters of the
Moon, Proclamation No. 7373, 65 Fed. Reg. 69,221 (Nov. 9, 2000); and Buck Island Reef,
Proclamation No. 7392, 3 C.F.R. 60 (2001).
' Proclamation No. 6920, 3 C.F.R. 64 (1997).
227 Id.
Proclamation No. 7265, 3 C.F.R. 7 (2001).
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National Monument 29 on the northeastern side of the Park,
encompass similar landscapes and help to secure the ecology of the
Grand Canyon.23
0
Two of the BLM's new monuments-the 71,100-acre Agua Fria2 1
in Arizona and the 164,000-acre Canyons of the Ancients 232 in
Colorado-were set aside largely for their archaeological impor-
tance. Two others-the 128,917-acre Ironwood Forest National
Monument 23  and the 486,149-acre Sonoran Desert National
Monument 2 4-are designed to protect the unique biological
resources of the Sonoran desert. The 52,947-acre Cascade-Siskiyou
National Monument in Oregon was designated primarily to protect
its rich biological diversity, 235 and the 504,729-acre Upper Missouri
River Breaks National Monument 236 protects biological, geological,
and historical objects along the Upper Missouri River through
Montana.
In addition to these monuments, the Antiquities Act legacy left
by the Clinton Administration arguably should include several areas
that received legislative protection only because Secretary Babbitt
indicated that he was considering monument recommendations for
these areas. 37 The Secretary was actively involved with each of the
legislative proposals and insisted that they meet certain standards
before he would agree not to pursue monument designations. 3 s
Proclamation No. 7374, 3 C.F.R. 199 (2001).
230 See, e.g., Grand Canyon Wildlands Counsel, Inc., An Inventory, Assessment, and
Development of Recovery Priorities for Arizona Strip Springs, Seeps, and National Ponds
(Mar. 3, 2001), available at http://www.grandcanyonwildlands.org/springsynthesis.pdf (last
visited Feb. 17, 2003).
s' Proclamation No. 7263, 3 C.F.R. 1 (2001).
23 Proclamation No. 7317, 3 C.F.R. 93 (2001).
Proclamation No. 7320, 3 C.F.R. 107 (2001).
23 Proclamation No. 7397, 3 C.F.R. 22 (2002).
23 Proclamation No. 7318, 65 Fed. Reg. 37,249 (June 9, 2000). This proclamation
describes the area as a "biological crossroads--the interface of the Cascade, Klamath, and
Siskiyou ecoregions, in an area of unique geology, biology, climate and topography." Id.
23 Proclamation No. 7398, 66 Fed. Reg. 7,359 (Jan. 17, 2001).
221 Interior Secretary Babbitt's policy was to give local politicians the opportunity to
advance legislation that would assure the protection of areas before he recommended a
monument proclamation to the President. See infra notes 409-10 and accompanying text.
23 For example, the Secretary refused to support legislation that would have established
the Shivwits Plateau National Conservation Area because it did "not establish a management
standard adequate for long-term protection of the unique resources of this area." Shivwitz
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Lands that were protected by legislation in lieu of having monument
designations included Steens Mountain in eastern Oregon,239
Colorado Canyons in Colorado,24 the Santa Rosa and San Jacinto
Mountains in California,2 4' Black Rock Desert in Nevada,242 and Las
Cienegas in Arizona.243 In a significant concession to the manage-
ment precedent established by Secretary Babbitt, all five of these
areas will be managed by the BLM.244 In addition to these designa-
tions, eighty-four million acres of submerged lands in the northwest-
ern Hawaiian Islands were protected by executive order, following
a public comment period,245 under the National Marine Sanctuaries
Act,246 in lieu of granting these lands national monument status.
Several cases involving challenges to the proclamations made by
President Clinton have sought to reopen some of the legal questions
raised in earlier cases regarding the scope of the Antiquities Act. 24
7
Three separate lawsuits were filed challenging various aspects of
the Grand Staircase-Escalante decision.24' The cases were consoli-
dated in the federal district court for Utah, but one of the par-
ties-the Utah Schools and Institutional Trust Lands Administra-
Plateau National Conservation Area Establishment Act: Hearing on H.R. 2795 Before the
House Res. Subcomm. on Nat'l Parks & Public Lands of the House Comm. on Res., 106th
Cong. (1999) (statement of Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior), available at 1999 WL
969928. This area was subsequently protected as part of the Grand Canyon-Parashant
National Monument. Proclamation No. 7265, 65 Fed. Reg. 2,825 (Jan. 11, 2000).
2 Steens Mountain Cooperative Management and Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-399,
114 Stat. 1655 (2000).
'0 Colorado Canyons National Conservation Area and Black Ridge Canyons Wilderness
Act, Pub. L. No. 106-353, 114 Stat. 1374 (2000).
241 Santa Rosa and San Jacinto Mountains National Monument Act, Pub. L. No. 106-351,
114 Stat. 1362 (2000).
242 Consolidated Appropriation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, App. D-1, 114 Stat. 2763.
243 Pub. L. No. 106-538, 114 Stat. 2563 (2000).
244 See 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2000); 16 U.S.C.§ 460mmm.4(a)(2)(A) (2000); 16 U.S.C. § 460nnn-
21(a) (2000); 16 U.S.C. § 46ooo-2(a) (2000) 16 U.S.C. § 460ppp-3(a) (2000).
2 See Exec. Order 13,178, § 8(a). 65 Fed. Reg. 76,903, 76,908 (Dec. 4,2000) (establishing
preliminarily Reserve but also providing that Reserve would be made permanent only after
opportunity for public comment).
246 Exec. Order No. 13,196, 66 Fed. Reg. 7395 (Jan. 18, 2001).
247 See Carol Hardy Vincent & Pamela Baldwin, National Monuments and the Antiquities
Act: Recent Designations and Issues, CONG. RES. SERv. REP. NO. RL30528, Jan. 15, 2001 at
11-12, available at http://www.cnie.orglnle/crsreprots/public/pub-15.pdf (last visited Feb. 12,
2003).
24 See, e.g., Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Clinton, No. 2:97 CV 0479, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15852 (D. Utah Aug. 11, 1999).
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tion-settled their case after Congress passed legislation providing
for the exchange or disposition of state lands located inside the
monument's borders.24 Another lawsuit was filed in federal court
in Arizona challenging the Grand Canyon-Parashant National
Monument.25 Finally, two lawsuits were filed in federal court in
the District of Columbia. One of these was a generic lawsuit filed
by the Mountain States Legal Foundation challenging various
aspects of four national monument designations, namely Canyons
of the Ancients, Cascade-Siskiyou, Hanford Reach, and Ironwood.
251
The other was filed by Tulare County and others challenging the
Giant Sequoia National Monument.252 In these last two cases, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed
district court decisions granting the federal government's motion to
dismiss the cases, finding that the proclamations easily met the
court's limited review authority.
253
Given the size of many of the Clinton monuments, one issue that
is likely to arise in these cases is whether a monument can be
designated to protect a large landscape or ecosystem. While the
Clinton proclamations take care to identify particular "objects of
historic and scientific interest," they also acknowledge the impor-
tance of landscapes and ecosystems for the protection of biological
resources. For example, while the relevant proclamation describes
the Sonoran Desert National Monument as "a magnificent example
of untrammeled Sonoran desert landscape" and as encompassing "a
functioning desert ecosystem," 254 it also describes in detail the
specific plant and animal communities and the historic and
archaeological objects located within the monument. 255 Thus, it may
21 Id.; see also Engineering & Mining Journal, North American Roundup (Oct. 1, 1999),
available at http://e-mj.com/ar/mining-north-american-roundup-4 (last visited Feb. 17,
2003).
' Esplin v. Clinton, CIV 00-0248 PCT PGR (D. Az filed Jan. 25,2000), available at http://
www.citizensalliance.org/links/pages/legal%20issues/lanas-injunction.htm (last visited Mar.
14, 2003).
251 Mountain States Legal Found. v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
252 Tulare County v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also supra notes 17, 70 and
accompanying text.
25 Tulare County, 306 F.3d at 1141; Mountain States, 306 F.3d at 1137-38.
25 Proclamation No. 7397, 3 C.F.R. 22 (2001).
w Id.
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be unnecessary for the government to claim that a landscape or an
ecosystem is itself the "object" protected in a proclamation.
Even if the government relies on a landscape or ecosystem to
defend a monument decision, however, it seems likely that such
"objects" would qualify for monument status. The vast literature
that has developed in recent years describing landscape ecology and
ecosystem management offers strong support for the claim that a
landscape or ecosystem is a legitimate object of scientific interest.256
Moreover, if the courts continue to follow the deferential approach
taken by the United States Supreme Court in Cameron25" and
Cappaert,2M the Wyoming district court in Franke,259 the Alaska
district court in Anaconda,2 6' and the District of Columbia circuit
court in Tulare County2 ' and Mountain States,26 2 a proclamation
protecting a landscape or ecosystem seems likely to be upheld.263
To be sure, the legal analysis offered in the Antiquities Act cases
has been sparse,26 4 and it is possible that some future court will take
a closer look at the scope of the Antiquities Act. But it remains
unlikely that any court will overturn a presidential proclamation
2m See, e.g., REED F. NOSS & ALLEN Y. COOPERRIDER, SAVING NATURE'S LEGACY 87, 89
(1994). Among other things, the authors describe the emerging science of conservation
biology, stating, "The fundamental belief of conservation biology is that biodiversity is good
and should be conserved. The mission of conservation biology, then, is to conserve as much
of global diversity as possible and to allow evolution to continue generating biodiversity." Id.
at 85-86. In order to conserve biodiversity, the authors promote the protection of ecosystems,
as well as ecological processes for "[m]anag[ing] landscapes and communities... to maintain
the evolutionary potential of the biota." Id. at 89.
2 252 U.S. 450 (1920).
'8 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
25 58 F. Supp. 390 (D. Wyo. 1945).
20 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1853 (D. Alaska 1980).
261 306 F.3d 1138 (D. C. Cir. 2002).
306 F.3d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
2' Alternatively, plaintiffs may argue that, if the Antiquities Act allows such designa-
tions, they constitute an unconstitutional delegation of authority to the President. As noted
previously, however, the courts rarely strike down legislation on this ground. See supra note
70 and accompanying text. Moreover, even if the standards established under the Antiquities
Act are fairly general, they are likely to be sufficient to satisfy a reviewing court. See supra
note 70 and accompanying text.
' See generally, e.g., Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920); Tulare County, 306
F.3d at 1141-42; Wyoming v. Franke, 53 F. Supp. 890, 897-98 (D. Wyo. 1945).
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declaring a national monument, absent compelling evidence that the
area designated lacks objects of historic or scientific interest.265
IV. THE MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL MONUMENTS
A. WHAT MAKES A MONUMENT?
Among the quandaries posed by the terse language in the
Antiquities Act is the uncertainty over the management and use
restrictions that apply to national monuments. The statute
authorizes the President to "reserve" the land, but does not require
that he do 80.266 Moreover, the scope of any such reservation may
vary considerably, and the monuments proclaimed thus far reflect
a wide diversity of restrictions.6 7 In general, however, virtually all
2 As described more fully below, President Clinton's recent monument designations
include a substantial record and bibliography of authorities that support the designations.
See infra note 426 and accompanying text. Accordingly, unless the record distorts the facts,
it may be difficult to overturn these designations under current case law. See generally
Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920). Given this fact, it might make strategic sense
for plaintiffs to focus on particular portions of a monument that they believe do not meet the
criteria established in the proclamation and the supporting literature. It will likely be
difficult and perhaps impractical or even impossible, to identify such tracts and to
demonstrate with certainty that the tracts are not part of the landscape or ecosystem that
was intended for protection. Moreover, the federal government will likely follow the strategy
that was used to defend the Jackson Hole National Monument, which was to avoid focusing
on particular portions of the monument, but rather to treat the monument and its resources
as a single, unified entity. See Franke v. United States, 58 F. Supp. 890, 895-96 (D. Wyo.
1945).
2 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2000).
" President Carter's Alaska proclamations generally were more detailed than those of
his predecessors in describing the objects to be protected, and in articulating restrictions on
use. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 4625, 93 Stat. 1473 (1978); Proclamation No. 4626, 98 Stat.
1472 (1978); Proclamation No. 4627, 93 Stat. 1473 (1978). The Clinton-era proclamations
continued this trend. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 6920, 3 C.F.R. 64 (2000); Proclamation No.
7295, 65 Fed. Reg. 24095 (Apr. 15, 2000). Most proclamations generally preclude, either
explicitly or implicitly, most forms of physical appropriation of the land. See, e.g.,
Proclamation No. 658, 34 Stat. 3236, 5237 (1906) (Warning is hereby expressly given to all
unauthorized persons not to appropriate, injure, or destroy... or to locate or settle on any
of the lands reserved"). The Clinton monuments, however, address issues such as grazing,
off-road vehicle use, and hunting and fishing, that were often ignored in earlier proclama-
tions. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 7397, 3 C.F.R. 22 (2001); Proclamation No. 7319, 65 Fed.
3d Reg. 37253 (June 9, 2000). Some of the Clinton-era proclamations allow uses such as
grazing to continue, subject to the overriding goal of protecting the objects identified in the
proclamation. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 7393, 3 C.F.R. 32 (2001) (allowing pre-monument
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monument proclamations contain very similar language warning
"all unauthorized persons not to appropriate, injure, destroy, or
remove any feature" of the monument, and "not to locate or settle
upon any of the lands thereof."268 Furthermore, when a monument
is declared on lands that previously have been reserved for other
purposes, the monument designation is declared to be the "dominant
reservation. 26 9 The significance of this standard language became
most apparent in the Mount Olympus National Monument, when
Gifford Pinchot drafted language that he thought would allow
logging to continue within the monument. Pinchot's language
provided in relevant part that:
mhis proclamation is not intended to prevent the use of
the lands for forest purposes under the proclamation
establishing the Olympic National Forest, but the two
reservations shall both be effective on the land with-
drawn.27" '
This language was followed, however, by the standard language
making the monument designation dominant, and the standard
warning against appropriating, injuring, removing, or destroying
any features of the monument. 72 Based upon this language, the
grazing policies to "continue to apply"). Others restrict such uses. See, e.g., Proclamation No.
7394, 3 C.F.R. 7 (2001) (requiring Interior Secretary to retire grazing allotments within
monument "unless the Secretary specifically finds that livestock grazing will advance the
purposes of the proclamation"); Proclamation No. 7397, 3 C.F.R. 22 (2001) (providing that
grazing permits south of Interstate 8 "shall not be renewed at the end of their current term");
Proclamation No. 7399, 3 C.F.R. 32 (2001) (prohibiting anchoring and "all extractive uses"
including fishing, subject to limited exceptions).
Even the earliest proclamations include this language except for the word "remove" in
the first clause. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 658, 34 Stat. 3236 (1906); Proclamation No. 2226,
34 Stat. 3265 (1937). The most recent proclamations employ this language verbatim. See,
e.g., Proclamation No. 7397, 3 C.F.R. 22 (2001); Proclamation No. 7399, 66 Fed. Reg. 7364
(Jan. 17, 2001).
' See, e.g., Proclamation No. 7320, 65 Fed. Reg. 37259 (June 9, 2000) C[Mhe national
monument shall be the dominant reservation.").
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Department of the Interior concluded that logging was not allowed
within the monument.273
For monuments that become part of the national park system,
the National Park Service Organic Act requires strict management
to protect and preserve the lands within the monument.274 Monu-
ments that are managed by the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service as part of the National Wildlife Refuge System are subject
to other, albeit less stringent, restrictions.2 7 ' By contrast, for
monuments on Forest Service or BLM lands, broader uses may be
allowed.276
At a minimum, all national monument lands are off limits to new
mineral leasing277 under the express terms of the Mineral Leasing
Act.27 ' Furthermore, land management agencies entrusted with
273 See LIEN, supra note 115, at 39 (noting that Interioa Secretary Ballinger, and his
successor Walter Fisher, had construed Antiquities Act to preclude mining and logging in
national monuments).
w See 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2000):
The (National Park) service thus established shall promote and regulate
the use of the Federal areas known as national parks, monuments, and
reservations hereinafter specified ... by such means and measures as
conform to the fundamental purpose of the said parks, monuments and
reservations, which purpose is to conserve the scenery and the natural
and historic objects and the wildlife therein and to provide for the
enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave
them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.
Id.
"5 Management of units of the National Wildlife Refuge System are governed by the
National Wildlife Refuge Administration Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd-668ee (2000).
Among other things, that law makes it illegal to "disturb, injure, cut, burn, remove, destroy,
or possess any real or personal property of the United States, including natural growth, in
any area of the System; or take or posses any fish, bird, mammal, or other wild vertebrate or
invertebrate animals or part or nest or egg thereof within such area" unless permitted in
accordance with regulations promulgated by the Secretary. Id. § 668dd(c).
26 Unlike special purpose agencies, the Forest Service and the BLM both follow a
multiple use/sustained yield mandate. 16 U.S.C. § 529 (2000); 43 U.S.C. § 1732 (2000).
277 Typically, national monument proclamations are made subject to valid existing rights,
thereby protecting the rights of persons who have valid leases at the time of the proclamation.
See, e.g., Proclamation No. 7397, 3 C.F.R. 22 (2001) ("The establishment of this monument
is subject to valid existing rights.").
278 30 U.S.C. § 181 (2000) ("Deposits of coal, phosphate, sodium, potassium, oil, oil shale,
gilsonite... or gas, and lands containing such deposits, but excluding lands.., in national
parks and monuments .... shall be subject to disposition [under the Mineral Leasing Act.]")
(emphasis added); see also National Monuments, 60 Interior Dec. 9, 10, No. M-34978, 1947
WL 5112 (Dep't of the Interior, July 21, 1947). In the Canyons of the Ancients National
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management of a national monument are charged with managing
the "objects" as may be necessary to fulfill the purposes of the
proclamation. 7 ' This usually means withdrawing the area from
location under the mining laws.28° It also may require restrictions
on grazing, rights-of-way, and other uses of the land, including
recreational uses.2 8' These restrictions can be imposed in the
proclamation itself,282 but to the extent that they involve discretion-
ary actions, such as a decision to grant a new right of way, they
Monument in Colorado, Proclamation No. 7317, 3 C.F.R. 93 (2000), President Clinton
provided that:
Because most of the Federal lands have already been leased for oil and
gas, which includes carbon dioxide, and development is already occurring,
the monument shall remain open to oil and gas leasing and development;
provided, the Secretary of the Interior shall manage the development,
subject to valid existing rights, so as not to create any new impacts that
interfere with the proper care and management of the objects protected
by this proclamation; and provided further, the Secretary may issue new
leases only for the purpose of promoting conservation of oil and gas
resources in any common reservoir now being produced under existing
leases, or to protect against drainage.
Id. Arguably, this leasing provision in the Canyons of the Ancients Proclamation conflicts
with the Mineral Leasing Act. The Attorney General has determined that "where oil is being
drained from Government-owned land that is not subject to the Mineral Leasing Act, there
is implied authority in the head of the department having jurisdiction over such land to take
protective measures to offset the drainage, including the making of the necessary contracts."
National Monuments, 60 Interior Dec. at 10 (interpreting meaning of 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 41
(1941)). Solicitor White construed this language to allow oil and gas leasing in the Jackson
Hole National Monument where federal resources were at risk of being lost, notwithstanding
the plain language of the Mineral Leasing Act. Id. While the Canyons of the Ancients
Proclamation allows new leases more broadly than were authorized by the Solicitor's opinion,
the narrow leasing authority contained in the Canyons of the Ancients Proclamation is
arguably consistent with the intent of that opinion, which was to avoid the waste of federal
resources.
" See, e.g., Proclamation No. 7320, 65 Fed. Reg. 37259 (June 9, 2000) ('The Secretary of
the Interior shall manage the monument.., to implement the purposes of this proclama-
tion.").
2mo Id.
2"1 See, e.g., Proclamation No. 7397, 3 C.F.R. 22 (2001) (prohibiting "all motorized and
mechanized vehicle use off road," and, subject to valid existing rights, withdrawing land from
'all forms of entry, location, selection, sale, or leasing, or other disposition under the public
lands laws"). This proclamation also provides that grazing leases south of Interstate 8, which
runs through the center of the monument, "shall not be renewed at the end of their current
term." Id.
282 Id.
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might simply be handled in the course of managing the
monument.1
3
National monuments may be reserved only "upon the lands
owned or controlled by the Government of the United States. 284
Thus, while the exterior boundaries of a monument may enclose
private or state-owned land, the monument does not include those
lands.285 Monuments also may include submerged lands that are
under the "control" of the United States." 6 The Office of Legal
Counsel in the Department of Justice has determined that this may
include lands in the territorial sea,287 which extends twelve miles
' All of the federal land management agencies prepare land use plans to govern the
management of particular tracts of land. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (2000) (governing land
use planning on BLM lands). Separate plans are likely to be developed for each monument,
and these plans will identify compatible and incompatible uses throughout the monument.
See, e.g., Bureau of Land Management, Cascade-Siskiyou National Monument, Draft
Resource Management Plan/Environmental Import Statement (May 2002), available at http://
www.or.blm.gov/csnm/Docs/Volume%201-%2OIntroduction.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2003).
2" 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2000).
285 Id.
2W0 Id.
28' A nation is sovereign in its territorial sea. 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 238, 240 (1988).
Under a 1988 presidential proclamation, President Reagan extended the territorial seas of
the United States to twelve nautical miles seaward. Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777
(Dec. 27, 1988). The Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (2000), however,
generally granted to the states all "right, title, and interest" over submerged lands from the
high water mark to three miles seaward. Id. § 1311. Nonetheless, the Attorney General has
taken the position that the President may proclaim a national monument over submerged
lands under the primary jurisdiction of the states in accordance with the Submerged Lands
Act. Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department
of Justice, to John Leshy, Solicitor, Department of Interior, James Dorskind, General
Counsel, National Organic and Atmospheric, Administration, and Dinah Bear, General
Counsel, Counsel on Environmental Quality 4-9 (Sept. 15, 2000), available at http://www.
atlantisforce.org/dojl.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2003). According to the Assistant Attorney
General, this is because the United States retains some measure of "control" over lands
within the zero-to-three mile range under § 6(a) of the Submerged Lands Act. Id. It provides
that the United States retains "its rights in and powers of regulation and control of said lands
and navigable waters for the constitutional purposes of commerce, navigation, national
defense, and international affairs." 43 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (2000); see also Memorandum from
Randolph D. Moss, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, to John Leshy,
Solicitor, Department of Interior, James Dorskind, General Counsel, National Organic and
Atmospheric, Administration, and Dinah Bear, General Counsel, Counsel on Environmental
Quality 4-9 (Sept. 15, 2000), available at http://www.atlantisforce.org/doj 1.html (last visited
Feb. 16, 2003). In United States v. California, 436 U.S. 32 (1978), the Supreme Court
concludes that the submerged lands within the Channel Islands National Monument, which
extended one mile from the shore, were conveyed to the State of California in the Submerged
Lands Act of 1953. Id. at 41. But the Court does not explicitly find that these lands are no
LEGACY OF THE ANTIQUITIES ACT
seaward, and even those within the exclusive economic zone of the
United States, which extend two hundred nautical miles seaward.2
This latter issue arose in the context of a proposal to establish a
national monument over a substantial tract of predominantly
submerged lands in the northwestern Hawaiian Islands. Although
this area was ultimately protected by an executive order under the
National Marine Sanctuaries Act,2"9 the Office of Legal Counsel
opined that a national monument encompassing these submerged
lands would have been a viable option.29 °
As described in greater detail below,29 the management policies
put in place by Secretary Babbitt, especially for BLM monuments,
may go a long way toward focusing the attention of policymakers
and perhaps even the courts on the essential characteristics that
make a particular national monument. But ultimately, it seems
that national monuments are a bit like snowflakes, each with a
character of its own.
B. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES IN MONUMENT MANAGEMENT
The Antiquities Act does not grant any particular federal agency
the responsibility for managing national monuments,2 92 and
management of the early monuments was often given to the agency
with prior jurisdiction over the lands.293 Between 1910 and 1925,
longer part of the monument. On the contrary, at the end of its opinion, the Court notes that
the Submerged Lands Act"provides for the retention by the United States of its navigational
servitude and its 'rights in and powers of regulation and control of said lands and navigable
waters for the constitutional purposes of commerce, navigation, national defense, and
international affairs."' Id. at 41 n.8 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (2000)) (emphasis added).
Under the Antiquities Act, the retention of some "control" over the lands is all that is required
to allow designation of a national monument. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2000).
Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10605 (Mar. 10, 1983).
2 Exec. Order No. 13,196, 66 Fed. Reg. 7,395 (Jan. 18, 2001).
290 Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department
of Justice, to John Leshy, Solicitor, Department of Interior, James Dorskind, General
Counsel, National Organic and Atmospheric, Administration, and Dinah Bear, General
Counsel, Counsel on Environmental Quality 11-17 (Sept. 15, 2000), available at http://www.
atlantisforce.org/dojl.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2003). Management of any such monument
must, however, be consistent with "recognized rules of international law." Id. at 16.29 See infra notes 433-36 and accompanying text.
292 See 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2000).
293 ROTHMAN, supra note 22, at 49.
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nine national monuments were placed under the jurisdiction of the
Department of War.294 The United States Forest Service in the
Department of Agriculture was responsible for more than twenty
monuments carved out from Forest Service lands before 1943, and
the National Park Service in the Department of the Interior was
responsible for those monuments on lands managed by the Interior
Department. 29 This system did not work well for any of these three
agencies. The War Department showed little interest in managing
its monuments, and frequently authorized private organizations to
manage those monuments which attracted tourists. As a result,
even the Statue of Liberty-the War Department's premier
site-suffered by comparison to its counterparts in the Park
Service. 96
The Forest Service and the "utilitarian conservation" approach
pioneered by Gifford Pinchot2 97 were at odds with the Park Service
and its preservation mandate.298 More importantly, the competition
between the two agencies to administer the same lands was fierce,
and Forest Service monuments were often perceived-correctly it
seems 299 -as a target for Park Service acquisition.0" But the Park
29, Id.
m See LEE, supra note 23, at ch. 8. In 1915, the War Department issued Bulletin No. 27,
which purported to establish fifty additional national monuments on military lands, including
the Statue of Liberty (which was adjacent to Fort Wood). ROTHMAN, supra note 22, at 191.
Though the bulletin remained in effect for ten years, these "monuments" were not lawful
because the Antiquities Act authorizes only the President to declare national monuments.
Id. Bulletin No. 27 was finally rescinded on March 20, 1925 by War Department Bulletin No.
2. LEE, supra note 23, at ch. 8 n. 160. Five of these monuments were ultimately ratified by
President Coolidge, however, including the Statue of Liberty. Proclamation No. 1713,43 Stat.
1968 (1924); LEE, supra note 23, at ch. 8; ROTHMAN, supra note 22, at 191.
2 ROTHMAN, supra note 22, at 192-93. On November 16, 1925, the War Department
appointed William A. Simpson as the first superintendent of the Statue of Liberty National
Monument. Id. at 193. His responsibilities were essentially custodial, and they did not even
include explaining the historical importance of the monument to the general public. Id.
29 HARO K. STEEN, THE U.S. FOREST SERVICE: A HISTORY 153-59 (1976).
2m 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2000); see also Wood, supra note 74, at 116 (arguing that rivalry between
Park Service and Forest Service had salutary effect of pushing Forest Service toward its own
program to protect aesthetic resources and preserve wilderness areas).
9 Perhaps the most famous forest reserve converted to a national park is the Grand
Canyon. President Benjamin Harrison created the Grand Canyon Forest Reserve in 1893,
and withdrew the land from homestead entry, notwithstanding the fact that the area had few
trees. Proclamation No. 45, 27 Stat. 1064 (1893). Theodore Roosevelt subsequently declared
the land a national monument but provided that the Forest Service would continue to manage
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Service was not entirely comfortable with managing monuments
either, especially those that did not meet the standards for grandeur
that had come to characterize the early national parks.301
When Congress was considering passage of the National Park
Service organic legislation,"' it originally proposed to transfer
jurisdiction over all national monuments to the Park Service.30 3 The
final version of the law, however, merely grants to the Park Service
jurisdiction over those monuments "now under the jurisdiction of
the Department of the Interior,"' 4 and authorizes the Park Service
to make regulations for those monuments under their jurisdiction.0 5
Following the passage of the 1916 National Park Service organic
legislation, presidents continued to designate monuments and place
them under the jurisdiction of the United States Forest Service."°
In 1929, President Herbert Hoover requested an opinion from the
Attorney General on the President's authority to transfer those
national monuments under the jurisdiction of the War and Agricul-
ture Departments to the National Park Service.307 The Attorney
General concluded that the President lacked such authority because,
the lands. Proclamation No. 794, 35 Stat. 2175 (1908). In 1919 the Grand Canyon became
a national park and was placed under the jurisdiction of the National Park Service. Act of
Feb. 26, 1919, 40 Stat. 1175 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 221-222 (2000)).
" ROTHMAN, supra note 22, at 140-45. The Bandelier National Monument in New
Mexico offers one of the better examples of the conflicts between the two agencies. Originally
under the jurisdiction of the Forest Service, the Park Service was unhappy with the way in
which the Forest Service managed the cultural resources of the monument. Id. In 1924,
Stephen Mather, the Director of the National Park Service, proposed creation of a 200,000-
acre Cliff Cities National Park that would include Bandelier and much more national forest
land. Id. Eventually, the Forest Service reluctantly agreed to transfer jurisdiction over a
slightly enlarged 26,000-acre monument to the National Park Service. Proclamation No.
1991, 47 Stat. 2503 (1932); ROTHMAN, supra note 22, at 145-59.
so ROTHMAN, supra note 22, at 119-39.
302 Act of Aug. 25, 1916, ch. 408, 39 Stat. 535.
w3 H.R. 15522, 64th Cong. (1916), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 64-700, at 1 (1916).
a04 16 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). This section also provides that for monuments "contiguous to
national forests the Secretary of Agriculture may cooperate with [the] National Park Service
to such extent as may be requested by the Secretary of the Interior." Id.
w 16 U.S.C. § 3 (2000). As noted previously, the statute also requires management of all
monuments for conservation purposes and "by such means as will leave them unimpaired for
the enjoyment of future generations." Id. § 1.
's Examples include Lehman Caves National Monument, Proclamation No. 1618,42 Stat.
2260 (1922); Timpanogos Cave National Monument, Proclamation No. 1640, 42 Stat. 2285
(1922); and Lava Beds National Monument, Proclamation No. 1755, 44 Stat. 2591 (1925).
' 36 Op. Att'y Gen. 75 (1929).
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under the Antiquities Act, "Congress intended that jurisdiction to
administer the national monuments which the President was...
authorized to create should reside in the Departments which had
jurisdiction respectively of the land within which the monuments
were located." 8' The Attorney General based his conclusion on
language in the Antiquities Act which recognized that several
federal departments might have jurisdiction over tracts of land that
were designated as national monuments. °9 But nowhere does this
language require that the lands remain under that department's
jurisdiction once a monument has been created. Perhaps a better
explanation for the decision is simply that the Antiquities Act
contains a limited delegation to the President that authorizes him
to designate national monuments but does not authorize him to
transfer jurisdiction over federal lands. Since Congress has the
constitutional authority to regulate federal lands,31 national
monuments designated by the President must, absent other
authority, remain with the department that has jurisdiction over
the lands before the monument is proclaimed.3"
Surprisingly, and in apparent derogation of this advice, Herbert
Hoover transferred jurisdiction over at least two national monu-
ments. One was Arches National Monument in southeastern Utah.
The public lands that made up this monument had been under the
jurisdiction of the General Land Office, but were transferred to the
National Park Service in the 1929 proclamation establishing the
monument. 12 The other was the Bandelier National Monument in
Id. at 77.
Id. (stating that §§ 1, 3, and 4 of the Antiquities Act support this conclusion).
310 U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
" The opinion, 36 Op. Att'y Gen. 75, 79 (1929), also cites an earlier Attorney General
Opinion, 28 Op. Att'y Gen. 143, 144 (1910), holding that absent authority from Congress,
lands reserved for military purposes cannot be transferred to another department. A 1923
Attorney General Opinion appears to limit the scope of the Camp Hancock opinion and
suggests that it does not apply where the President is exercising "broad discretionary powers"
to reserve land (e.g., under the implied authority of United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S.
459 (1915)). 33 Op. Att'y Gen. 436, 437 (1923). But since the Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. § 431
(2000), contains express reservation authority, this Attorney General Opinion does not seem
applicable to national monument proclamations.
812 Proclamation No. 1875, 46 Stat. 2988 (1929).
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New Mexico, which Hoover transferred from the Forest Service to
the Park Service in 1932.813
In 1933, Congress passed legislation granting the President
broad authority to "[tiransfer the whole or any part of any executive
agency and/or functions thereof to the jurisdiction ... of any other
executive agency. 81 4 On June 10, 1933, acting pursuant to this
authority, President Franklin Roosevelt issued Executive Order No.
6,166, which provides in relevant part as follows:
All functions of administration of public buildings,
reservations, national parks, national monuments, and
national cemeteries are consolidated in an Office of
National Parks, Buildings, and Reservations 15 in the
Department of the Interior, at the head of which shall be
a Director of National Parks, Buildings, and Reserva-
tions; except that where deemed desirable there may be
excluded from this provision any public building or
reservation which is chiefly employed as a facility in the
work of a particular agency. This transfer and consoli-
dation of functions shall include, among others, those of
the National Park Service of the Department of the
Interior and the National Cemeteries and Parks of the
War Department which are located within the continen-
tal limits of the United States. National cemeteries
located in foreign countries shall be transferred to the
Department of State, and those located in insular
possessions under the jurisdiction of the War Depart-
3" Proclamation No. 1991, 47 Stat. 2503 (1932). Bandelier was originally established
under Proclamation No. 1322, 39 Stat. 1764 (1916). It was enlarged and transferred to the
National Park Service in the 1932 proclamation. Proclamation No. 1991,47 Stat. 2503 (1932).
81 Act of Mar. 3, 1933, ch. 212, 47 Stat. 1489, 1517.
3'5 Renamed the National Park Service by the Act of Mar. 2, 1934, 48 Stat. 362, 389.
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ment shall be administered by the Bureau of Insular
Affairs 1 ' of the War Department. 17
The result of this order was to move to the Park Service numerous
national monuments which were previously managed by non-
Interior agencies, primarily the Forest Service in the Department of
Agriculture.
On September 29, 1933, the Secretary of Agriculture wrote to the
Secretary of the Interior requesting to exclude the fifteen national
monuments then under the jurisdiction of the Forest Service from
Executive Order No. 6,166.8' The Secretary of Agriculture noted
that the lands embraced Within the fifteen national monuments
were also withdrawn for national forest purposes, and that this
"duality of withdrawal [was] specifically recognized in the proclama-
tions by which fourteen of the monuments were created." 1 ' The
Agriculture Secretary thought that the "most practicable and
satisfactory adjustment of this matter would be to exempt the
fifteen areas from the transfer to keep them under unified manage-
ment." 2 ' The Solicitor disagreed, stating:
Whether or not these monuments, due to their dual
status as both national forests and national monuments,
may be more efficiently administered under the jurisdic-
316 The functions of the Bureau of Insular Affairs were transferred to the Division of
Territories and Island Possessions in the Department of the Interior by Reorganization Plan
No. 2 of 1939. 4 Fed. Reg. 2731 (May 9, 1939).
317 Exec. Order No. 6,166, § 2 (June 10, 1933), available at http://www.archives.gov/
federaL-register/codificationexecutiveorder06166.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2003). Section
22 of Executive Order No. 6,166 provides that "this order shall become effective 61 days from
its date." Id. On July 28, 1933, President Franklin Roosevelt issued Executive Order No.
6,228, which modified Executive Order No. 6,166 before it took effect in several respects. For
example, the newer order contains a specific list of all War Department cemeteries and parks
transferred to the Interior Department under Executive Order No. 6,166, but provides that
the transfer of national cemeteries not listed was postponed "until further order." Id.
Furthermore, it revokes the provision that provides for the transfer of national cemeteries
located in foreign countries to the Department of State. Id.
"' See Transfer of National Monuments Located in National Forests, 54 Interior Dec. 314,
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tion of the Agriculture Department or the Interior
Department is not for legal determination, but should be
considered administratively. 21
Furthermore, he noted that the dual status of these lands as both
monuments and national forests did not make the Interior Depart-
ment's administration of these monuments "impossible or impracti-
cable." '22
The Secretary of Agriculture also asked whether the exception
clause in Executive Order No. 6,166 for "reservations... employed
as facilities" might be invoked to allow the Forest Service to
administer the monuments that would otherwise have been
transferred under the order.323 The Solicitor concluded that such
exceptions could be made only within the sixty-day congressional
waiting period required for executive orders under the 1933
Reorganization Act.324 According to the Solicitor, once that time
expired, "the status of all monuments transferred or consolidated
became crystalized, and changes [could] be effected only through
further action by the President or Congress.3 25
One issue left unresolved by Executive Order No. 6,166 is
whether it applies only to monuments in existence at the time the
order was entered in 1933, or whether it also applies to future
national monuments established by presidential proclamation. The
language of the Executive Order applies arguably to existing and
future monuments, since it provides for the transfer of "all functions
of administration of... national monuments" rather than providing
for the transfer of monuments themselves.326 In fact, presidents




32" 54 Interior Dec. at 316.
" Exec. Order No. 6,166 (June 10, 1933), available at http://www.archives.gov/federaL
register/codification/executive-order/06166.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2003).
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have continued to transfer lands to the National Park Service upon
their designation as a national monument.127
In 1978, however, when President Carter proclaimed seventeen
new or expanded national monuments in Alaska, he left two of those
monuments under the management of the United States Forest
Service. 28 This decision triggered two brief legal opinions from the
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the Department of Justice relating
to the administration of national monuments by non-Interior
agencies.329 In an opinion dated February 9, 1979, the OLC found
that Executive Order No. 6,166 "requires the transfer of manage-
ment functions [for national monuments on national forest lands]
'" See, e.g., Proclamation No. 3889, 83 Stat. 924 (1969) (establishing Marble Canyon
National Monument and revising boundaries of Kaibab National Forest to eliminate national
monument lands). The proclamation itself is unclear as to whether the National Park Service
is supposed to manage these lands, but that appears to have been the intent since the
proclamation cites with approval an Advisory Board endorsement to include Marble Canyon
in the National Park System. See id.
m See Proclamation No. 4611, 3 C.F.R. 69 (1979); Proclamation No. 4623, 3 C.F.R. 93
(1979). See also Proclamation No. 4612, 3 C.F.R. 72 (1979); Proclamation No. 4613, 3 C.F.R.
74 (1979); Proclamation No. 4614, 3 C.F.R. 76 (1979); Proclamation No. 4615, 3 C.F.R. 78
(1979); Proclamation No. 4616,3 C.F.R. 80 (1979); Proclamation No. 4617,3 C.F.R. 82 (1979);
Proclamation No. 4618, 3 C.F.R. 84 (1979); Proclamation No. 4619, 3 C.F.R. 86 (1979);
Proclamation No. 4620, 3 C.F.R. 88 (1979); Proclamation No. 4621, 3 C.F.R. 89 (1979);
Proclamation No. 4622, 3 C.F.R. 91 (1979); Proclamation No. 4624, 3 C.F.R. 96 (1979);
Proclamation No. 4625, 3 C.F.R. 98 (1979); Proclamation No. 4626, 3 C.F.R. 100 (1979);
Proclamation No. 4627, 3 C.F.R. 102 (1979). The 56 million acres included Aniakchak,
Becharof, Bering Land Bridge, Cape Krusenstern, Denali, Gates of the Arctic, Glacier Bay,
Katmai, Kenai Fjords, Kobuk Valley, Lake Clark, Noatak, Wrangell.St. Elias, Yukon Charley,
Yukon Flats, Admiralty Island (Agriculture), and Misty Fjords (Agriculture) National
Monuments. These monuments were subsequently modified by the Alaska National Interest
Lands Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233 (2000). Most of the monument lands were
converted to other conservation system units. See 16 U.S.C. § 3102(4) (2000) (defining
conservation system unit); see also 16 U.S.C. § 410nn (2000).
' See generally 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 396 (1980); 3 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 85 (1979).
The conduct of litigation on behalf of the United States generally is reserved to the
Department of Justice and the Attorney General. 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519(2000). Likewise, all
legal advice provided by the Office of Legal Counsel, under delegation from the Attorney
General, generally is binding on executive branch agencies. See Pub. Citizen v. Burke, 843
F.2d 1473, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Archivist's testimony before Congress that opinion
is binding on National Archives); Tenaska Washington Partners II, L.P. v. United States, 34
Fed. Cl. 434 (1995) (stating that "OLC [opinion] is binding on the Department of Justice and
the executive branch agencies"); see also 28 U.S.C. § 512 (2002) (stating thatAttorney General
is to advise heads of executive departments); 28 C.F.R. § 0.25 (2000) (describing general
function of Office of Legal Counsel).
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from the Forest Service to the National Park Service.""33  The
opinion further stated that "[i]t is not possible to amend Executive
Order-No. 6,166 merely by issuing an amendatory order because the
original order itself became effective only with the assent of Con-
gress.""3 ' In support of this claim, the OLC cited a 1934 Attorney
General Opinion addressing the legality of two proposed executive
orders submitted by the Director of the Budget.33 ' The first delayed
the effective date of section 18 of Executive Order No. 6,166; the
second revoked section 18 entirely.3 3 The 1934 opinion concluded
thaf, although:
[t]he statute does not expressly authorize the President
to revoke in whole or in part any Executive order which
has become law.., where as here, the President deter-
mines after further investigation that certain provisions
of such an Executive order "are not in the public interest
or consistent with the efficient operation of the govern-
ment," he is impliedly authorized by the statute to revoke
such provisions in the same manner in which they were
enacted into law.
34
The 1933 Reorganization Act expressly authorized the adoption of
executive orders, provided that such orders were first submitted to
the Congress for a sixty-day waiting period while the Congress was
in session. 35 Contrary to the implication of the 1979 Office of Legal
Counsel opinion, however, the 1934 opinion did not require congres-
sional assent for such orders to take effect. 3 6 Indeed, the 1934
opinion expressly approved the proposed executive orders amending
Executive Order No. 6,166 as to "form and legality" without the
congressional authorization that the 1979 opinion suggests was
& 3 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 85, 85 (1979).
' Id. at 90.
37 Op. Att'y Gen. 418 (1934).
Id. at 418-19.
Id. at 419 (emphasis added).
3 Act of March 3, 1933, ch. 212, § 407, 47 Stat. 1519.
r 37 Op. Att'y Gen. 418 (1934).
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needed. 87 Thus, following the 1934 opinion, the President may
issue an executive order that amends or overrides Executive Order
No. 6,166 without congressional authorization, even if that order is
otherwise construed to have prospective effect.38"
The 1979 opinion also addressed the exception clause in Execu-
tive Order No. 6,166 finding that it did not apply to these monu-
ments, because the national forest land in question could not be
considered a reservation" 'which is chiefly employed as a facility in
the work of a particular agency.' " Accordingly, the 1979 opinion
concluded that Executive Order No. 6,166 "does require the transfer
of management [to NPS], and that a legally effective reorganization
plan, or other legislative action, is necessary in order to authorize
the Forest Service to administer the two monuments."340
Following a Department of Agriculture request to reconsider its
opinion, the Office of Legal Counsel issued a second opinion in 1980
that distinguished an agency's responsibility as land manager on
lands encompassing a national monument from the National Park
Service's responsibility as monument administrator.3 41  While
affirming its previous finding that "Executive Order No. 6166
creates management authority in the National Park Service with
respect to national monuments," the 1980 opinion conceded that the
Forest Service may participate in the management of monuments
on national forest lands so long as the order establishing the
7 Id. This point finds support in a 1996 memorandum prepared by the American Law
Division of the Congressional Research Service, which stated, "The 1979 Legal Opinion stated
that the 1933 Order had required 'the assent of Congress,' but this is not the case."
Memorandum by Pamela Baldwin, American Law Division of the Congressional Research
Service 14 (Dec. 13, 1996) (on file with the American Law Division).
" See generally Baldwin, supra note 337.
3 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 85, 86 (1979) (quoting Exec. Order No. 6,166 (1933)).
3'0 Id. at 85. The 1979 opinion also addressed the Forest Service's argument that the
National Forest Management Act (NFMA) requires congressional approval before forest lands
are removed from Forest Service jurisdiction. Id. at 87-89. The relevant provision of NFMA
states that "no land now or hereafter reserved or withdrawn from the public domain as
national forests... shall be returned to the public domain except by an act of Congress." 16
U.S.C. § 1609(a) (2000). A Senate Report describing this language suggested that it "in effect,
gives Congressional status to National Forest lands." S. REP. No. 94-893, at 19 (1976). The
Office of Legal Counsel opinion, however, describes this language as "at best, inconclusive"
and found that the relevant language from NFMA merely precludes restoration of the land
to the public domain. 3 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 85, 88-89 (1979).
"' 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 396, 396-99 (1980).
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monument does not terminate the national forest status of the
lands. 42 Moreover, while the 1980 opinion noted that the Depart-
ments of Agriculture and Interior had reached an agreement that all
management responsibilities for national monuments on national
forest lands established prior to 1933 (the effective date of Executive
Order No. 6,166) were transferred to the National Park Service,343
it conceded that a dual management structure-in which Interior
administered the monument and Agriculture managed the
forest-was possible for post-1933 monuments:
[A] determination as to pre-1933 monuments ... does
not preclude a case-by-case administrative decision as to
the proper management of post-1933 national monu-
ments to the extent permitted by the executive order and
any other applicable statutory authorities. Executive
Order 6166 creates management authority in the
National Park Service with respect to national monu-
ments even if created on forest lands; whether that
authority is exclusive, additional, delegable, or forfeitable
depends on the terms of the order and other authorities
that may exist with respect to the lands.,
44
The 1980 opinion thus seems to open the door for the President
to grant limited authority to the pre-monument land management
agency for both the management and administration of a monu-
See id. at 399:
The USDA and Interior representatives agreed that the Forest Service
and the National Park Service would enter into a memorandum of
understanding to govern the management of these monuments, account-
ing for the land use standards binding on the departments and specifying
each department's regulatory and budgetary responsibilities. We have
concluded that this is a permissible option for structuring the manage-
ment responsibilities of the two departments.
Id.
43 A 1972 agreement between the Departments of Agriculture and Interior accepted the
conclusion of the 1933 Solicitor's Opinion, 54 Interior Dec. 314, 316, 1933 WL 1976 (Dep't of
the Interior Oct. 24, 1933), that jurisdiction over pre-1933 monuments had been transferred
to the National Park Service.
'" 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 396, 398-99 (1980) (emphasis added).
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ment--even if that agency is outside the Department of the
Interior-in the order creating the national monument. 34 ' But it
remains at odds with the view taken by the Attorney General in
1934 that Executive Order No. 6,166 can be amended by a new
executive order. 46
In 1950, Congress enacted legislation authorizing Reorganization
Plan No. 3 of 1950.14' This plan was designed to consolidate in the
Secretary of the Interior all of the various legal authorities previ-
ously vested by Congress in the various specific bureaus and offices
of the Interior Department. 348 Among other things, it provided that,
with certain exceptions not relevant here, "there are hereby
transferred to the Secretary of the Interior all functions of all other
officers of the Department of the Interior and all functions of all
agencies and employees of such Department." '49 The Reorganization
Plan went on to authorize the Secretary to delegate any function
back to various bureaus and offices:
The Secretary of the Interior may from time to time
make such provisions as he shall deem appropriate
authorizing the performance by any other officer, or by
any agency or employee, of the Department of the
Interior of any function of the Secretary, including any
function transferred to the Secretary by the provisions
of this reorganization plan.
s5
Technically, however, the 1980 opinion only considers the possibility of shared
management responsibilities, because that is all the USDA's General Counsel requested in
seeking reconsideration of the 1979 opinion.
3" See 37 Op. Att'y Gen. 418 (1934). Moreover, it may be inconsistent with the
determination made in the 1979 Office of Legal Counsel Opinion that an effective
reorganization plan or legislative action was necessary for the Forest Service to administer
the monuments. 3 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 85, 90 (1979).
" Reorg. Plan No.3 of 1950, reprinted in 5U.S.C. app. at 105 (2000), and in 64 Stat. 1262
(1950).
"8 Id.
39 Id. § l(a).
m Id. § 2. The Departmental Manual implements the Reorganization Plan through
secretarial delegations of various functions to various assistant secretaries and bureaus.
Department of Interior, Department Manual, Parts 200-296, available at http:/elipse.doi.gov/
table.cfm (last visited Mar. 14, 2003). Since it was established in 1849, the most recent
codification of the Department of the Interior restates the consolidation of authorities in the
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Thus, whether or not Executive Order No. 6,166 applies prospec-
tively, the 1950 legislation allows the Secretary of the Interior to
transfer functions internally from the National Park Service to
other Interior agencies. 5' This legislation did not resolve whether
monuments designated on lands under the jurisdiction of non-
Interior agencies must be administered by the National Park
Service in accordance with Executive Order No. 6,166. Moreover,
even for transfers within the Interior Department, the enactment of
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) in 1976
may confound the otherwise plain authority contained in the 1950
legislation.
Section 204 of FLPMA broadly defines a "withdrawal" as
"withholding an area of Federal land" from the operation of certain
public land laws, or "transferring jurisdiction over an area of Federal
land."35'  Section 204(j) of FLPMA further provides that "[t]he
Secretary shall not... modify or revoke any withdrawal creating
national monuments." The statute does not speak to the Secretary's
authority to "make" withdrawals creating national monuments as
it does with respect to other types of withdrawals in the very same
section of the statute. 5 Thus, it appears that the Secretary retains
the authority to "make" a withdrawal-not by creating a monument,
Secretary and the power to redistribute these authorities by delegation under Reorganization
Plan No. 3. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1472 (2000).
"I Congress ratified Executive Order No. 6,166 in 1984 as part of a sweeping legislative
approval of plans put into effect under various reorganization acts after an appellate court
retroactively struck down one such act on the ground that it contained an unconstitutional
legislative veto. EEOC v. CBC, Inc., 743 F.2d 969, 975 (2d Cir. 1984). The 1984 legislation
included the Reorganization Act that authorized Executive Order No. 6,166 even though it
did not contain an unconstitutional legislative veto. Act of Oct. 19, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-532,
98 Stat. 2705. By its terms, however, the ratification language of the 1984 legislation did not
purport to give prospective effect to orders such as Executive Order No. 6,166. Rather, it
merely "ratifie[d] and affirm[ed] as law each reorganization plan" previously implemented,
and further ratified "[a]ny actions taken prior" to 1984 "pursuant to a reorganization plan
ratified and affirmed" under the 1984 law. Id.
5 43 U.S.C. § 1702(j) (2000) (emphasis added). This language relating to the transfer of
jurisdiction does not apply to" 'property' governed by the Federal Property and Administra-
tive Services Act" which includes acquired lands. Id.
m See 43 U.S.C. § 1714() (2000) C'The Secretary shall not make, modify, or revoke any
withdrawal created by Act of Congress; make a withdrawal which can be made only by Act




since that authority is vested in the President-but rather by
transferring the jurisdiction of a national monument from one
agency to another. This would include the authority to transfer to
or from an agency outside the Department of the Interior with the
consent of the outside agency. 5 4 Such "withdrawals," however,
would have to comply with the withdrawal process established
under section 204 of FLPMA, which includes compliance with the
National Environmental Policy Act.355
On the other hand, a decision to transfer a national monument
to another agency after it has been established by proclamation
might reasonably be viewed as a modification of an existing
withdrawal, and this would seem to be more in line with the plain
meaning of the terms "make" and "modify." If so, section 204(j) of
FLPMA precludes the Secretary from transferring jurisdiction over
national monuments.
The FLPMA withdrawal provisions can be avoided altogether if
the President simply designates the current Interior Department
management agency as the monument administrator in the
proclamation establishing the monument. 56 Even assuming that
Executive Order No. 6,166 would otherwise require the National
Park Service to exercise some control over all such national
monuments, Reorganization Plan No. 3 appears to authorize the
Secretary to keep the management responsibilities with the existing
management agency. 57 This was the approach taken, for example,
43 U.S.C. § 1714(i) (2000).
See generally 43 C.F.R. § 2300 (1994) (governing FLPMA.withdrawals); 43 C.F.R. §
2310.3-2(b)(3) (1994) (providing for NEPA compliance).
' The President's authority to designate a land management agency from within the
Department of the Interior derives from one of at least two possible sources. First, the
President may override Executive Order No. 6,166 with a subsequent executive order as is
clearly contemplated in the 1934 Attorney General's Opinion. 37 Op. Att'y Gen. 418, 419-20
(1934). Alternatively, he can exercise the authority of the Secretary as his superior officer,
under Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1950, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 105 (2000), and in 64
Stat. 1262 (1950).
" Reorg. Plan No.3 of 1950, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 105 (2000), and in 64 Stat. 1262
(1950). Since there is no transfer of jurisdiction under this scenario, FLPMA's withdrawal
requirements would not come into play.
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in the proclamation setting aside the Grand Staircase-Escalante
National Monument""8 and Vermillion Cliffs National Monument.35
Conversely, if the President wishes to have the National Park
Service manage monument lands that were previously managed by
another agency-whether within the Department of the Interior or
not-he may use Executive Order No. 6,166 to accomplish that
result since, unlike the Secretary, the President is not subject to the
restrictions at section 204(j) of FLPMA.36 ° This was apparently the
basis upon which lands previously under the management of the
Bureau of Land Management within the enlarged Pinnacles
National Monument proclaimed by President Clinton were placed
under the jurisdiction of the National Park Service. 36 ' Likewise,
certain lands in the enlarged Craters of the Moon National Monu-
ment in Idaho were placed under the Park Service's authority, while
other lands within the monument remain under the jurisdiction of
the Bureau of Land Management." 2 The only limitation on this
authority may be for United States Fish and Wildlife Service
management of national wildlife refuges, since the National Wildlife
Refuge Administration Act provides that lands within the refuge
system "shall continue to be part of the System until otherwise
specified by an Act of Congress."3
Finally, if the President wants to leave the jurisdiction of
monument lands with a non-Interior agency, such as the United
States Forest Service, he may either have to accept a limited role for
the National Park Service, as was done with the Giant Sequoia
National Monument,36 4 or he may try to amend Executive Order No.
6,166 in the manner provided under the 1933 Reorganization Act,
as was suggested by the 1934 Attorney General's Opinion. 65
35 Proclamation No. 6920, 3 C.F.R. 64 (1997).
" Proclamation No. 7374, 3 C.F.R. 199 (2001).
43 U.S.C. § 1714(j) (2000).
Proclamation No. 7266, 3 C.F.R. 13 (2001).
Proclamation No. 7373, 3 C.F.R. 194 (2001).
16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(3) (2000).
Proclamation No. 7295, 3 C.F.R. 60 (2001).
37 Op. Att'y Gen. 418,418-20 (1934). This approach would run counter to the 1979 and
1980 opinions from the Office of Legal Counsel. See 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 396, 396-99
(1980); 3 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 85, 85-90 (1979).
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V. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF MONUMENT DECISIONS
A. JURISDICTION TO HEAR MONUMENT CHALLENGES
The United States Constitution vests in the President the power
and responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted."3  The judicial power, by contrast, "extends to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the
United States . .. and to Controversies to which the United States
shall be a party."36 In Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court
made clear that this language gives the judicial branch the author-
ity "to say what the law is." '  Nonetheless, in Franklin v. Massa-
chusetts,3 69 the Supreme Court held that the judicial review
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) do not
apply to the President. 3" Thus, to the extent that the authority to
review presidential decisions proclaiming national monuments rests
upon the APA and its waiver of the federal government's sovereign
immunity, Franklin might suggest that review of such decisions is
unavailable.
As Professor Bruff has noted, the APA chapter on judicial review
merely codified the existing law of nonstatutory equitable remedies
such as mandamus, injunction, and declaratory relief. 71' Thus,
reliance on the APA is not necessary to obtain equitable relief from
presidential decisions, and limited review of presidential decisions
has been allowed. 72 If the APA does not apply, then the court must
U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 3.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 788-801 (1992).
e Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (2000).
' Harold H. Bruff, Judicial Review and the President's Statutory Powers, 68 VA. L. REV.
1, 21 (1982). This approach has been followed by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. See Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(holding that nonstatutory judicial review of presidential actions generally is available).
7 See Reich, 74 F.3d at 1324 (allowing such review). To support its decision, the Reich
court relied substantially on American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94
(1902). In McAnnulty, the Court allowed an action to go forward seeking to restrain a
subordinate from carrying out the orders of the Postmaster General. Id. at 97. The Court
held that "in case an official violates the law to the injury of an individual, the courts
generally have jurisdiction to grant relief." Id. at 96. While neither McAnnulty, nor any of
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determine the scope of judicial review for presidential decisions.3 73
Since judicial review of non-presidential agency decisions under the
APA is highly deferential, 74 judicial review of presidential decisions
should be at least as deferential. Nonetheless, if review is to be
meaningful, the courts must be allowed to assess the record of the
President's decision and determine whether the President's action
is rationally related to the statutory authority and purpose.7 5
In Wyoming v. Franke,176 the United States District Court for the
District of Wyoming reviewed the proclamation establishing the
Jackson Hole National Monument under an "arbitrary and capri-
cious" standard of review. 7  Although Franke was decided before
the APA was enacted, the arbitrary and capricious standard that
the court purports to follow is the same standard that would apply
under the APA. 7' As construed by the Franke court, however, this
standard is more deferential than the APA standard in concluding
the other cases cited by the court involved an action by the President, the court found that
the fact that the challenged action was that of the President was not sufficient to "insulate
the entire executive branch from judicial review." Reich, 74 F.3d at 1328. As for sovereign
immunity, the court found that the "APA's waiver of sovereign immunity applies to any suit
whether under the APA or not," citing previous decisions of the District of Columbia Circuit.
Id.; see also Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 420 (1998) (upholding constitutional
challenge to President's exercise of "line item veto"); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 660 (1952) (striking down, on constitutional grounds, executive order
providing for seizure of steel mills in order to avert nationwide strike was not authorized by
Constitution).
" See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ('It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
374 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2000).
T5 Bruff, supra note 371, at 51-57. Professor Bruff discusses several appellate court
decisions which appear to follow this approach toward judicial review of presidential
decisions, although perhaps not as rigorously as even this highly deferential standard might
warrant. Id. Bruff also discusses Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrus, 14 Env't Rep. Cases (BNA)
1853 (D. Alaska 1980), a case challenging several national monument proclamations issued
by President Carter to protect federal lands and resources in Alaska. Bruffs discussion of
this case, however, appears in the context of congressional acquiescence to presidential
decisions. Bruff, supra note 371, at 36-40. Since Carter's actions plainly were premised on
a federal statute, this case might be viewed as supporting deferential review of presidential
decisions made pursuant to a statute. See 16 U.S.C. § 1616(d)(2) (2000); see also notes 257-63
and accompanying text.
376 58 F. Supp. 890 (D. Wyo. 1945).
Id. at 894.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000).
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that a reviewing court may not question "the judgment of the officer
as to the existence of the facts calling for the action.
' 79
A more recent decision from the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia supports the Franke result. In Tulare
County v. Bush,8 ' the court considered this question in the context
of an appeal from President Clinton's decision proclaiming the Giant
Sequoia National Monument in California. 8 ' The court found that
non-APA review was available, but that its review authority was
limited to the question of whether the President had "exercised his
discretion in accordance with the standards of the Antiquities
Act."82 According to the court, review was limited to determining
whether the President had properly exercised his discretion under
the law.8 ' The court found that it could not review "the President's
determinations and factual findings.""3 4
B. STANDING AND RIPENESS ISSUES IN CHALLENGES TO MONUMENT
DECISIONS
Assuming that judicial review is available, a party seeking to
challenge a monument decision still must demonstrate that they
have standing to sue, and that the case is ripe for judicial review.
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,3"5 the Supreme Court set forth the
"constitutional minimum" for standing.e First, a party must show
379 58 F. Supp. at 896; see also Motor Vehicle Manufacturer's Ass'n v. State Farm Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1971):
[Tihe agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory
explanation for its action including a 'rational connection between the
facts found and the choice made.'... Normally, agency rule would be
arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which
Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation that runs counter
to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.
Id. (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962).
38 185 F. Supp. 2d 18 (D.D.C. 2001).
'"' Proclamation No. 7295, 65 Fed. Reg. 24,095 (Apr. 15, 2000).
382 Tulare County, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 25.
Id. at 25.
'9 Id.
504 U.S. 555 (1992).
3 Id. at 560.
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"injury in fact." 7  Second, the injury must be traceable to the
defendant's conduct.' Finally, it must be likely that the plaintiffs
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.18 9
The ripeness doctrine is intended to avoid the "premature
adjudication" of issues until an agency decision becomes final and
"its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties."390 It
requires a reviewing court "to evaluate both the fitness of the issues
for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding
court consideration." 9 ' Monument decisions are final decisions, and
thus the first prong of the ripeness doctrine will not likely prevent
monument challenges. The standing test, and the second prong of
the ripeness test, however, both require an assessment of the impact
of the agency action on the party initiating the challenge, and these
may pose a more difficult hurdle for prospective plaintiffs.
Certain parties should have no difficulty obtaining judicial review
of monument decisions. For example, an off-road vehicle enthusiast,
who is denied off-road access to public lands because of the express
language in a monument proclamation, likely suffers a sufficient
injury and hardship to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts. On the
other hand, a person who merely anticipates future problems
because of a monument decision may face a more formidable
obstacle. For example, a mining claimant who holds preexisting
mining claims in a newly proclaimed national monument retains
valid existing rights, which generally protect the miner's legal right
to maintain and ultimately develop those claims. Such claimants
may justifiably believe that their ability to mine inside the bound-
aries of the monument will be severely hampered, and perhaps even
precluded, 92 by the monument designation. Nonetheless, such
" Id. (noting that injury must be "concrete and particularized" and "actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical").
3" Id.
Id.
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967).
9' Id. at 149.
' The government's authority to preclude public land mining on valid mining claims is
the subject of intense debate. One of the chief critics of the law is John Leshy, the Solicitor
at the Interior Department during the Clinton Administration. See generally JOHN D. LESHY,
THE MINING LAW: A STUDY IN PERPETUAL MOTION (1987). Toward the end of the Clinton
Administration, the Department of the Interior promulgated a controversial rule which
2003]
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parties do not likely face a sufficient "imminent" injury or hardship
to overcome standing and ripeness challenges until they have had
their right to mine specifically curtailed by a subsequent agency
decision.39
VI. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MONUMENT PROPOSALS IN THE
CLINTON ADMINISTRATION
The Antiquities Act received scant attention from the Clinton
Administration until the reelection campaign of 1996. This changed
in dramatic fashion on September 18, 1996 when, with little
advance warning to Utah's governor and congressional delegation,
President Clinton designated 1.7 million acres of land in southern
Utah as the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument. 94 The
President's action was controversial in Utah and throughout the
West,8 95 but it proved to be enormously popular throughout the
country,3 9 and it set the stage for an unprecedented expansion of
authorized the Bureau of Land Management to deny mining operation plans on otherwise
valid mining claims if those operations would cause unnecessary and undue degradation of
the public lands. 65 Fed. Reg. 69,998 (Nov. 21, 2000). The regulation was based upon a
provision in FLPMA which requires the Secretary to "take any action necessary to prevent
unnecessary or undue degradation of the [public] lands." 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2000). The
Bush Administration repealed this rule on October 31, 2001. 66 Fed. Reg. 54,834 (Oct. 30,
2001). A lawsuit has been filed by several environmental groups challenging the repeal.
Mineral Policy Ctr. v. Norton, No. 01-CV-0073 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 16, 2001).
' In a similar context, the Supreme Court held that the Sierra Club's attempt to
challenge the land use management plan for the Wayne National Forest was not ripe for
review because the Sierra Club's potential injury from possible future logging activities would
not occur until the Forest Service took some later action approving one or more timber sales.
Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 738-39 (1998). At that point, the Sierra
Club could challenge the decision to allow logging, including any related issues that might
have arisen under the land use plan. Id. at 733-34.
' Proclamation No. 6920,3 C.F.R. 64 (1996). The President requested a recommendation
on the proposal from Secretary Babbitt in July 1996. Telephone Interview with John Leshy,
Former Solicitor, Department of the Interior (July 20, 2001). The designation followed after
a favorable recommendation from the Secretary. Id.
r See, e.g., Grand Staircase-Esclante National Monument: Before the Subcomm. on
National Parks, Forests, and Lands of the House Comm. on Resources, 105th Cong. (1997)
(statement of Gov. Michael 0. Leavitt).
' See, e.g., The Wilderness Society, The Antiquities Act: Protecting America's National
Treasures, available at www.wilderness.org/newsroom/pdf/antiquitieshandbook.pdf (last
visited Feb. 25, 2003).
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the national monument system.897 During the final year of his
Administration, President Clinton proclaimed twenty-one new or
expanded national monuments, ranging in size from the two-acre
Anderson Cottage in Washington, D.C.,398 to the million-acre Grand
Canyon-Parashant National Monument in northern Arizona. In
total, Clinton added nearly six million acres to the national
monument system.0 °
While national monuments are created by presidential proclama-
tion, the ultimate responsibility for President Clinton's stunning
accomplishment goes to Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt and
his carefully engineered strategy to protect areas deemed worthy of
national monument status.40 '  Babbitt's strategy had both a
procedural and substantive component.4"2
A. THE PROCESS FOR DEVELOPING MONUMENT PROPOSALS
Following the Grand Staircase-Escalante proclamation, calls to
amend or repeal the Antiquities Act were common.40 3 Much of the
criticism was focused on the Administration's failure to consult
adequately with state officials, and the statute's failure to establish
a public process before a proclamation is issued.4 4
To address this criticism, and to defuse efforts to amend or repeal
the Antiquities Act, Babbitt committed to a three-part pro-
cess-which he often described as a "no surprises" policy 40 - before
recommending new national monuments. 406 First, he expressed a
During his second term, Clinton designated eighteen new monuments and expanded
three others. See infra Appendix.
8" Proclamation No. 7329, 3 C.F.R. 123 (2001).
Proclamation No. 7265, 3 C.F.R. 7 (2001).
'o See infra Appendix.
"o Interior Solicitor John Leshy, who like Secretary Babbitt served for the entire Clinton
term, also deserves much of the credit for developing the Antiquities Act strategy.
' See infra notes 403-51 and accompanying text.
4o3 See infra notes 549-56 and accompanying text.
'04 See infra notes 549.56 and accompanying text.
" This should not be confused with another important "no surprises" policy established
by Babbitt under the Endangered Species Act. See 63 Fed. Reg. 8859 (Feb. 23, 1998).
0 See, e.g., Kettle Range Conservation Group, Answers to Frequently Asked Questions
About the Columbus Mountain National Monument Proposal, available at http://www.
kettlerange.org/columbia.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2003) (noting that "Bruce Babbitt had a
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willingness to personally visit any area that his office was consider-
ing for monument status. 40 7 Second, he agreed to meet personally
with local officials and interested members of the public about
different strategies for protecting the area under review. 48 Finally,
he agreed to afford local members of Congress and senators the
opportunity to adopt appropriate legislation to protect the area
under consideration for national monument status before making a
recommendation to the President.4 ' This last concession resulted
in legislation protecting several remarkable areas that would not
likely have received congressional attention without indications
from the Secretary that these areas were being considered for
national monument status.410
Besides adhering to these public initiatives, the Interior Depart-
ment under Secretary Babbitt followed a strict internal process for
developing monument proposals. Babbitt's ability to successfully
promote protection of areas under the Antiquities Act depended on
cooperation from the White House, and President Clinton obligingly
sent Babbitt a letter requesting Babbitt's recommendations for
areas deemed worthy of national monument status.41 In accordance
'no surprises' policy regarding national monuments, requiring that local officials be made
aware of a monument proposal before any formal process could begin").
" Charles Levendorsky, Latest Environmental Policy in to Lie and Plunder, N. COUNTY
TIMES, Apr. 8,2001, availableat http://www.nctimes.net/news/2001/20010408/kkkk.html (last
visited Mar. 14, 2003).
' Babbitt's willingness to meet personally with local officials was perhaps his most
important commitment. His sophisticated understanding of public lands issues, combined
with his well-deserved reputation for working cooperatively with local communities to address
practical concerns went a long way toward diffusing public criticism for the monuments that
were ultimately proclaimed. See John Leshy, The Babbitt Legacy at the Department of the
Interior: A Preliminary View, 31 ENVrL. L. 199, 216-21 (2001) (discussing Babbitt's process
in implementing protections on public lands).
'o See John D. Leshy, Shaping the Modern West: The Role of the Executive Branch, 72
U. COLO. L. REV. 287,307-08 (2001) (discussing relationship between executive and legislative
branches); Sarah Foster, President Targets More Monuments, WORLDNETDAILY, Apr. 20,
2000, available at http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE-ID=18037 (last
visited Feb. 25, 2003) (describing Secretary Babbitt's "promise ... not to designate Steens
Mountains as a monument if Oregon congressmen of both parties come up with legislation...
acceptable to all parties").
410 See supra notes 237-46 and accompanying text.
4" Letter from President Bill Clinton to Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior (Nov. 10,
1998) (on file with author). The letter states in pertinent part:
I would appreciate any recommendations you may have for further
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with Alaska v. Carter,1 2 this insured that Babbitt's recommenda-
tions would not be subject to the NEPA process.4 3 Freed from the
burden of having to engage in a lengthy review process, Babbitt
followed a standardized approach toward developing monument
proposals, and preparing the necessary proclamation and back-
ground documents.
Developing proposals was not difficult. Babbitt's many years of
experience in public life, and his longstanding interest in public
lands, had put him into contact with the people who were likely to
promote monuments, and the places where monuments might be
proclaimed.414 Moreover, the conservation community flooded
Babbitt's office with various proposals, along with thousands of
letters in support of them. For those proposals that appeared to
have merit, and were politically feasible, the Secretary's office
generally would make preliminary inquiries with local congressional
representatives and state officials to gauge the degree of support or
opposition that a proposal might engender.41 5 If at this stage, or any
other stage in the process, it appeared that legislative action to
protect the lands was a possible option, the Secretary would pursue
that avenue with the appropriate congressional representatives.
The Secretary did not shy away from proposals that lacked broad
support from the local political establishment, but local concerns
appropriate exercise of my authority under the Antiquities Act to protect
objects of historic or scientific interest on federal lands. I will seriously
consider and weigh any such proposals in the context of our overall efforts
to save the most valuable, unique, and threatened places in America as a
legacy for our children and grandchildren.
Id.
'12 462 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Alaska 1978); see also Tulare County v. Bush, 185 F. Supp. 2d
18, 28-29 (D.D.C. 2001) (holding that presidential proclamation designating national forest
as national monument is not agency action and thus not reviewable under NEPA).
4" See Carter, 462 F. Supp. at 1160.
" Babbitt served as the Arizona Attorney General from 1975-1978 and was Governor of
Arizona from 1978-1987. He currently serves as Of Counsel at the law firm of Latham &
Watkins in Washington D.C.
"5 If it appeared that the resources proposed for protection might be threatened with
adverse impacts while the proposal was pending, the Secretary would consider a temporary
withdrawal of lands under FLPMA § 204(e). 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) (2000).
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were always part of the calculus."' Of particular concern to the
Secretary was that he not force proposals that might unnecessarily
threaten the Antiquities Act itself.417
If a proposal passed through this filter, then the Secretary would
usually schedule one or more visits to the site and associated
communities. He would walk the ground and meet with local
people, individually and publicly, to discuss their concerns and
hopes for the lands.4"8 Frequently, proposals would change during
these encounters.4 9
B. THE PREPARATION OF MONUMENT DOCUMENTS
For proposals that remained viable after this public process,
document preparation would begin. This included preparing a draft
proclamation, developing maps to describe the area proposed for
designation, and preparing appropriate background documents.
From the earliest history of the Antiquities Act, monument
proclamations were written simply. They described, sometimes
4"' See, e.g., Bruce Babbitt, Remarks at the University of Denver Law School (Feb. 17,
2000), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/archives/000222b.html (last visited Feb. 25,2003).
During his speech he noted that he was "on his way to Grand Junction" where he planned to
"join a dialogue" to protect what later would become the Canyons of the Ancients National
Monument. Id.; see also Proclamation No. 7317, 65 Fed. Reg. 37,243 (June 9, 2000).
417 See infra notes 552-56 and accompanying text. The Secretary understood that the
Antiquities Act was vulnerable to political attack, and that the more the law was used, the
more likely it would be that opponents would try to amend or repeal it.
418 During the course of his tenure, Secretary Babbitt developed a knack for engaging the
public on controversial issues in a personal and highly effective manner. Most notable to this
observer was his willingness to respond directly and honestly to questions asked even when
he knew his response would not be well received by the questioner.
I'l For example, in the Sonoran Desert National Monument, in response to concerns by
the utility industry, language was added in the memorandum supporting the proclamation
indicating that new rights-of-way could be approved through the monument, subject to a
requirement that they be consistent with the monument management plan. See Bureau of
Land Management, Arizona State office, Sonoran Desert National Monument Background
Materials, available at http://www.az.blm.gov/fr-nlcs.htm (last modified Oct. 18, 2002)
("Nothing in this proclamation precludes the issuance of new rights-of-way within existing
right-of-way corridors, so long as the BLM determines, after NEPA compliance, that such
rights-of-way are consistent with the purposes of protecting the objects for which the
monument was established and the monument's management plan."). In the same
proclamation, at the State of Arizona's request, the monument boundaries were adjusted to
exclude state lands along the borders of the monument. Proclamation No. 7397, 66 Fed. Reg.
7354 (Jan. 22, 2001).
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eloquently, but almost always briefly, those objects that were to be
protected in the proclamation.42 The Clinton-era proclamations
followed the trend begun under President Carter and the Alaska
monuments of being somewhat more detailed than their predeces-
sors.421  They describe with particularity the "objects" to be pro-
tected.42' They explicitly withdraw the lands from "all forms of
entry, location, selection, sale, or leasing or other disposition under
the public land laws," including the mining and mineral leasing
laws.4 3 They also typically "prohibit all motorized and mechanized
vehicle use off road" in most circumstances.424 Where appropriate,
they also address whether the monument designation reserves
water rights.425 Otherwise, they follow the historical preference for
simplicity.
Map preparation generally was entrusted to the appropriate land
management agency, which usually had a good idea of the resources,
potential resource conflicts, and topography of the area under
consideration. Draft maps were prepared and studied, and potential
conflicts or issues with other resources were identified. Conflicts
were avoided to the extent possible by carefully drawing monument
boundaries.
"z See, e.g., Proclamation No. 794, 35 Stat. 2175 (1908); Proclamation No. 160, 35 Stat.
2162 (1907).
121 See, e.g., Proclamation No. 4622, 93 Stat. 1465 (1978); Proclamation No. 4623,93 Stat.
1466 (1978).
41 See, e.g., Proclamation No. 7374, 3 C.F.R. 199 (2001); Proclamation No. 7295, 65 Fed.
Reg. 24095 (Apr. 15, 2000).
a2 See, e.g., Proclamation No. 7397, 3 C.F.R. 22 (2001); Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed.
Reg. 50223 (Sept. 18, 1996).
424 See, e.g., Proclamation No. 7398, 66 Fed. Reg. 7359 (Jan. 17, 2001); Proclamation No.
7394, 66 Fed. Reg. 7343 (Jan. 17, 2001). It is not entirely clear whether this language
prohibits new road construction within these monuments, although that appears to have been
the intent. Several of the proclamations require preparation of a transportation plan to
address road closures and travel restrictions. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 7398, 66 Fed. Reg.
7359 (Jan. 17, 2001); Proclamation No. 7343, 66 Fed. Reg. 7343 (Jan. 17, 2001). In other
cases, a general management plan is required. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 7399, 3 C.F.R. 32
(2001) (requiring Secretary to prepare management plan "which addresses... specific actions
necessary to protect the objects identified in this proclamation").
42 For example, the Sonoran Desert proclamation disavows any intent to reserve new
water rights. Proclamation No. 7397, 66 Fed. Reg. 7,354 (Jan. 17, 2001). By contrast, the
Hanford Reach proclamation expressly reserves "a quantity of water in the Columbia River
sufficient to fulfill the purposes for which this monument is established." Proclamation No.
7319, 65 Fed. Reg. 37,253 (June 9, 2000).
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
In addition to preparing draft proclamations and maps, Babbitt's
recommendations to the President included a detailed memorandum
describing the reasons for the recommendation, and including a
bibliography of sources supporting the decision.426  These were
generally developed by Babbitt's staff in conjunction with experts
from within and outside the agency familiar with the landscape.
Press documents also were prepared that summarized the resources
that were proposed for protection under the Antiquities Act.427
When it appeared likely that a monument recommendation would
be made, the Secretary's staff briefed the President's staff at the
Council on Environmental Quality on the background of the
proposal and the possible controversy that the proposal might
engender. A recommendation was sent only after it had received
tentative approval by the White House.
C. DEVELOPING A MONUMENT RECOMMENDATION
On the substantive side, Babbitt was willing to entertain a wide
variety of proposals, but his penchant was for monument proposals
that would protect large landscapes and unique ecosystems. And he
viewed these concepts broadly to encompass landscapes of archaeo-
logical sites.42 Babbitt also made the calculated risk that he could
4. Although the official memoranda to the President were not released, all of the
substantive data contained in the memoranda, including the bibliography, were released to
the public at the time that the recommendation to the President was announced. Although
these documents may not be readily available in all cases, many are available online. The
Bureau of Land Management office in Arizona provides access to relevant monument
documents at http://www.az.blm.gov/fr.nlcs.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2003).
427 See supra note 426 and accompanying text.
' At the University of Denver Law School on February 17, 2000, Babbitt spoke
eloquently about how archaeological sites ought not be viewed in isolation, but rather as part
of a landscape or "anthropological ecosystem." Bruce Babbitt, Remarks at the University of
Denver Law School (Feb. 17, 2000), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/archives/000222b/
html (last visited Feb. 25, 2003). Secretary Babbitt stated, "The real science on these
landscapes doesn't come out of digging out a room and extracting a few pots .... The real
discoveries today come from asking the deeper question of'How did communities manage to
live in spiritual and physical equilibrium with the landscape?'" Id. Babbitt described the
Agua Fria National Monument as:
a defensive community on the ramparts up above Phoenix.... IT]hey've
located line of sight watchtowers and shown how these huge Pueblo ruins
were built in defensive array around about 100,000 acres. The whole
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win approval and broad public support for a substantial number of
new monuments by entrusting their management to the existing
land manager, which in the case of many of the largest new
monuments was the Bureau of Land Management.429
The environmental community has long been skeptical of the
Bureau's ability to manage lands for conservation purposes.4 °
Historically, the Bureau had aligned itself with the ranching and
mineral industry, earning the agency the derisive sobriquet "the
Bureau of Livestock and Mining. ' 41 But Babbitt sensed that at
least some within the Bureau were ready to assume the conserva-
tion mantle, and the monument initiative was just the vehicle to
steer the agency in this new direction." 2
Babbitt chose to promote this initiative by establishing a new
subagency within the Bureau of Land Management that is responsi-
ble for managing national monuments and other Bureau lands with
a conservation focus such as wilderness areas. 43  The National
landscape is kind of a Masada in central Arizona. As a single ruin it's not
a very interesting place. But all of the sudden you think of Masada and
how this all fits together and it's a starburst of revelation and the
protection is fitted to the landscape.
Id.
4 See, e.g., Proclamation No. 6920,61 Fed. Reg. 50223 (Sept. 18,1996); Proclamation No.
7394, 66 Fed. Reg. 7343 (Jan. 17, 200 1). This also allowed the Department of Interior to avoid
potentially difficult issues regarding the President's authority to transfer management
jurisdiction over national monument lands. See supra notes 292-365 and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., George Cameron Coggins & Doris K. Nagel, "Nothing Beside Remains": The
Legal Legacy of James G. Watt's Tenure as Secretary of the Interior on Federal Land Law and
Policy, 17 B.C. ENVrL. AFF. L. REV. 473,483 (1990) (noting that Bureau of Land Management
"has long been considered a model of the'capture' phenomenon because some of its operations
essentially have been controlled by the entities that the agency is supposed to regulate").
' See, e.g., Jenny Jackson, Redrocks, FOREST VOICE ONLINE, available at http://www.
forestcouncil.org/voice/issues/02Ifall/redrocks3.php (last visited Feb. 25, 2003). The article
notes that "[t]he BLM is sometimes called the 'Bureau of Livestock and Mining.' It's a title
it often deserves." Id.
In his University of Denver Law School speech, Babbitt noted that:
the largest (public) land manager [the BLM] ought to have a sense of pride
rather than simply having a bunch of inventory out in the garage that is
discovered and given to someone else.... I think you give an institution
some pride and some direction, not by stripping it [ofl its best assets.
Babbit, supra note 428.
in See Bureau of Land Management, Questions and Answers: National Landscape
Conservation System, available at http://www.blm.gov/nhp/news/releases/pages/2000/
NLCSQ&As.615a.htm (last modified June 29, 2000) (noting system is designed to include
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Landscape Conservation System (NLCS) was designed to give the
Bureau a conservation mission distinct from the other land protec-
tion agencies such as the National Park Service. The focus of the
NLCS is on managing landscapes and ecosystems and eliminating
incompatible uses.43 4 In keeping with this focus, units of the NLCS
provide opportunities for visitor use, but generally promote such use
without visitor centers and other facilities in the monument itself.
To the extent that such facilities are needed, they usually will be
built in nearby communities or on the periphery of the monument.4 5
The Bureau of Land Management also intends to allow a wider
range of uses within its NLCS units to the extent such uses are
consistent with other management authorities and, in the case of
national monuments, with the proclamation establishing the
monument. Thus, while new mineral development and new road
construction generally is precluded in Bureau of Land Management
monuments, hunting and grazing may continue to the extent that
such uses are consistent with the management of the objects
identified for protection in the proclamation.436
It remains to be seen how such notions of multiple use will play
themselves out in the context of monument management, especially
under the leadership of a new administration which shows every
sign of favoring more extractive uses on public lands, including
national monuments. Certainly, some forms of hunting and
recreational activities are compatible with the protection of some
objects, and the proclamations generally leave the state game and
fish departments in charge of regulating hunting and fishing
activities. 4"1 But other uses, such as grazing, may be more problem
national monuments, national conservation areas, wilderness areas and wilderness study
areas, national wild and scenic rivers, and national scenic and historic trails on BLM land).
Id. (noting that "management will focus on conservation").
Id. ('While there will be opportunities for visitation, there will be no major facilities
located within these areas. Visitor contact and information facilities will be located in
adjacent communities or at the periphery of the units.").
4W id.
" See, e.g., Proclamation No. 7398, 66 Fed. Reg.7359 (Jan. 17, 2001) ('Nothing in this
proclamation shall be deemed to enlarge or diminish the jurisdiction of the State of Montana
with respect to fish and wildlife management."). The State of Arizona has complained,
however, that its ability to manage monument lands is unduly restricted. See The Wilderness
Society, National Monument Designation in Arizona: Governor Hull's Letter and the Facts,
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atic. Indeed, in two of the proclamations signed at the end of his
term-Kasha-Katuwe Tent Rocks and Sonoran Desert-President
Clinton required the elimination of livestock grazing over much or
all of the monument to promote the protection of these areas. 48" The
Steens Mountain legislation also provides for elimination of certain
livestock grazing, albeit through the vehicle of land exchanges.439
The proclamation for the Cascade-Siskiyou National Monument in
Oregon requires the Bureau to "study the impacts of livestock
grazing on the objects of biological interest in the monument with
specific attention to sustaining the natural ecosystem dynamics."44
The study is now ongoing but could plainly lead to restrictions on
grazing in the monument.441
Authorizations for new rights-of-way across monument lands also
may raise difficult questions. The broad language in the Clinton
monument proclamations withdrew "[a]U Federal lands and
interests in land . . . from all forms of. . . disposition under the
public land laws," which would appear to include new rights-of-
at 2, available at http://www.wilderness.org/newsroom/pdf/hull~etter-factsheet.pdf (last
visited Feb. 25, 2003). The State's complaint arose in the context of an attempt by the
Arizona Game and Fish Department to chain an area within the Grand Canyon-Parashant
National Monument to improve wildlife habitat. Id. The Bureau of Land Management
refused to allow the chaining because it was contrary to the Bureau's policies. See Bureau
of Land Management, Interim Management Policy, BLM National Monuments, available at
http://www.blm.gov/nhp/efoia/wo/woerr.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2003). Subsequently, when
the Secretary proposed to designate the Sonoran Desert National Monument, the State of
Arizona sought assurances that it would be allowed to retain its artificial water holes, which
are maintained for wildlife purposes. See Proclamation No. 7397,66 Fed. Reg. 7354 (Jan. 17,
2001).
43 See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
"' See Steens Mountain Cooperative Management and Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §
460nnn-23(e) (2000) (requiring cancellation of certain grazing permits "on Federal lands in
the Fish Creek/Big Indian, East Ridge, and South Steens allotments," and prohibiting future
grazing on these lands).
"' Proclamation No. 7318, 65 Fed. Reg. 37,249 (June 9, 2000); see also Bureau of Land
Management, Cascade-Siskiyou National Monument: Draft Study of Livestock Impacts on
the Objects of Biological Interest (Apr. 2001), available at http://www.or.blm.gov/medford/
docs/CSNMRangeStudy.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2003).
"" See Bureau of Land Management, Cascade-Siskiyou National Monument: Frequently
Asked Questions, available at http://www.or.blm.gov/csnm/faq.htm# (last visited Feb. 25,
2003) (responding to question on grazing, Bureau states that allotments within monument
may be restricted or retired if grazing is found to be incompatible with area's natural
ecosystem).
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way.442 The memoranda from the Secretary that accompanied the
recommendations to President Clinton typically addressed rights-of-
way in a very general manner, noting that "[s]ome existing rights-of-
way may include valid existing rights," but indicating that "[t]he
exercise of such rights may be regulated to protect the purposes of
the proposed monument, but any regulation must respect such
rights."443  New rights-of-way were not generally mentioned.444
When the issue of new rights-of-way was raised squarely, however,
in the context of the Sonoran Desert National Monument, the
Secretary agreed to include an additional sentence in the memoran-
dum which reads as follows:
Nothing in this draft proclamation precludes the issu-
ance of new rights-of-way within existing right-of-way
corridors, so long as the BLM determines, after NEPA
compliance, that such rights-of-way are consistent with
the purposes of protecting the objects for which the
monument was established and the monument's man-
agement plan.445
While it thus appears that new rights-of-way under strict conditions
might be allowed in the Sonoran Desert National Monument, the
"' See, e.g., Proclamation No. 7374, 3 C.F.R. 199 (2000); Proclamation No. 7295, 65 Fed.
Reg. 24095 (Apr. 15, 2000). In 1908, Secretary of the Interior James Garfield addressed
several rights-of-way applications that had been filed by the Grand Canyon Scenic Railroad
Company through the Grand Canyon National Monument. See 36 Pub. Lands Dec. 394, 1908
WL 837 (Dep't of the Interior May 1, 1908). The language of the Grand Canyon proclamation
was even broader than that included in the Clinton-era proclamations. It reserved the land
"from appropriation and use of all kinds under all of the public land laws, subject to all prior,
valid adverse claims." Proclamation No. 794, 35 Stat. 2175 (1908). The Secretary held that
the Department was "without authority to approve [the] applications for rights-of-way." 36
Pub. Lands Dec. at 394.
44 See, e.g., Bureau of Land Management, Grand Canyon-Parashant National Monument
Background Materials (Jan. 11, 2000), available at http://www.az.blm.gov/parashantbkgdp.
htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2003) (containing background memorandum issued by Secretary of
the Interior in conjunction with monument proclamation).
444 Id.
4' Arizona Bureau of Land Management, Sonoran Desert National Monument
Background Materials, available at http://www.az.blm.gov/sonorantsdbkgd.htm (last visited
Mar. 14, 2003).
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absence of comparable language in all of the other memoranda may
suggest a contrary intent for those monuments.
For all of the landscape level monuments, the Clinton proclama-
tions sometimes required the management agency to prepare a
management plan to address appropriate actions that are necessary
to protect the objects identified in the proclamation.446 Such plans
likely will be prepared in accordance with the existing land use
planning authorities of the various management agencies whether
or not they are specifically required in the proclamation. 47 But the
proclamations will clearly limit the management options that would
otherwise be available, especially to agencies like the Bureau of
Land Management. 44 The Bureau has established an Interim
Management Policy for Newly Created National Monuments,4 9 and
has completed its management plan for the Grand Staircase-
Escalante National Monument.450 If that management plan offers
a glimpse into how the Bureau will manage its other monuments,
then the agency appears to be well on its way toward achieving the
transformation that Secretary Babbitt had promoted.45'
'" See, e.g., Sonoran Desert National Monument, Proclamation No. 7397, 66 Fed. Reg.
7,354 (Jan 22, 2001); Proclamation No. 7295, 65 Fed. Reg. 24095 (Apr. 15, 2000).
"4 See 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (2000) (requiring land use planning on BLM lands).
4' This is clear from the language of the proclamations which generally limits or
precludes uses, and which makes the monument the "dominant reservation." See, e.g.,
Proclamation No. 7374,3 C.F.R. 199 (2001); Proclamation No. 7295, Fed. Reg. 24095 (Apr. 15,
2000).
"' Bureau of Land Management, Interim Management Policy for Newly Created National
Monuments (Jan. 11, 2000), available at http://www.az.blm.gov/interimgt.htm (last visited
Oct. 25, 2002).
' Bureau of Land Management, The Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument
Approved Management Plan/Record of Decision, at ch. 2, p. 9 (Feb. 2000), available at http://
www.ut.blm.gov/monument/monumentmanagement/Plan/rod-introduction.html (last visited
Feb. 25, 2003).
"' Id. The final management plan sets aside 65% of the monument in a "Primitive" zone.
The Bureau plans to provide no facilities in this zone and will post only such signs as are
necessary for public safety or resource protection. Id. No motorized or mechanized vehicles
(including bicycles) are authorized in this zone. Id. Approximately 4% of the land will be in
the "Frontcountry" zone, which will be the "focal point of visitation," although visitor centers
themselves will be placed outside of the monument and in the local communities. Id. at ch.
2, p. 8. The "Passage" zone encompasses 2% of the monument and includes the main travel
routes. Id. at ch. 2, p. 9. The remaining 29% of the land is in the "Outback" zone where
motorized and mechanized access will be accommodated, but only on designated routes. Id.
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VII. ABOLITION AND MODIFICATION OF NATIONAL MONUMENTS
The Congress of the United States has the constitutional
responsibility to make all needful rules governing the public
lands,452 and there is no doubt that Congress may use this authority
to alter or repeal monument designations created by the President.
Yet, despite the controversy that frequently surrounds national
monument designations, Congress has only rarely reversed or
curtailed presidential decisions establishing national monuments.453
Congress most often ratifies these presidential actions and builds
upon them by expanding the protected area or upgrading its status
to a national park.454 This has been true even in those cases where
an initial designation by Congress may have been inconceivable.
President Clinton's designation of the Grand Staircase-Escalante
National Monument offers an excellent example. Protection of this
remote area of southern Utah has long been a priority for conserva-
tion groups, but the staunch opposition of the Utah congressional
delegation made it highly unlikely that protective legislation would
have been enacted. 4 5 After the monument was proclaimed, several
unsuccessful attempts were made by Senator Robert Bennett and
Congressman Jim Hansen to enact legislation to undo the
decision. 456  Then, in 1998, Congress passed, and the President
signed, two pieces of legislation that appear to ratify the designation
4' U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
13 Ten national monuments have been abolished, see infra Appendix, but the lands
encompassing at least four of these monuments were conveyed to the state or local
government for use as a public park with a reverter to the United States if the lands ceased
to be used as a park. See Verendrye, 40 Stat. 1677, 1677 (1917), repealed by Act of July 30,
1956, Pub. L. No. 84-846, 60 Stat. 712, 712; Papago Sagualo, 38 Stat. 1991, 1991 (1914),
repealed by Act of Apr. 7, 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-92, 46 Stat. 142, 142; Shoshone Cavern
National Monument, 36 Stat. 2501, 2501-02 (1909), repealed by Act of May 17, 1954, Pub. L.
No. 83-360, 68 Stat. 98, 98.
' Congress has ratified more than half of all of the designated monuments, often by
expanding their boundaries or designating the lands as a national park. See infra Appendix.
' See Leshy, supra note 409, at 305-07.
46 See, e.g., S. 357, 105th Cong. § 4(a)(2) (1997). Under § 4(a)(2) of the proposed
legislation, the Secretary would be required to "manage the resources within the Monument
in accordance with the principles of multiple use and sustained yield (including recreation,
range, timber, minerals, oil and gas, watershed, wildlife, fish, and natural scenic, scientific,
and historical values), using principles of economic and ecologic sustainability." Id.
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of the monument. The first was the Utah School and Land Ex-
change Act, which transferred approximately 176,000 acres of school
trust lands located within the exterior boundaries of the Grand
Staircase-Escalante National Monument to federal ownership in
exchange for a money payment and a transfer of other federal lands
to the State of Utah.45 7 Subsequently, Congress passed the Automo-
bile National Heritage Area Act.45 Title II of that law is entitled
"Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument," and was designed
to correct minor errors in the original proclamation and to make
minor boundary adjustments.4 9
Notwithstanding local opposition, monument designations are
invariably popular with the general public, and it is perhaps for this
reason that Congress has been reluctant to tamper with them once
they have been proclaimed. Assuming then that congressional
action to abolish or significantly diminish a monument is unlikely,
does a future President have the authority to alter a predecessor's
action to proclaim a national monument?
Whether a future President has the authority to abolish a
national monument arguably resolves the question as to whether a
President may reduce the size of a national monument or eliminate
restrictions or conditions included in the proclamation, since the
legal issues are essentially the same. Nonetheless, government
officials and commentators alike generally have viewed these
questions separately,"' and accordingly they are addressed
separately here.
" Utah Schools and Lands Exchange Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-335, 112 Stat. 3139,
3141.
'" Pub. L. No. 105-355, 112 Stat. 3139, 3247 (1998).
49 See id. § 201, 112 Stat. at 3252-53 (modifying boundaries of Grand Staircase-Escalante
National Monument and conveying certain lands to Utah).
See, e.g., 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 185 (1938); see also Pamela Baldwin, Authority of a




A. ABOLISHING NATIONAL MONUMENTS BY PRESIDENTIAL ACTION
The Antiquities Act authorizes the President "to declare by public
proclamation" national monuments." 1 The statute is silent,
however, as to a President's authority to modify or repeal such
proclamations once they are issued.46 ' In 1938, the Acting Secretary
of the Interior proposed to President Franklin Roosevelt the
abolition of the Castle-Pinckney National Monument, which had
been established by President Coolidge in 1924.463 This proposal
was referred to the Justice Department, which rendered a legal
opinion by Attorney General Homer Cummins.6 4 The Attorney
General found that the President lacked the authority to abolish a
national monument, stating:
The grant of power to execute a trust, even
discretionally, by no means implies the further power to
undo it when it has been completed. A duty properly
performed by the Executive under statutory authority
has the validity and sanctity which belong to the statute
itself, and, unless it be within the terms of the power
conferred by that statute, the Executive can no more
destroy his own authorized work, without some other
legislative sanction, than any other person can.465
According to the Attorney General, the Antiquities Act grants a
limited delegation of authority to the President to proclaim national
monuments. 46 It does not authorize the President to abolish
them.467 Once a monument is established by presidential proclama-
' 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2000).
462 Id.
40 Proclamation No. 1713, reprinted in 43 Stat. 1968 (1924).
4' 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 185, 185 (1938); see also Pamela Baldwin, supra note 460. Baldwin
notes that FLPMA § 204(j) specifically provides that the Secretary of the Interior shall not
"modify or revoke any withdrawal creating national monuments under the [Antiquities] Act
of June 8, 1906." 43 U.S.C. § 1714(j) (2000).
'6 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 185, 187 (1938) (quoting 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 359 (1862)).
39 Op. Att'y Gen. 185, 188 (1938).
467 Id.
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tion, only the Congress is free to abolish it in accordance with its
general power over public property. 8' To bolster this conclusion,
the Attorney General noted that the Congress had expressly
authorized the President to both make and revoke withdrawals in
at least two other withdrawal statutes469 but that no such authority
was included in the Antiquities Act.47
Nearly twenty years after the Interior Department proposal to
abolish Castle Pinckney, Congress enacted legislation abolishing the
monument,471 and it has abolished nine other monuments over the
course of the nearly one hundred year history of the Antiquities
Act.4 72  Since the Castle-Pinckney proposal no President has
proposed to abolish a monument on his own authority.
The idea that Congress granted the President "one-way" author-
ity to create, but not revoke or modify, national monuments is
compelling not only when comparing the Antiquities Act with other
withdrawal authority, but also when viewed from the perspective of
the underlying purpose of the Antiquities Act. The impetus to pass
the law came from the concern that spectacular public land
resources might be harmed before Congress could act to protect
them. 478  To address this concern, the Antiquities Act gave the
President limited authority to preserve certain public lands and
their resources until Congress chose to take its own action.4 74
Because Congress has the ultimate authority over public lands
40 Id.
4 Id. (citing Pickett Act of 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-303, 36 Stat. 847. National Forest
Organic Act of 1897, 30 Stat. 11 (1897)). The Pickett Act authorized the President to
"temporarily withdraw... public lands ... such withdrawals... [to] remain in effect until
revoked by him or by an Act of Congress." Pickett Act, 36 Stat. 847, repealed by Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 70-4(a), 90 Stat. 2792 (emphasis
added). The National Forest Organic Act provided in relevant part that "[t]he President is
hereby authorized... to modify any Executive order that has been or may hereafter be made
establishing any forest reserve, and by such modification may reduce the area or change the
boundary lines of such reserve, or may vacate altogether any order creating such reserve."
30 Stat. 11, 36, repealed in part by National Forest Management Act of 1976, 36 U.S.C. §
1609(a) (2000).
470 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 185, 188 (1938).
171 Act of Mar. 29, 1956, Pub. L. No. 447, 70 Stat. 61, 61.
.7 See infra Appendix (providing names, locations, and dates for other monuments that
Congress abolished).
478 See ROTHMAN, supra note 22, at 34.
474 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2000).
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under the Property Clause of the Constitution,475 it is free to undo
or modify the President's action, albeit subject to a possible.
presidential veto. If the President, however, has the power to undo
these protections before the Congress has a chance to act, a resource
might be lost forever. Thus, it is both logical and appropriate to
construe the Antiquities Act to allow a President to protect re-
sources, but to deny a President the authority to undo those
protections. 47
6
B. PRESIDENTIAL MODIFICATION OF MONUMENT PROCLAMATIONS
Even assuming that the President lacks the authority to abolish
monuments, can he nonetheless modify a monument by a proclama-
tion that diminishes its size? 477 The analysis offered in the 1938
Attorney General's opinion suggests that a President may not
modify a monument proclamation. 47' That opinion found that the
President's authority under the Antiquities Act was limited to
designation of monuments, and not to their revocation, in large part
because the Congress did not grant the President revocation
authority as it had done in other statutes.479 One of the laws relied
upon by the Attorney General to support this argument 480 specifi-
cally authorizes the President to "modify any Executive order...
establishing any forest reserve, and by such modification... reduce
475 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
47' David Brower, a renowned conservationist, offered his assessment of the tenuous
nature of land protection measures, noting that "[a]ll a conservation group can do is to defer
something. There's no such thing as a permanent victory. After we win a battle, the
wilderness is still there, and still vulnerable. When a conservation group loses a battle, the
wilderness is dead." JOHN MCPHEE, ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ARCHDRUID 61 (1971).4" Enlarging a monument does not raise the same issue, since the enlargement would not
be valid unless it includes lands that are needed to protect the objects identified in the
original proclamation, or embraces separate objects suitable for protection under the law.
Accordingly, a valid enlargement is either necessary to fulfill the purposes of the original
proclamation, or is capable of standing on its own as a new monument.
478 See 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 185, 186-87 (1938) C'T]he reservation made by the President...
under the statute was in effect a reservation by the Congress itself and that the President
thereafter was without power to revoke or rescind the reservation.").
479 Id.
480 Id. at 188.
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the area or change the boundary lines of such reserve."48 Thus, just
as Congress denied the President revocation authority in the
Antiquities Act, it also might be argued that it denied the President
the power to modify monuments.
Notwithstanding this seemingly ineluctable conclusion, the 1938
Attorney General's opinion accedes to the past practice of some
presidents to "diminish[ ] the area of national monuments estab-
lished under the Antiquities Act by removing or excluding lands
therefrom under that part of the Act which provides that the limits
of the monuments 'in all cases shall be confined to the smallest area
compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to
be protected.' "2 While the Antiquities Act contains the limitation
referenced by the Attorney General, this language cannot rightfully
be construed to authorize a future President to diminish the size of
a monument. This conclusion follows from the fact that an original
monument proclamation, by definition, represents the judgment of
a president that the area protected is the "smallest area compatible
with the proper care and management" of the protected objects.483
Otherwise the proclamation would be invalid on its face. Indeed, all
of the proclamations issued during and after the Carter Administra-
tion specifically state that the area protected is "the smallest area
compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to
be protected."48 4 Thus, allowing a new President to reverse the
considered judgment of a prior President regarding the size of a
national monument is not simply correcting a mistake in an original
proclamation to conform to the narrow language of the statute.
Rather, it allows the new President to exercise a power not granted
under the Antiquities Act, namely the power to reverse the judg-
ment of a prior President and modify a monument proclamation.
Just as the Attorney General determined that the Antiquities Act
delegates a limited power authorizing presidents to create but not
481 Act of June 4, 1897, 30 Stat. 11, 36 (1897) (emphasis added).
2 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 185, 188 (1938) (quoting Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2000)).
39 Op. Att'y Gen. 185, 188 (1938).
See, e.g., Proclamation No. 4611, 93 Stat. 1446, 1447 (1978); Proclamation No. 7295,
65 Fed. Reg. 24095 (Apr. 15, 2000).
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revoke monuments,8 5 so too the law must be construed to limit a
President's power to diminish a monument.
Of course, if a future President can demonstrate that a past
proclamation lacks sufficient specificity to accurately identify the
lands to be protected, then a clarification of an original proclamation
might be in order.4" Likewise, if a future President can demon-
strate that a mistake was made in a previous proclamation as, for
example, where the objects protected plainly did not require the
withdrawal of particular lands, or were located outside the monu-
ment boundaries, then a modification clearly should be sustained.
But where a President exercises his discretion, lawfully including
particular lands within the boundaries of a national monument, that
decision can be reviewed by an appropriate federal court 4 7 or
altered by Congress. However, it should otherwise be immune from
presidential second-guessing.
39 Op. Att'y Gen. 185, 185 (1938).
For example, when President Taft proclaimed the Navajo National Monument, he set
aside:
[All prehistoric cliff dwellings, pueblo and other ruins and relics of
historic peoples, situated upon the Navajo Indian Reservation, Arizona,
between the parallels of latitude thirty-six degrees thirty minutes North,
and thirty-seven degrees North, and between longitude one hundred and
ten degrees West and one hundred and ten degrees forty-five minutes
West.
Proclamation No. 873, 36 Stat. 2491 (1909). As described, the monument encompassed more
than 100,000 acres of land. Hal K. Rothman, Navajo National Monument: A Place and its
People, ch. 2 (1991), available at http://www.nps.gov/nava/adhi/adhi.htm (last visited Feb. 25,
2003). The designation was made because William B. Douglass, the Examiner of Surveys for
the General Land Office, was concerned about the imminent exploitation of the site by an
approaching expedition even before Douglass had the opportunity to survey the site and
identify the precise location of the ruins. Id. After the monument was proclaimed, even
Douglass recognized that the area reserved "was far larger than necessary to protect the
ruins." Id. at ch. 2, text accompanying note 18. Less than three years after he created the
monument, Taft signed a proclamation reducing its size to two 160-acre tracts that were
within the monument's original boundaries and one additional forty-acre tract that included
another nearby ruin. Proclamation No. 1186, 37 Stat. 1733, 1733-34 (1912). While pressure
to reduce the size of the monument came from the livestock industry, and while the
government's limited information regarding the ruins may have led to the omission of some
sites that should have been retained, the original proclamation only reserved the ruins
themselves rather than the land. See ROTHMAN, supra note 486, at ch. 2, text accompanying
notes 34 and 35.
"7 See supra notes 366-84 and accompanying text.
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Construing the Antiquities Act to deny a President the power to
diminish a national monument conforms to the underlying policy of
the law that public lands are held in trust for the entire nation. 8
The Antiquities Act was adopted because of congressional concern
that objects might be lost before they could be protected by the
Congress." 9 To address that concern, the Congress authorized the
President to protect objects, but not to remove such protection once
put in place.49° While this one-way policy might temporarily result
in more protection than Congress ultimately deems necessary, it
ensures that objects considered worthy of protection by one Presi-
dent do not lose that protection until the Congress decides other-
wise. An interpretation of the Act that allows a President to remove
protections once they are in place defeats the statute's policy in
favor of protection.
While the 1938 Attorney General's opinion briefly acknowledged
the past practice of some Presidents to diminish the size of national
monuments, the legality of that practice was not before the Attorney
General.491 Several opinions from the Interior Department Solici-
tor's Office, however, squarely confront this question.492 The issue
arose most prominently in the early history of the Antiquities Act in
the context of the decision of President Woodrow Wilson to reduce,
by approximately half, the size of the more than 600,000-acre Mount
Olympus National Monument that Theodore Roosevelt created.49
Three weeks before Wilson issued his proclamation eliminating half
the monument, the Solicitor issued an opinion approving the
decision.494 The Solicitor's 1915 opinion relied substantially on an
1892 opinion of the Assistant Attorney General dealing with the
President's authority to restore forest reserves to the public domain
' Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409 (1917); Causey v. United
States, 240 U.S. 399, 402 (1916); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911); United
States v. Trinidad Coal & Coking Co., 137 U.S. 160, 170 (1890).
See ROTHMAN, supra note 22, at 34.
39 Op. Att'y Gen. 185, 185 (1938).
4' Id. at 188.
'9 See infra notes 493-539 and accompanying text.
'm Proclamation No. 1191, 37 Stat. 1737 (1912).
Opinion of Apr. 20, 1915 (cited in Opinion of January 30, 1935, M-27657) (on file with
Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Department of the Interior).
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after the lands had been designated under the General Revision Act
of 1891.""5 That statute authorized the President to "set apart and
reserve [forest lands] as public reservations."49 The Assistant
Attorney General found that the "language of the section, and the
theory which prompted the [forest reserve] legislation, seem to have
recognized that said reservation might be temporary or permanent,
as, in the discretion of the President, the good of public service
might demand."497 The Assistant Attorney General's 1892 opinion
4 The Assistant Attorney General's opinion is reproduced at 14 Pub. Lands Dec. 209,
1892 WL 489 (Dep't of the Interior Feb. 19, 1892). The General Revision Act, formerly
codified at 16 U.S.C. § 471 (2000), was modified by the Congress on several occasions, and was
ultimately repealed in its entirety in 1976. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976,
Pub. L. 94-579, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2792. In 1892, when the statute was construed by the
Assistant Attorney General, it provided as follows:
That the President of the United States may, from time to time, set apart
and reserve, in any State or Territory having public land bearing forests,
in any part of the public lands wholly or in part covered with timber or
undergrowth, whether of commercial value or not, as public reservations,
and the President shall, by public proclamation, declare the establishment
of such reservations and the limits thereof.
26 Stat. 1103 (1891).
496 16 U.S.C. § 471 (repealed 1976).
'" 14 Pub. Lands Dec. at 210. The Assistant Attorney General's Forest Reservation
opinion also relies on Grisar v. McDowell, 73 U.S. 363 (1867), in which the Supreme Court
noted that the President had the "same authority" to modify a reservation of public land as
he had to make it in the first instance. Id. at 371. The Grisar case is not especially helpful,
however, in analyzing the Antiquities Act because the President exercised implied authority
to make the reservation in Griwar, and the scope of that authority therefore was not confined
by legislative language. Id. at 381. The Forest Reservation opinion also relied on an old
circuit court decision which involved public lands that had been reserved for military
purposes but that were subsequently abandoned by the military after they were no longer
needed for that purpose. 14 Pub. Lands Dec. 209, 210 (1892). Associate Justice McLean
found that under these circumstances "the reserve falls back into the mass of public lands
subject to be sold under the general law." United States v. R.R. Bridge Co., 27 F. Cas. 686,
690 (1855). However, lands reserved for a narrow purpose, such as military use, are very
different from lands reserved for the protection of antiquities or objects of scientific interest.
In the former situation, the land is reserved for a specific use. In the latter situation the land
is reserved to protect objects found to exist there. Thus, while it might reasonably be argued
that a reservation for military purposes should be allowed to revert to the public domain
when that use is no longer needed, it is far more difficult to claim that lands reserved for the
protection of specific objects found on those lands can be restored to the public lands
whenever a future President makes a different judgment than his predecessor about the
merits of protecting those objects. Moreover, the Railroad Bridge decision was thoroughly
refuted in a subsequent opinion of the Attorney General involving the very same military
lands. 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 359, 370-71 (1862). The Solicitor's opinion mentions this opinion
from the Attorney General but rejects it without analysis. Opinion of Apr. 20, 1915 (cited in
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is suspect for its heavy reliance on an 1855 court opinion involving
the Rock Island Military Reservation that had been thoroughly and
unequivocally rejected by Attorney General Edward Bates in
1862,4"' a position that was reaffirmed in an 1878 opinion of
Attorney General Charles Deven.499 Indeed, the 1892 opinion never
mentions the 1862 or 1878 Attorney General opinions. 00 To its
credit, the 1915 Solicitor's opinion acknowledged these opinions but
found them unpersuasive because they "rested somewhat on the
premise that the President had no power to withdraw or reserve
public lands in the absence of specific authority from Congress." ''
The problem with this argument is that the reservations involved in
both the 1862 and 1878 cases were made pursuant to a specific
congressional authorization, and the Attorney General had found
that this authorization granted the power only to reserve the lands
and not to modify those reservations." 2 In this sense, the 1862 and
1878 cases were much like the situation presented with the Mount
Olympus National Monument, which was created in accordance
with an express congressional delegation under the Antiquities Act.
Less than ten years after the Mount Olympus opinion, the
Solicitor once again faced the question of the President's authority
to reduce the size of national monuments, this time in a proposal to
restore lands from the Gran Quirva and Chaco Canyon National
Monuments to the public domain."° In a 1924 opinion, the Solicitor
Opinion of Jan. 30, 1935, M-27657) (on file with Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Department of the
Interior).
10 Op. Att'y Gen. 359, 370-71 (1862); see also supra note 497.
See 16 Op. Att'y Gen. 121, 123 (1878) (stating that lands set aside by President for
military purposes cannot be restored to condition of public lands except by Congress).
' 14 Pub. Lands Dec. at 209-13.
50' 1915 Solicitor's Opinion at 4 (on file with Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Department of the
Interior). Shortly before the Solicitor issued his opinion, the Supreme Court in United States
v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 511-12 (1915), had upheld the president's implied authority
to reserve lands for various purposes.
' Indeed, the Attorney General merely "conceded," for the sake of argument, that "the
President could not have selected a portion of public lands and... devoted it to military
purposes." 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 359, 363 (1862). He did not rely on this fact to reach his
conclusion that the express delegation to the President was a limited one. Id. at 364-65.
' Opinion of June 3, 1924, M-12501, M-12529 (cited in Opinion of January 30,1935, M-
27657) (on file with Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Department of the Interior).
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relied substantially on a 1921 Attorney General opinion 0 4 in
concluding that the restoration of national monument lands to the
public domain was "unauthorized."' 5  The opinion recommended
that, when a President wants to reserve lands for a national
monument but is unable to fix specific boundaries, he should
temporarily withdraw the lands under the Pickett Act of 1910"°
because that law specifically authorized the modification of
reservations. 5 7 After a national monument is established, however,
"it becomes a fixed reservation subject to restoration to the public
domain only by legislative act."'
The Solicitor reversed himself again in a 1935 opinion,0 9 and
later confirmed this view in a 1947 opinion." 0 The 1935 opinion
acknowledges that it appears to be inconsistent with "a series of
rulings by the Attorney General."5" ' Nonetheless, the Solicitor
argued that these rulings could be distinguished because they
involved military reservations.1 2 He then offered two additional
arguments to support his conclusion that the President may reduce
5 32 Op. Att'y Gen. 488, 488.91 (1921). This 1921 opinion involved lands that had been
reserved for military purposes for use as a lighthouse. Id. at 489. A 1913 statute authorized
the Department of Commerce to sell land that could not "profitably be used in Lighthouse
Service," but the Interior Department argued that lands no longer needed for military
purposes should revert to the public domain. Id. The Attorney General disagreed, finding
that "lands reserved out of the public domain for specific Government purposes can thereafter
be disposed of only as directed by Congress." Id. at 490. The opinion goes on to find that:
The power to thus reserve public lands and appropriate them ... does not
necessarily include the power to either restore them to the general public
domain or transfer them to another department. This department has
repeatedly held that lands reserved for military purposes cannot be
restored to the public domain without an Act of Congress.
Id.
Opinion of June 3, 1924, M-12501, M-12529 (cited in Opinion of January 30, 1935, M-
27657) (on file with Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Department of the Interior).
5w Pickett Act, Pub. L. No. 61-303, 36 Stat. 847 (1910), repealed by Federal Land Policy
and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2792.
am Id.
w Opinion of June 3, 1924, M-1205, M-12529 (cited in Opinion of January 30, 1935, M-
27657) (on file with Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Department of the Interior).
- Opinion of Jan. 30,1935, M-27657 (on file with Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Department
of the Interior).
0 National Monuments, 60 Interior Dec. 9 (Dep't of the Interior July 21, 1947).
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the size of monuments. First, he argued that the President has
implied power under United States v. Midwest Oil Co.51 8 to create
and reduce executive withdrawals,514 including national monuments
created under the Antiquities Act.515 The President's implied
authority to reserve lands, recognized by the Supreme Court in
Midwest Oil, was expressly repealed by Congress in 1976.5"' Even
if it had not been repealed, it seems unlikely that a court would
recognize the implied authority of a President to undo something
that could only be accomplished by statute in the first instance.1 7
The second argument offered by the 1935 Solicitor's opinion to
support the President's authority to reduce the size of the monu-
ment is the language in the Antiquities Act, referenced in the 1938
Attorney General's opinion,518 which limits withdrawals to the
"smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of
the objects to be protected."5 9 As noted previously,520 this language
might support a President's decision to fix boundaries that are found
to be indeterminate, or to correct a mistake that might have been
made in an original proclamation regarding the legal description of
the land. But a construction that would allow a future President to
effectively reverse the discretionary judgment of an earlier Presi-
dent wholly undermines the one-way protective license granted by
the Antiquities Act. A review of the facts surrounding the Mount
Olympus monument-the very case that precipitated the 1935
Solicitor's opinion-demonstrates why the Antiquities Act ought not
to be construed to allow presidents to modify monument proclama-
tions.
The original Mount Olympus National Monument proclamation
signed by Theodore* Roosevelt describes "the slopes of Mount
513 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
514 See id. at 468-69.
BI' Opinion of Jan. 30, 1935, M-27657 at 4-5 (on file with Office of the Solicitor, U.S.
Department of the Interior).
616 Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2792, 2792.
617 This position also would appear to be inconsistent with the 1938 Attorney General's
opinion, which suggests that the Antiquities Act contains a limited delegation of authority.
See 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 185, 186 (1938).
5's 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 185, 186 (1938).
519 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2000).
52o See supra note 486 and accompanying text.
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Olympus and the adjacent summits of the Olympic Mountains" as
embracing "objects of unusual scientific interest" including "numer-
ous glaciers" and "the summer range and breeding grounds of the
Olympic elk. 521 Woodrow Wilson's amended proclamation indicates
that the objects to be protected by the original proclamation were
the glaciers and the Olympic elk, and that these were adequately
protected by a monument half the size of the original proclama-
tion.5 22 While Wilson's characterization of the scope of the original
proclamation may be correct, it might also be argued that Roosevelt
had intended to protect the slopes of the Olympic Mountains, and
that the glaciers and elk were merely examples of the scientific
objects to be protected. More importantly, however, the Solicitor's
claim that the area of the original monument was, in the opinion of
the Interior and Agriculture Departments, "larger than necessary
for the protection of the [elk] summer range, 523 is not supported by
the record. On the contrary, elk were apparently given little, if any,
consideration in deciding to reduce the size of the monument. One
historian who has written about this period noted that "[t]he needs
521 Proclamation No. 869, 35 Stat. 2247, 2247 (1909).
While Roosevelt was familiar with the Olympic peninsula and its elk herd, he was not
personally engaged in the details of the proposed monument or the land that would be
protected. LIEN, supra note 115, at 37-38. In signing the proclamation just two days before
he left office, Roosevelt relied entirely on the recommendation of Congressman William E.
Humphrey of Seattle, Washington. Id. In a meeting at the White House, Roosevelt told
Humphrey, "Tell me what you want... and I will give it to you." Id. at 37. Humphrey
replied that he wanted a 750,000-acre monument in the heart of the Olympic mountains. Id.
at 37. Roosevelt responded, "Prepare your order and I will sign it." Id. at 38. Ironically,
Humphrey fully supported continued logging in the monument and, at Humphrey's request,
Gifford Pinchot drafted language for the proclamation that was intended to ensure this result.
Id. at 38-39. Pinchot also decided to exclude some heavily forested areas with both major elk
herds and heavy stands of timber, thus leading to a monument proposal smaller than
Humphrey had originally proposed to the President. Id. at 38.
52 Proclamation No. 1293, 39 Stat. 1726, 1726 (1915). The following two additional
proclamations reduced the size of the Mount Olympus National Monument, but were very
minor: a 1912 proclamation by President Taft reduced the monument by 160 acres,
Proclamation No. 1191, 37 Stat. 1737, 1737 (1912), and a 1929 proclamation by President
Coolidge reduced the monument by 640 acres, Proclamation No. 1862, 45 Stat. 2984,2984-85
(1929).
.. Opinion of Jan. 30, 1935, M-27657, at 4 (on file with Office of the Solicitor, U.S.
Department of the Interior).
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of the elk had never even come up for discussion."24 What now
seems clear is that the size of the monument was reduced not
because President Wilson decided that the "objects" identified in the
proclamation did not require the additional lands for their protec-
tion, but because of the intense lobbying pressure by the mining5 25
and logging5 2 industries. It is likewise clear that the decision was
made, at least in part, to placate the Forest Service, which wanted
these lands restored to forest preserve status so that they could be
made available for logging. 527 To be sure, had Wilson been acting in
the first instance to reserve the lands around Mount Olympus, a
more limited proclamation might well have been justified. But the
larger monument proclaimed by Teddy Roosevelt was almost
certainly within Roosevelt's discretion under the Act. Once
Roosevelt acted, future presidents lacked the authority to undo his
decision.
Following the monument's reduction, eighty-five percent of the
land that remained was unforested alpine terrain.5 21 Conservation
524 LIEN, supra note 115, at 52. Another historian has suggested that elk were in fact
using the areas that were eliminated from the monument, but that the Forest Service
believed it could adequately protect them. Gerald W. Williams, Ph.D., The USDA Forest
Service in the Pacific Northwest: Major Political and Social Controversies Between 1891-1945,
available at http://fs.jorge.com/archivesthistory.Regional/R6-Historyl891TO1945.htm (last
visited Mar. 21, 2003).
52 RUBY EL HULT, THE UNTAMED OLYMPIcS 214-15 (1954).
'" For example, "[ChiefForester of the Forest Service Henry J. Graves] recommended for
elimination, with one exception--everything the timber-industry controlled Seattle Chamber
of Commerce had recommended for elimination. For good measure he removed another six
miles of the heaviest timber which they had not asked for." LIEN, supra note 115, at 51-52.
Graves's recommendations were accepted by President Wilson in his May 11, 1915
proclamation. Id. at 52. Subsequently, during hearings on proposals for an Olympic National
Park, Graves admitted that his support for eliminating lands from the original monument
was in error. Id. at 54.
527 As noted previously, Gifford Pinchot had added language to the original proclamation
that he thought would allow logging to continue inside the monument. Id. at 38-39; see also
supra note 521 and accompanying text. But the language was in conflict with other language
declaring the monument to be the dominant reservation and forbidding uses interfering with
the preservation and protection of the monument. LIEN, supra note 115, at 38-39. After the
Forest Service realized it would not be allowed to log in the monument, it tried to have the
monument abolished altogether. Id. at 37-39, 50-52. When this failed, it settled for reduction
of the monument's size by half, and a return of the eliminated lands to the forest preserve.
Id.
8 HULT, supra note 525, at 215.
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groups described the Wilson proclamation as the "rape of 1915."529
When the Mount Olympus National Monument was transformed
into the Olympic National Park in 1938,30 much of the land that
President Wilson took out of the monument was put back into the
park,5"' suggesting that this land did indeed encompass objects
worthy of preservation.
The other most significant example of a presidential action to
reduce the size of a national monument involved the Grand Canyon.
Congress had designated the Grand Canyon as a national park in
1919, but in 1932 Herbert Hoover designated 273,145 acres of
additional land along the west boundary of the park as the Grand
Canyon National Monument.5 12 The new monument aroused strong
opposition among ranchers who wanted the land for grazing, and
among local county officials who were concerned about the loss of
their potential tax base.5 3 Several bills were introduced into the
Congress that would have reduced the size of the monument by as
much as 150,000 acres, and one bill actually passed both houses of
Congress only to be vetoed by Franklin Roosevelt because of his
concerns that the proposal had not been fully vetted.53 4 After
further investigation, and on the recommendation of Secretary of
Interior Harold Ickes, Roosevelt signed a proclamation reducing the
size of the monument by 71,854 acres."5
While the Interior Department's investigation was designed to
insure the preservation of all of the essential features that had led
Hoover to designate the area as a monument in the first place, the
ultimate decision to exclude certain lands by proclamation was a
concession to political concerns, and was not made on the basis of an
I29 d.
o Act of June 29, 1938, ch. 812, Pub. L. No. 75-778, 52 Stat. 1241, 1241-42 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 251 (2000)).
63 See id.
Proclamation No. 2022, 47 Stat. 2547, 2547-48 (1932).
53 SeeBARBARAJ.MOREHOUSE, APLACECALLEDGRANDCANYON 73-79(1996) (discussing
ranchers' and officials' efforts to eliminate or reduce size of monument). While these were
public lands at the time and not subject to local taxes, local officials hoped that these lands
would eventually become private lands through the operation of the homestead, mining, or
similar laws. See id. (discussing bills proposed to reduce size of monument).
54 Id. at 74-78.
" Proclamation No. 2393, 3 C.F.R. 150 (1938-1943).
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assessment that the reduced area was the "smallest area compatible
with the proper care and management of the objects to be pro-
tected."'SS The Antiquities Act does not authorize the President to
make the political choice to reduce the size of a monument.
37
Rather, as the Attorney General has repeatedly found, that choice
is reserved for the Congress."8
There have been at least six other examples of monuments that
were reduced in size, although in many cases the reductions were
relatively minor.5 39 More recently, Secretary of the Interior Gale
Norton has written to various states to inquire whether the Interior
Department should recommend boundary adjustments to national
monuments, 540 and thus the question of a president's authority to
diminish the size of a national monument may arise yet again.
Unquestionably, different people and different experts may have
different opinions about what lands are needed to protect particular
resources. But the decision to protect a particular tract of land
instead of another tract involves an exercise of discretion in much
16 U.S.C. § 431 (2000).
537 Id.
' Congress plainly understands how to grant the President the authority to reduce the
size of a national monument, and it has done so in at least one statute, which provides for the
creation of the Colonial National Monument in Virginia. That statute provides that the
boundaries of the monument "may be enlarged or diminished by subsequent proclamations
of the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary of the Interior." Act of July 3,
1930, Pub. L. No. 71-510, 46 Stat. 855 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 81a (2000))
(emphasis added).
' See, e.g., Proclamation No. 1186, 37 Stat. 1733 (1912) (reducing size of Navajo National
Monument); Proclamation No. 2454, 3 C.F.R. 208 (1938-1943) (eliminating 52.27 acres from
Wupatki National Monument to allow for irrigation of lands on Navajo Indian Reservation);
Proclamation No. 3138, 3 C.F.R. 73 (1954-1958) (eliminating 9,880 acres from Great Sand
Dunes National Monument and adding 960 acres); Proclamation No. 3307,3 C.F.R. 49 (1959-
1963) (eliminating 211 acres from Colorado National Monument, but adding 120 acres);
Proclamation No. 3360, 3 C.F.R. 83 (1959-1963) (eliminating 720 acres from Arches National
Monument because lands were used for grazing and had no known scenic or scientific value);
Proclamation No. 3344, 3 C.F.R. 74 (1959-1963) (eliminating approximately 470 acres from
Black Canyon of Gunnison National Monument).
" Congressman Nick Rahall quotes Secretary Norton from a letter to the State of
Arizona, as follows:
I would like to hear from you about what role these monuments should
play in Arizona. Are there boundary adjustments that the Department of
Interior should consider recommending? Are there existing uses inside
these monuments that we should accommodate?
147 CONG. REC. H,3418 (June 21, 2001) (statement of Rep. Rahall).
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the same way that a decision to proclaim a monument involves an
exercise of discretion.54' This is especially true for monuments that
protect objects such as free-roaming wildlife and wildlife ecosys-
tems. Future Presidents may disagree with the judgment made by
their predecessors, either to establish monuments or to include
particular lands within their boundaries. But their recourse, and
the recourse of other citizens unhappy with such decisions, is in the
Congress, or perhaps in the courts on the grounds that the President
abused his discretion. It is not in the executive branch. The
intentional and rational design of the Antiquities Act is to make it
easier to designate national monuments than to alter their status.
The objects preserved under the Antiquities Act often took many
millennia to create. Their destruction-if that is to be their
fate-can wait the few years that it might take to reach agreement
between some future Congress and the President.
C. MODIFICATION OF MONUMENT RESTRICTIONS
Even assuming that the 1938 Attorney General's opinion and the
1935 Solicitor's opinion are correct in authorizing presidential
modification of national monuments, that support is limited to
boundary adjustments that are necessary to reflect "the smallest
area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects
to be protected."542 As suggested above, at least some boundary
modifications for national monuments were made without primary
regard for the objects that were supposed to be protected by the
proclamation. 4 Moreover, the arguments for and against allowing
changes to monument boundaries do not necessarily encompass the
8"" Despite the Attorney General's apparent willingness to accept without analysis
presidential modifications of national monuments, language from the 1938 opinion offers a
powerful argument against this conclusion. As the Attorney General noted, "[Unless it be
within the terms of the power conferred by that statute, the Executive can no more destroy
his own authorized work, without some other legislative sanction, than any other person can."
39 Op. Att'y Gen. 185, 187 (1938). The Antiquities Act simply does not confer upon the
President the power to modify a legitimate action taken under the law by a predecessor.
542 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2000).
54 See supra notes 523-27 and accompanying text.
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entirely different question that arises where a President seeks to
change the scope of protection afforded by a particular proclamation.
Although no President has attempted to eliminate or reduce the
use restrictions imposed in a prior proclamation, this issue has come
to the forefront recently as a result of particular protections that
were included in some of the landscape monuments that President
Clinton proclaimed. In all of the Clinton proclamations, for
example, the federal lands within the boundaries of the monument
were withdrawn from all forms of mineral development, including
hard rock mining and mineral leasing.544 Nonetheless, the Bush
Administration has suggested that it will be looking at some of these
monument lands for possible oil and gas development. 45
For the same reasons that Presidents lack the authority to
abolish or diminish a monument, absent a demonstration of
mistake, so too do they lack the authority to unilaterally remove
restrictions imposed by a predecessor. Consider, for example, the
restrictions on grazing included in the Sonoran Desert National
Monument. Under the proclamation, President Clinton found that
an area within the new monument that was part of the Barry
Goldwater Air Force Range, saw limited public access, had no
livestock grazing for nearly fifty years, and had achieved a remark-
able level of biological diversity when compared with adjacent and
similar lands that had been subject to grazing.' In an effort "to
replicate and extend the extraordinary diversity and health" of this
area, the President provided that existing grazing leases on adjacent
lands in this part of the monument should not be renewed when
their current terms expire. 47
A future President might well disagree with President Clinton's
judgment that elimination of grazing was necessary or appropriate
to protect the objects identified in the proclamation. But it is
.. See, e.g., Vermilion Cliffs National Monument, Proclamation No. 7374, 3 C.F.R. 199
(2001); Proclamation No. 7295, 65 Fed. Reg. 24095 (Apr. 15, 2000).
" Mike Soraghan, Bush: National Monuments Have Oil-Drilling Potential, DENy. POST,
Mar. 15, 2001, at Al (quoting President George W. Bush's statement that "[t]here are parts
of the monument lands where we can explore without affecting the overall environment").




unlikely that a future President could show that Clinton's judgment
was a mistake, in the sense that the objects to be protected would
not benefit from the elimination of livestock grazing. Allowing a
future President to unilaterally reverse restrictions included in a
monument proclamation because of a different judgment about the
need for that restriction is no different in kind from allowing a
future President to abolish a monument because of a different
judgment about the need for the monument itself.
As discussed above, a claim that certain lands are not needed to
protect the objects of scientific interest designated in a proclamation
may be subject to judicial review on the grounds that a President
abused his or her discretion. Likewise, a person may be able to seek
judicial review of restrictions imposed in a proclamation on the
grounds that those restrictions are not needed to protect the objects
designated in the proclamation.5 48 Finally, Congress may choose to
change the protections that are accorded in a presidential proclama-
tion. The Antiquities Act, however, does not grant a President the
power to revoke or modify a proclamation that was previously made.
VIII. AMENDING OR REPEALING THEANTIQUITIES ACT
In 1970, the Public Land Law Review Commission (PLLRC)
recommended the repeal of the Antiquities Act, along with all of the
other executive branch authority to reserve public lands.549 When
Congress enacted FLPMA in 1976, it accepted virtually all of the
recommendations of the PLLRC with respect to withdrawals.55 ° The
See Mountain States Legal Found. v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1132, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2002)("[Judicial] review is available to ensure that the Proclamations are consistent with
constitutional principles and that the President has not exceeded his statutory authority.").
"' ONE THIRD OF OUR NATION'S LAND: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS
BYTHE PUBLIC LAND LAWREVIEW COMMISSION, 54-56 (1970). Recommendation 8 is that only
Congress should approve withdrawals of a permanent or indefinite term. Id. at 54.
Recommendation 9 is that "Congress should establish a formal program by which
withdrawals would be periodically reviewed and either rejustified or modified." Id. at 56.
' Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704(a), 90
Stat. 2743, 2792 (1976); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1163, at 29 (1976).
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notable exception was its decision not to repeal the Antiquities
Act.551
More recently, several bills have been introduced into the
Congress to amend the Act,552 and some recent scholarly commen-
tary on the Antiquities Act supports reforms that would incorporate
modern notions of public process. " ' Critics of the Antiquities Act
argue that, at a minimum, law ought to incorporate notice, com-
ment, and consultation opportunities, and that proposals should be
'. ' In addition to repealing most of the other statutory withdrawal authorities, Congress
repealed the implied authority of the President to make withdrawals and reservations
resulting from the acquiescence of the Congress, which was approved by the Supreme Court
in United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915). A leading public lands treatise has
suggested, however, that since the power arose from congressional inaction in the face of
executive action, it cannot simply be repealed. 2 GEORGE COGGINS & ROBERT GLICKSMAN,
PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW, § lOD.0312][b] (1997). Rather, it is "regenerable and
effective" until Congress objects to a particular exercise of the power." Id. Moreover, it can
be argued that, even to the extent that FLPMA's repeal of Midwest Oil is effective, the repeal
is applicable only to "public lands" which is the subject matter of FLPMA. Public lands is
defined in FLPMA to encompass only certain lands managed by the Bureau of Land
Management, and expressly excludes lands on the outer continental shelf. 43 U.S.C. §
1702(e) (2000). Under this view, Midwest Oil still might be used to designate national
monuments on outer continental shelf lands. The Office of Legal Counsel rejected this
argument in an opinion addressing the issues relating to a proposal to establish a national
wildlife refuge on submerged lands in the northwestern Hawaiian Islands. Memorandum
from Randolph D. Moss, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, to John
Leshy, Solicitor, Department of Interior, James Dorskind, General Counsel, National Organic
and Atmospheric, Administration, and Dinah Bear, General Counsel, Counsel on Environ-
mental Quality 4-9 (Sept. 15, 2000), available at http://www.atlantisforce. org/dojl.html (last
visited Feb. 16, 2003). In a footnote, however, the OLC opinion concedes that the President
might have the authority to establish a national wildlife refuge for national defense or foreign
affairs purposes. Id. at 19 n.25.
5 See, e.g., National Monument NEPA Compliance Act, H.R. 1487, 106th Cong. (1999).
The House passed H.R. 1487 by a vote of 408 yeas to 2 nays. 145 CONG. REC. D,1033 (1999).
This bill would have required preparation of a draft and final environmental impact
statement (EIS) on any monument proposal including a minimum six-month comment period
on a draft EIS and at least a four-month comment period on a final EIS before a proclamation
is issued. H.R. 1487 § 3. A similar bill requires various forms of public participation before
a monument can be proclaimed. National Monument Public Participation Act, S. 729, 106th
Cong. (1999). Bills that effectively would repeal presidential authority to proclaim national
monuments include the following: National Monument Fairness Act of 2001, H.R. 2114,
107th Cong. (2001) (requiring that any national monument proclamation that protects more
than 50,000 acres "shall cease to be effective" two years after it is issued unless it is approved
by Congress); and National Monument Fairness Act of 1997, S. 477, 105th Cong. (1997)
(requiring that all monuments in excess of 5,000 acres be approved in advance by Congress).
' James R. Rasband, The Future of the Antiquities Act, 21 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL.
L. 619 (2001); Rasband, supra note 10, at 532-62; Shepherd, supra note 10, at 4-39 to 4-42.
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evaluated in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act
before they are made.554 One commentator has gone so far as to
suggest that monuments created without adequate process are
"forever tarnished" because they run contrary to basic principles of
wilderness ethics.555 Some have also argued that the Antiquities Act
should be repealed because the withdrawal authority contained in
FLPMA is more than adequate to protect public lands and resources
that are at risk of damage or destruction.55 While these arguments
have superficial appeal, they do not withstand close scrutiny.
A. THE NEED FOR A PUBLIC PROCESS
Local politicians often express indignation about the President's
failure to involve the public--especially the local public-before
proclaiming a new national monument.557 But the Antiquities Act
" See, e.g., National Monument Fairness Act of 1997, S. 477, 105th Cong. (1997);
National Monument NEPA Compliance Act, H.R. 1487, 106th Cong. (1999).
' Rasband, supra note 10, at 561. Rasband claims that the "overarching virtue" of
wilderness values is the recognition that it is "the chase [and] not the catching [which] is
paramount." Id. at 534. Rasband argues that "each wilderness venture, accomplishment is
not a function of conquest but of ... method." Id. at 535. By failing to follow a "fair or
virtuous" process in designating monuments, Rasband concludes that they are "forever
tarnished by the method of ... acquisition." Id. at 561. Rasband's attempt to compare
monument designation with fishing, hunting, and mountain climbing, however, ultimately
fails. Fishing, hunting, and mountain climbing are private and personal endeavors where the
ethical behavior of the participants ennobles the enterprise. By contrast, monument
designation is in no way a private endeavor. It is a public action taken by the highest elected
public official in the United States, presumably to promote the broad public interest and not
any particular private interests or virtues. It is an action that readily can be overturned by
the Congress. It is inconceivable to this author that many people really believe that the
Grand Canyon, Zion, Olympic, or Grand Teton National Parks are "tarnished" because they
were first protected by a law that did not require a public process. See id. at 561.
" Rasband, supra note 553, at 630 (arguing that "FLPMA's withdrawal provisions are
wholly adequate to the preservation task and have the added benefit of confirming a
democratic and participatory approach to withdrawal decisions").
" Senator Edward Robinson of Wyoming reportedly described the Jackson Hole
proclamation as a "foul, sneaking Pearl Harbor blow," an astonishing statement from a
United States Senator less than two years after the actual Pearl Harbor attack, at a time
when the United States was in the midst of World War II. Righter, supra note 49, at 295.
More recently, Utah Governor Michael Leavitt, in asking President Bush to designate the San
Rafael Swell National Monument following what he described as a seven-year process
involving "many stakeholders," used the opportunity to criticize the process followed by
President Clinton to designate the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument as a
"stealth proposal." Governor Michael Leavitt, Utah State of the State Address (Jan. 28,
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is hardly unique in denying the public an opportunity to participate
in government decisionmaking. For example, while the Administra-
tive Procedure Act generally requires a notice and comment
procedure for legislative actions such as rulemaking, 58 it expressly
provides that an agency may forego such procedures when it finds
"for good cause . . . that notice and public procedure thereon are
impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest."5 9
Agencies frequently invoke this exemption,56 which was designed
to apply where public process "might defeat legitimate agency
goals,"56 for example, where swift action is needed to address an
extant problem.562
Nonetheless, several arguments might be advanced for requiring
public process in the development and approval of monument
proposals. First, a public process helps promote democratic values
by giving a voice to affected constituencies. Second, a public process
can help assure that government officials are better informed about
the consequences of their actions, thus fostering better decisions.
Finally, a public process can help achieve the virtues of civic
2002), available at http://www.utah.gov/governor/stateofetate02.html (last visited Feb. 27,
2003).
5" 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000). Designation of a national monument is akin to a rulemaking
proceeding since it is "an agency statement of.. . particular applicability and future effect
designed to implement... or prescribe law or policy." Id. § 551(4).
Id. § 553(b)(3)(B).
A General Accounting Office study for the calendar year 1997 found that of 4,658 final
regulatory actions, 2360 or 51% were published without a notice of proposed rulemaking. Of
the sixty-one major rules, eleven or nearly one-fifth were published in final form without prior
notice. UNITED STATES GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: AGENCIES OFTEN
PUBLISHED FINAL ACTIONS WITHOUT PROPOSED RULES 11, 13 (1998).
561 ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 4.4 (1993).
5 See JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 78 (3d ed. 1998)
(noting that good cause exception includes those situations in which advance notice would
defeat agency's regulatory objective); Ellen R. Jordan, The Administrative Procedure Act's
"Good Cause"Exemption, 36 ADMIN. L. REV. 113, 118 (1984) (noting that good cause exception
can be invoked where notice and public procedure are impracticable, unnecessary, or against
public interest). In the context of monument designation, it might be argued that affording
a public process could compromise a President's ability to assure timely protection of public
land resources. Moreover, while any overprotection that might result from swift action can
be corrected by Congress, the failure to provide timely protection for such resources may
mean that they are lost forever.
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republicanism.8s As argued below, however, none of these reasons
is compelling in the context of national monument designations.564
Because a mandatory public process likely would hamper the ability
of future Presidents to use the Antiquities Act, adding such a
process would be a serious mistake.
1. Promoting Democratic Values. The notion that public partici-
pation in agency decisionmaking is the "right" of every citizen is
often invoked to support public participation in monument deci-
sions.5' Yet, far from a right, public participation in agency
decisions is a relatively recent phenomenon that historically was not
deemed necessary to the effective operation of the American
government.5 6  Nonetheless, it might be argued that public
participation advances democratic values by promoting majority
rule. But if this were the sole virtue of public participation, then
such participation actually might prove antithetical to the American
system of government, which was carefully designed to avoid a
"tyranny of the majority."T67
' See, e.g., Jonathan Poisner, A Civic Republican Perspective on the National
Environmental Policy Act's Process for Public Participation, 26 ENVTL. L. 53, 61 (1996)
(stating that good citizens are those who participate in public affairs, thereby supporting
community); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1556
(1988) (noting that political participation is vehicle for inculcation of virtues such as empathy
and feelings of community).
See infra notes 565-604 and accompanying text.
m In introducing the NationalMonument NEPA Compliance Act, H.R. 1487, 106th Cong.(1999), to a hearing of the House Committee on Resources held on June 17, 1999, Congress-
man Jim Hansen of Utah noted that "the Antiquities Act... is being used to thwart
Congressional control over the public lands, to avoid the National Environmental Policy Act,
and to deny the American people the right to have input in public land decisions." H.R. 1487
National Monument NEPA Compliance Act. Hearing on H.R. 1487 Before the Subcomm. on
Nat'l Parks and Public Lands of the House Comm. on Resource, 106th Cong. 8 (1999)
(statement of Rep. Jim Hansen).
N See Poisner, supra note 563, at 53-54 (noting that citizen involvement traditionally
focused on legislative branch).
'6 The phrase was coined by John Stuart Mill in his famous essay, On Liberty. See
generally John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in 43 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 267(William Benton ed., 1952). The idea was carried over into the United States Constitution
through the establishment of a republican system of government. THE FEDERALIST No. 10
(James Madison). In Federalist No. 10, James Madison writes:
[A) pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small
number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in
person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction.... A republic,
by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation
572
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Under our republican form of government, the voting public
democratically elects their representatives who are charged with
promoting the greater public good."' If the public is dissatisfied
with their representatives' decisions, it may vote those representa-
tives out of office, but it may not at the federal level vote for an
alternate course of action." 9 Moreover, even if the public were
allowed to vote on a complex question like whether and to what
extent a President should designate a national monument, Arrow's
theorem demonstrates that it is unlikely that the outcome would
reflect the will of the majority.57 Thus, allowing the public to
participate in a decision to designate a national monument will not
necessarily promote either rational decisions or democratic values.
2. Fostering Better Decisions. The most compelling reason for
requiring public participation is that it fosters better decisions by
informing agency officials of the possibly unforeseen consequences
of their actions. While federal agencies may have a reasonable
grasp of the resources within a monument and the manner in which
they might best be protected, local officials and members of the
public might well have additional information regarding the
resources that would be valuable in deciding the extent to which
lands should receive Antiquities Act protection. Still, in the context
of monument designation, this reason is far less compelling than for
other types of agency decisions. This is because public land
takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which
we are seeking.
Id.
Madison advocated passing public issues "through the medium of a chosen body of
citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interests of their country." Id.
' See generally Catherine Engberg, Note, Taking the Initiative: May Congress Reform
State Initiative Lawmaking to Guarantee a Republican Form of Government?, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 569 (2001).
570 Arrow's Theorem, as it is now generally known, postulates that, where multiple voters
confront three or more choices, there can be no assurance that the choice receiving the most
votes will in fact reflect the preference of the majority of voters. See Herbert Hovenkamp,
Arrow's Theorem: Ordinalism and Republican Government, 75 IOWA L. REV. 949, 950-51
(1990) (noting that, under Arrow's Theorem, legislative process cannot yield democratic,
coherent, and stable outcomes); William T. Mayton, The Possibilities of Collective Choice:
Arrow's Theorem, Article I, and the Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative
Agencies, 1986 DuKE L.J. 948, 950-51 (1986) (noting that collective choice cannot meet all
conditions to make consistent and coherent choices).
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resources necessarily must be managed for the long term,571 and a
monument designation, at most, merely preserves the resources
within the monument as they were at the time of the designation.
Existing resource users within monument boundaries generally hold
valid existing rights, which allow them to maintain these uses.5 72
Moreover, monument proclamations often allow new public land
uses--even extractive uses-to continue.57  Thus, while the
Congress may ultimately decide that some or all the lands placed
under monument status are better suited to nonmonument uses, the
temporary protection of these lands and resources in a national
monument preserves, rather than limits, the options available to the
Congress in deciding on the long-term management of those lands.
By contrast, if a president is forced to delay monument decisions to
allow for public process, some of those decisions are likely to become
politicized, and monument-worthy resources might be lost before a
proclamation can be issued, thereby limiting Congress's long-term
management options.574 In addition, while local officials and
citizens may have more knowledge about local resources, their views
on protecting resources of national significance may reflect personal
and economic interests that will be affected by a monument
designation rather than the broader interests of all citizens.
To be sure, minimal process requirements such as prior notice to
appropriate state and local officials and the general public that a
57, See, e.g., Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2000)
(defining "multiple use" to include, among other things, "a combination of balanced and
diverse resource uses that takes into account the long-term needs of future generations for
renewable and nonrenewable resources")..
672 See, e.g., Proclamation No. 7374, 65 Fed. Reg. 69,227 (Nov. 9, 2000) ("The establish-
ment of this monument is subject to valid existing rights.").
578 For example, the original Buck Island Reef National Monument proclamation states
that "neither the Department of the Interior, nor any other agency or instrumentality of the
United States shall adopt or attempt to enforce any rule, regulation or requirement limiting,
restricting or reducing the existing fishing . . . bathing, or recreational privileges by
inhabitants of the Virgin Islands." Proclamation No. 3443, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1959-1963). In a
subsequent proclamation enlarging the boundaries of this monument, President Clinton
prohibited all extractive uses within the boundaries of the monument. Proclamation No.
7392, 66 Fed. Reg. 7335 (Jan. 17, 2001).
... Lands under consideration for national monument status can be protected temporarily
(up to three years) under FLPMA § 204(e). Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43
U.S.C. § 1714(e) (2000). But such protections might prove inadequate for many controversial
yet worthy proposals.
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monument proposal is under consideration, along with a brief
opportunity for public comment, would not likely impose a substan-
tial impediment to the operation of the law, and might allow the
President to avoid unintended conflicts and secure stronger political
support for the proposal. But if the process is made too cumbersome
by requiring, for example, extensive studies and affording appeal
rights beyond those allowed under current law,575 legitimate
proposals almost certainly will be derailed, not on their merits, but
rather because of the political baggage that a long process likely
would heap on such proposals. Indeed, the history of the Antiquities
Act is replete with examples of monument proclamations that are
universally acclaimed today, but that might have been abandoned
if Presidents were forced to allow local politicians to play a more
prominent role in the decisions.
576
3. Achieving the Virtues of Civic Republicanism. A final reason
that might be offered for allowing public participation is that it
achieves the virtues of civic republicanism,577 a political philosophy
that traces its roots to Thomas Jefferson.578 The American political
system reflects both pluralist and republican ideals.579 Pluralist
principles, which promote the efforts of various individuals and
interest groups to lobby political officials to achieve their political
ends, are utilitarian.' ° They "place no premium on political
participation" and thus support the presidential designation of
"" As described above, the Antiquities Act currently affords no public process. 16U.S.C.
§ 431 (2000).
578 The most prominent examples are the original Grand Canyon National Monument in
Arizona, and the Jackson Hole National Monument in Wyoming. Proclamation No. 794, 35
Stat. 2175 (1908); Proclamation No. 2578, 57 Stat. 731 (1943); see also supra notes 92-110 and
142-159 and accompanying text.
... Civic environmentalism is a more recent variant of this idea that is arguably more
relevant to national monument decisions. See generally JOHN DEWITT, CIVIC ENVIRONMEN-
TALISM, ALTERNATIVES TO REGULATION IN STATES AND COMMUNITIES (1994). The principles
animating civic republicanism are more fully developed, and thus offer a better basis for
evaluating the procedures used for designating national monuments.
78a See DANIELKEMMIS, COMMUNITYANDTHEPOLITICS OFPLACE 10.12(1990) (noting that
civic republicanism reflects Jefferson's vision of limited national government and enlightened
citizenry engaged in operation of government).
" Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1558 (1988)
CThere can be little doubt that elements of both pluralist and republican thought played a
role during the period of constitutional framing.").
5w Id. at 1543.
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national monuments under the current political regime.58' Cass
Sunstein, however, has noted some of the problems with pluralism,
including that interested parties may have objectionable preferences
that under the pluralist system become just as legitimate as
unobjectionable preferences.582 Furthermore, interested parties may
have disparate power and influence, thereby skewing the market-
like results that pluralism is designed to achieve.5"'
Sunstein describes the republican approach as requiring a
commitment to the following four principles: (1) deliberation, where
private interests are considered, but which ultimately give way to
the virtuous political choice; (2) political equality among interested
parties; (3) universalism, or agreement that the common good
reflects the right political choice; and (4) citizenship, which mani-
fests itself primarily in the public's right to participate in
decisionmaking." 4
While Sunstein offers a compelling portrait of the republican
ideal, the realities of political decisionmaking generally do not
reflect this ideal. In the real world, private interests frequently
obscure the public good and the virtuous choice. Interested parties
rarely have equal power. Instead, influence is wielded by those who
make campaign contributions or have political connections. While
most probably would agree that the right political choice should
reflect the common good, public views about what constitutes the
common good are so disparate as to render this principle meaning-
less to decisionmakers. Finally, while in the ideal world citizenship
might manifest itself through public participation, in the real world,
public participation is often offered to promote the private interests
of the commenter, rather than the interests of the entire citzenry.
58 See id. at 1542-47 (noting pluralists are unwilling to take steps to promote political
activity). As Sunstein explains, under the pluralist approach, which was espoused by James
Madison, politicians respond in a "market-like manner' to the pressures exerted upon them
by the self-interested parties affected by government action. Id.
2 d. at 1543-44.
Id. Sunstein uses race and gender discrimination as an example of an objectionable
preference. Id. In the context of monument designations, private pecuniary or property
interests might be deemed objectionable preferences to the extent that they distort decisions
that are supposed to represent the national interest of all citizens. See id.
" Id. at 1547-58.
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Efforts by "civic environmentalists" to overcome this problem by
promoting the participation of average citizens rather than profes-
sionals most likely exacerbates rather than solves this problem. 5
This does not mean, of course, that public participation is
inherently bad. At a minimum, it affords a means for venting
important issues before decisions are made. It does suggest,
however, that public participation should not be allowed, or at least
should be carefully regulated, when it has the potential to under-
mine the common good by interfering with the Government's
capacity to make decisions that are designed to promote the public
interest.
For example, the argument that national monument proposals
should be subject to basic notice and comment requirements seems
unobjectionable on its face. Yet a review of the controversies
surrounding past monument proclamations suggests that elaborate
notice and comment procedures very well might have thwarted the
President's ability to proclaim monuments under the authority of
the Antiquities Act.5 And the risk becomes greater as additional
process requirements, such as environmental impact statements
and cost-benefit analyses,57 are imposed.
The purpose of the Antiquities Act is to insure that public lands
and resources are protected before they suffer damage or destruc-
tion.' Requiring process before these protections are in place can
have the effect of targeting a resource in a manner that attracts the
very damage that the proclamation is designed to prevent. 58 9
FLPMA authorizes temporary withdrawals for up to three years,
' Professor Rena Steinzor has written a compelling critique of"civic environmentalism."
See generally Rena I. Steinzor, The Corruption of Civic Environmentalism, 30 ENVTL. L. REP.
10909 (2000).
' The controversy surrounding the Jackson Hole National Monument, Proclamation No.
2578, 57 Stat. 731 (1943), suggests that a public process might have doomed the monument.
See supra notes 143-59 and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., National Monument NEPA Compliance Act, H.R. 1487, 106th Cong. (1999)
(requiring preparation of draft and final environmental import statement along with
opportunities for public participation before monument could be proclaimed).
m See supra notes 21-57 and accompanying text.
O For example, parties may locate mining claims, as Ralph Cameron did in the Grand




and these usually can be carried out with minimal process.59 Such
temporary withdrawals certainly should be used whenever re-
sources are at risk pending consideration of a monument proposal,
or any other proposal to withdraw lands. But calling attention to a
monument proposal through a lengthy public process significantly
increases the risk that local political issues and pressures will
overwhelm the public interest and prevent the designation of
monuments which, in hindsight, are almost always universally
accepted as being in the public interest.
This concern is not speculative. If past actions under the
Antiquities Act had required a substantial public process in advance
of national monument proclamations, mining and political interests
might have stopped the designation of the Grand Canyon National
Monument, 591 mineral and timber interests might have prevented
the designation of the Mount Olympus National Monument,592 and
grazing interests might have persuaded Franklin Roosevelt against
designating the Jackson Hole National Monument, 593 which now
comprises a substantial portion of the Grand Teton National Park.9 4
More recently, the Utah political establishment might have
succeeded in blocking the Grand Staircase-Escalante National
Monument. At a minimum, all of these decisions likely would have
been tied up in process for many years at the expense of other
actions. Opportunities for judicial review would proliferate. The
public interest would not have been served.
o Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) (2000).
5' Proclamation No. 794, 35 Stat. 2175 (1908).
2 Proclamation No. 869, 35 Stat. 2247 (1909).
8 Proclamation No. 2578, 57 Stat. 731 (1943).
' 16 U.S.C. § 4065d-1 (2000). In discussing the Jackson Hole proclamation, Senator
Robertson noted that "[t]he framers of this proclamation well knew that they could never get
congressional sanction to extend this park." Abolition of the Jackson Hole National
Monument: Hearing on H.R. 2241 Before the House Comm. on Pub. Lands, 78th Cong. 99-100
(1943) (statement of Sen. Robertson). But it was for this very reason that executive branch
authority was necessary to secure protection for this area. If that authority had been
hampered by procedural requirements, the monument might never have been proclaimed.
578 [Vol. 37:473
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Of course, even if the law does not require process, nothing
prevents a President or his subordinates from providing it, 595 and
the political success of future decisions may well require it. As
previously described, following the Grand Staircase-Escalante
decision, Secretary Babbitt adhered to a specific and effective public
process for deciding whether to recommend new national monu-
ments to the President."" Arguably, the public's approval of these
monument decisions was at least partly attributable to the Secre-
tary's willingness to engage interested parties and, where appropri-
ate, address their concerns in his recommendations.597
Secretary Babbitt's approach to process sets a benchmark for
future executive branch officials considering Antiquities Act
proclamations, and they might find it expedient to follow his lead.
But mandating a cumbersome process runs a substantial risk of
denying or at least delaying the protection of important public land
resources.
By any measure, but most certainly from a historical perspective,
the Antiquities Act has worked exceedingly well, notwithstanding
its failure to impose on the President any process requirements. For
that reason, perhaps more than any other, the law should be left
alone.598
Perhaps, one might argue, the delays and obstructions that will
result from affording a fair process are simply costs of living in a
free society. But is it really necessary that we bear these costs?
Since all a President can do with an Antiquities Act proclamation is
" The Antiquities Act is silent about the process for declaring a national monument. 16
U.S.C. § 431 (2000). Thus, a decision to follow a particular process is not inconsistent with
the Act.
59 See supra notes 405-19 and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., Proclamation No. 7397, 66 Fed. Reg. 7,397 (Jan. 18, 2001) (authorizing
continuation of low-level overflights of military aircraft over monument's airspace).
' John Leshy, the Interior Solicitor during the Clinton Administration, describes
Secretary Babbitt's comments to a congressional committee regarding the proposal to amend
the Antiquities Act as suggesting that it would be "silly to change a single comma in a law
that has had such a remarkable track record of success." Leshy, supra note 9, at 307 (citing
Secretarial Powers Under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976: Excessive
Use of Section 204 Withdrawal Authority by the Clinton Administration: Joint Oversight
Hearing Before House Subcomms. on Nat'l Parks and Pub. Lands and on Energy and Mineral
Res. of the House Comm. on Res., 106th Cong. 44-46 (1999)) (statement of Bruce Babbitt,
Secretary of the Interior).
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preserve the status quo of the lands5" at the time of the proclama-
tion, why not allow such preservation without process? If our most
precious public land resources are destroyed, they are lost to us
forever. Why not embrace a law that follows the precautionary
principle"O and errs on the side of protecting these resources with
no questions asked, until Congress takes the opportunity to review
the decision? And why not insist that, if there is to be a public
process, the process be accommodated by the legislative branch
where the ultimate responsibility for public land management
lies?" Congress can, and for more than half of the monuments has,
assumed responsibility for national monument decisions by enacting
legislation, frequently by converting the monument to a national
park.6"2 More often than not, this legislation expands upon the
protections imposed by the President." The history of the Antiqui-
ties Act is one of overwhelming and enthusiastic public support for
... A proclamation likely will alter future management decisions on designated lands by
precluding uses such as new mineral leasing, see 30 U.S.C. § 181 (2000), and it may make it
unlawful to engage in activities that were previously allowed, such as off-road vehicle use.
See, e.g., Proclamation No. 7374, 3 C.F.R. 199 (2001) ("For the purpose of protecting the
objects identified above, the Secretary shall prohibit all motorized and mechanical vehicle use
off-road."). But because monument decisions are made subject to valid existing rights, they
generally do not interfere with preexisting uses. See, e.g., id. ("The establishment of this
monument is subject to valid existing rights.").
" The precautionary principle is a popular approach to environmental decisionmaking
in many countries, and especially among the decisionmaking authorities of the international
community. See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLIcY 360-63 (1998). The
Rio Declaration from the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
also known as Agenda 21, explains and supports the precautionary principle as follows:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to
prevent environmental degradation.
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Conf. on Env't and Dev., 15 U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1, 31 I.L.M. 874, 879 (1992).
" U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
so See infra Appendix.
® See, e.g., Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233
(2000). The original approximately 56 million acres of land protected by Jimmy Carter under
the Antiquities Act were converted to 43.5 million acres of national parks, 53.7 million acres
of wildlife refuge, 13 new wild and scenic rivers and 564 million acres of wilderness. COGGINS
ETAL., supra note 74, at 145. Another examples of a national monument expanded and made
into a national park is Mount Olympus National Monument, which was made into the
Olympus National Park on June 29, 1938. 16 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
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the national monument decisions, even among those who originally
may have opposed the designations."0 4 Any risk to the public
interest comes from a process that hampers the President's ability
to designate national monuments. There is little risk that such
designations will harm it.
B. FLPMA WITHDRAWALS AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR ANTIQUITIES ACT
PROCLAMATIONS
FLPMA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to "make, modify,
extend, or revoke withdrawals but only in accordance with the
provisions and limitations of this section." 5 FLPMA withdrawals
in excess of 5,000 acres may be made for more than twenty years,M
and are subject to detailed procedural requirements, including a
requirement that the Secretary furnish the appropriate congressio-
nal committees with a detailed report on the withdrawal." 7 In
addition, FLPMA withdrawals are subject to full NEPA
compliance.608 Thus, the objections to adding procedural require-
ments to the Antiquities Act process applies with greater force to
the more cumbersome procedural requirements for FLPMA
withdrawals.
The cumbersome process aside, however, FLPMA's twenty year
maximum withdrawal is simply an inadequate substitute for the
more permanent reservation authorized under the Antiquities Act.
The most important Antiquities Act proclamations are often among
the most controversial.0 9 The prospect that such withdrawal
6w See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1714(a) (2000).
eo6 Id. § 1714(c)(1).
=' Id. § 1714(c)(2). A provision authorizing FLPMA withdrawals to terminate if the
Congress adopts a concurrent resolution disapproving the withdrawal, id. § 1714(c)(1), is most
likely unconstitutional under the Supreme Court's decision in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
958-59 (1983).
6 43 C.F.R. § 2310.3-2(b)(3) (1994). Emergency withdrawals under FLPMA § 204(e),
however, need not comply with any pre.withdrawal notice and comment procedures. See 43
U.S.C. § 1714(e) (2000).
6W Consider, for example, the controversy surrounding the Jackson Hole National




decisions will be subject to executive branch review and politically
charged proceedings every twenty years, and furthermore that a
withdrawal might lapse even temporarily because of a future
Secretary's deliberate or careless failure to ensure timely review of
an existing withdrawal, makes FLPMA withdrawals far less
protective than national monument proclamations.
In addition to their lack of permanence, FLPMA withdrawals
lack the requisite status as conservation units to command the
public's support.1 ° The public recognizes national monuments as
important resources to be protected.6 ' But there is virtually no
corresponding recognition of the importance of the lands protected
by FLPMA withdrawals. To the extent that the public recognizes
withdrawn lands at all, it usually is because the land management
agency has given the land a special designation under its land use
planning process." 2
IX. CONCLUSION
The Antiquities Act has been controversial throughout its
history,1 ' and it is not surprising that President Clinton's resurgent
use of the law has sparked renewed calls for its repeal or modifica-
tion.1 4  Congress should resist these efforts. Perhaps the best
reason is that the Antiquities Act has worked so well. It has given
our nation and its people a conservation legacy that is the envy of
other nations.115 Our nation would be poorer-much poorer-if the
mining, logging, and livestock industries had succeeded in blocking
the creation or expansion of the Grand Canyon National Monument,
61 See 43 U.S.C. § 1714 (2000) (providing withdrawal authority as well as particular
reasons why withdrawals might be made).
o" The Bureau of Land Management received over 6,000 comments on its draft Grand
Staircase-Escalate Management Plan. The Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument,
Chapter 5, available at http://www.ut.blm.gov:80/monument/MonumentManagement/Initial
%20Planning/feis/Chapter_5/feis_5_A.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2003).
612 For example, FLPMA authorizes the Bureau of Land Management to designate "areas
of critical environmental concern." 43 U.S.C. §§ 1702(a), 1712(c)(3) (2000). These areas are
often withdrawn under FLPMA withdrawal procedures. Id. § 1714.
613 See supra notes 71-265 and accompanying text.
614 See supra notes 549-612 and accompanying text.
... See infra Appendix.
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the Jackson Hole National Monument, or the Mount Olympus
National Monument, to name just a few of the controversial
monuments that might never have been designated or expanded.
And that legacy was possible only because the law works simply and
in one direction, authorizing the President to protect land, and
leaving it to the Congress to decide whether to lessen, or perhaps
strengthen, those protections.
It is hardly surprising that some opponents of the law, recogniz-
ing that its repeal is unlikely, have pressed to amend the law to
include a cumbersome public process.616 They understand that
process can be used to delay, obfuscate, weaken, and perhaps even
defeat new proposals. To be sure, process is just as important in
developing public land policy as it is in other areas of political
decisionmaking. But examples of agencies eschewing process to
serve the greater public interest abound, and in the context of
national monuments, which protect critical public resources, any
process can and should be accommodated after the designation has
been made. The presumption should be-as it is under the Antiqui-
ties Act 617-that the protection of public resources is paramount,
and that any error, if one is to be made, should be made on the side
of preservation.
If we as a society regret a decision to designate a national
monument,618 that decision can be undone. 1 9 But a decision to leave
an area open to development may mean that spectacular resources
will be lost to our nation forever. Just ask the spirits of Glen
Canyon.20
616 See supra notes 552-54 and accompanying text.
617 16 U.s.c. § 431 (2000).
"' As noted previously, only ten relatively minor monuments have been abolished, and
at least four of these were conveyed to state or local governments for use as public parks. See
supra note 453 and accompanying text.
6(19 See supra notes 452, 475 and accompanying text.
620 Glen Canyon in southern Utah may be the most precious public land resource that was
not protected, and that is now essentially lost, having been inundated by the Glen Canyon
dam and Lake Powell. NASH, supra note 171, at 228. Oddly, it was the environmental
community that agreed to sacrifice Glen Canyon in exchange for protecting a national
monument-the Dinosaur National Monument-from a proposal to construct the Echo Park
dam. Id. David Brower, who was instrumental in negotiating the deal, never visited Glen
Canyon until after the deal had been struck, and lived to regret his decision. Id. at 229. On
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a visit to Glen Canyon before it was flooded he was so moved by what he saw that he
commissioned a book with elaborate photographs by Elliot Porter. Id. Lake Powell and what
remains of the Glen Canyon area is now protected as a national conservation area managed
by the National Park Service. 16 U.S.C. § 460dd (2000). But to many in the conservation
community, the Glen Canyon dam has come to symbolize how public treasures are sometimes
lost because the efforts to protect them came too late. The American Parks Network
describes the Glen Canyon Dam as "a symbol of environmental compromise." American Park
Network, Glen Canyon-Lake Powell: Sights to See, available at http://www.americanpark
network.com/parkinfo/gp/damlake.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2003). Another organization,
the Glen Canyon Institute, was founded for the sole purpose of providing "leadership toward
re-establishment of a freeflowing Colorado River through a restored Glen Canyon." Glen
Canyon Institute, About the Glen Canyon Institute (2002), available at http://www.
glencanyon.org/aboutgci/aboutgci.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2003).
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